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Abstract 
Natural disasters cause significant human casualties and damage to the natural and 
built environment. Ill-prepared communities are often those most significantly 
affected, particularly as disasters often occur with little or no warning. In recent 
years, the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to aid in 
disaster warning, preparation and relief efforts has played an increasingly vital role in 
response efforts by emergency management organisations. Social media in particular 
are now widely used by affected members of the public during an emergency. As 
these platforms have become mainstream, governments have responded to the 
public’s expectation that information is available online, especially during disasters. 
Emergency management organisations now use social media to communicate during 
both routine and non-routine events. The integration of social media in emergency 
management now widely affects how these organisations communicate externally, as 
they challenge and reshape the roles and functions that constitute such organisations 
and their communicative relationships with the broader community. 
 
Scholars have acknowledged the tendency for research in this field to focus on the 
potential use of new technologies by emergency management and law enforcement 
agencies rather than on how these technologies actually function (see Sanders, 2014; 
Sheptycki, 2004; Mergel, 2013b). By acknowledging the research tendency, other 
scholars thus recognise the need for further empirical research into emergency 
management organisations’ social media use (Mergel, 2013b; Plotnick et al., 2015). 
By combining participant observation and in-depth interviews as well as other forms 
of ancillary data within an ethnographic approach to observe the current practice and 
uses of social media in one emergency management organisation, the Queensland 
Fire and Emergency Services, this study provides a valuable contribution to the field 
by addressing and filling these acknowledged gaps. Although situated within media, 
communication and journalism studies, this research also borrows from other 
disciplines, including organisational sociology and emergency management, which 
together explain the organisational phenomena particular to this research better than 
the media and communication studies do.  
 
  iii
This thesis finds that the organisational restructure within Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services (QFES) that occurred during this study had a direct and 
disruptive effect on social media use within the organisation, repositioning the social 
media function to within the existing media team who felt ill prepared and under 
resourced to manage this responsibility. This repositioning was met with resistance; 
media team members’ professional histories shaped this resistance, as their 
traditional journalism backgrounds influenced their views and uses of social media. 
This thesis describes how the organisation largely normalised (rather than adapted to) 
social media. In doing so, their efforts to engage in a two-way conversation with 
their audience were secondary to their one-way communication responsibilities.  
 
Drawing on Stark (2009), this thesis also describes the broader dissonant 
perspectives towards social media that existed in the organisation. While Stark 
argues that dissonance can be both productive and problematic, drawing on 
ethnographic examples, this study finds that dissonance was often problematic within 
QFES. Finally, this thesis describes and analyses the internal operational tensions 
around QFES social media use. These tensions include the prioritisation of 
operational duties over public information responsibilities, and the difficulties around 
requesting and receiving information from operational personnel located on the 
ground. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The rapid adoption of social media technologies has had a transformative effect on 
how members of the public communicate with each other, gather and make sense of 
new information, and create and disseminate content. While some may consider 
these technologies relatively new, their significance has already been demonstrated 
across a wide range of political, everyday and business contexts – and during 
emergency events. The 2007 Virginia Tech shootings demonstrated how Facebook 
users organised and engaged in collective problem solving to identify the victims 
before authorities publicly confirmed their identities (Vieweg et al., 2008). An on-
scene, smartphone-equipped witness first reported news of US Airways Flight 1549 
crash landing into the Hudson River in 2009, demonstrating the value of Twitter as a 
news dissemination platform (Hughes and Palen, 2012). In 2010, the Haiti 
earthquake for the first time demonstrated the value of social media for official 
knowledge sharing and collaboration (Yates and Paquette, 2011). Since then, during 
emergency events, affected members of the public and curious onlookers turn to 
social media, searching event-related hashtags for breaking news, updates and 
warnings, expecting to source news faster than they have traditionally received via 
the mainstream media.  
 
Government agencies and their representatives, too, have rapidly adopted these 
platforms, largely in response to citizens’ increased expectations that they be 
accessible via these new modes of communication. Specifically related to this 
research, the 2010-11 Queensland floods marked a turning point for Australian 
emergency management organisations’ adoption and use of social media. Rogue 
social media champions within the Queensland Police Service’s media team 
effectively experimented with these new platforms, largely outside of the control of 
decision-makers, earning praise from members of the public and the Queensland 
government who thereafter introduced a mandate for other organisations, including 
the then-Department of Community Safety (DCS) to also adopt social media.  
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Proponents of government social media use initially maintained a largely 
technologically deterministic position towards these new platforms. Much of the 
early scholarship about government’s rapid adoption of social media came out of 
Government 2.0 studies and proclaimed that these new platforms would open up 
communication channels between government agencies, their representatives and 
citizens, serving a democratising function and thus making government more 
transparent and accountable. This optimistic view was neither new nor unique to 
social media; Mergel (2015) observed, “Every wave of new technology adoption in 
the public sector has been labelled ground breaking or disrupting. The assumption is 
that the mere existence of a new technology will revolutionise the processing of 
information, making government more effective and efficient” (p. 467). However, 
with many government agencies employing social media as an extension of their 
existing one-way communication strategies (see Mergel, 2013a; 2016), we have seen 
how, rather than transforming current communicative practices, these organisations 
instead normalise social media use to fit within existing tasks.  
 
The use of social media platforms by government agencies can be particularly 
beneficial when employed during unique or disruptive events. In March 2016, the 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transport (BART) communications team used 
Twitter to notify followers of an electrical outage affecting one of their train routes. 
The outage meant that BART would instead transport users of that particular route on 
buses, causing massive delays for many passengers. As Bay Area residents or 
frequent visitors to the area are aware, BART is frequently plagued with electrical 
problems, breakdowns and delays that makes it an unpopular public transportation 
option for local commuters (Brown, 2015). In response to the most recent outage, 
many angry passengers vented their frustration towards BART operators via angry 
tweets (Bromwich, 2016). Such user responses are neither uncommon nor 
unsurprising; for many BART users this was yet another obstacle preventing them 
from moving efficiently across the Bay Area. What was surprising to the hundreds of 
commuters tweeting their frustration and the curious onlookers observing these 
interactions unfold, was BART communications team’s response to those tweeters.  
 
Rather than responding with generic apologies and hollow promises that BART 
would quickly rectify the issues, the individual managing BART’s Twitter account—
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soon thereafter identified as 27-year old Communications Officer Taylor Huckaby—
instead responded honestly and openly to the angry tweeters (Bromwich, 2016). 
Huckaby, via BART’s official Twitter account, acknowledged and agreed with their 
complaints while attempting to explain and educate complainants about the root 
causes of the issues. For many complainants, their initial frustration with the service 
quickly subsided, as they were grateful that BART (or at least, BART’s 
communications team) heard their complaints and responded so transparently. Some 
complainants nevertheless remained unimpressed; one tweeter claimed BART’s 
Twitter responses were unhelpful, labelling them “defensive” and “combative” 
(Hawkins, 2016).  
 
BART’s candid online response surprised many because most government agencies 
treat social media as a soapbox to post media releases or promote their agency. Very 
rarely do we see such organisations acknowledge criticism, let alone respond to it. 
Many agencies’ default reaction to criticism is to ignore it. In an interview with 
American technology news site The Verge after the incident, Huckaby and his 
manager, Alicia Trost, acknowledged that their use of Twitter differs from that of 
many other agencies, particularly transit agencies. Huckaby explained that this is due 
to government agencies’ general risk-aversion: 
The standard, say-nothing stance from government comes from a very deep 
seeded risk aversion. They don't want to put any tone or voice or personal 
response. There's just a lot of institutional reservedness from government. 
And the side effect of that is it makes government look incompetent. 
(Quoted in Hawkins, 2016) 
The online exchange between Huckaby and BART Twitter followers also brought 
conversations about government communication—and specifically online 
government communication—into the mainstream. Media commentators from 
traditional news outlets (Bromwich, 2016), alternative news outlets (Roberts, 2016) 
and technology websites (Hawkins, 2016) alike praised BART’s social media team 
for providing the “honest” and “realest” government communication. Their 
communication resonated with followers, when so often attempts to humanise or 
personalise government agencies fail—see for example the New York Police 
Department’s failed #myNYPD public relations campaign (Jackson and Foucault 
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Welles, 2015) or the CIA’s bizarre retroactive “live-tweeting” of the 2011 Osama bin 
Laden raid (Plaugic, 2016).  
 
This incident is a good example of a government communications professional 
having power within their organisation to make decisions about social media. Much 
of my discussion in Chapter 5 centres around who has (perceived or actual) power 
within QFES to make decisions about social media. I examine how the media team 
did not seem to have (or want) the power to define how social media were used. In 
contrast, it is evident in the case of the BART communications team that 
Communications Officer Taylor Huckaby had the power to make decisions regarding 
the official Twitter account, without asking his manager or other stakeholders 
directly for approval to post each of the responses, which is atypical of government 
communication and government approval processes. 
 
Communication of the BART incident initially served an information dissemination 
function, warning followers of current issues and delays. That the communication 
around the incident was well-received, meant that it ultimately served a more 
valuable reputation-repairing function, presenting the agency as apologetic about this 
man-made disruption and understanding of followers’ frustrations, without issuing a 
generic, automated “we’re sorry” response. During other emergencies, social media 
have proved useful platforms for organisations managing the official response, and 
since social media platforms have become mainstream in the last 7-8 years, new 
possibilities for communicating in routine operations as well as during a crisis have 
emerged (Heverin and Zach, 2011). Social media platforms not only enable affected 
individuals to communicate among themselves and with official disaster responders, 
but they also enable emergency management organisations to communicate directly 
with those affected and to coordinate their efforts with those of other agencies 
(Pechta et al., 2010, pp. 9-10). The integration of social media into these 
organisations is having wider effects on the dissemination of public information, as 
they challenge and reshape the roles and functions of emergency management 
organisations and their communicative relationships with the public. For instance, 
the use of mobile technologies by firefighters to record and distribute on-the-ground 
footage via social media platforms can quickly inform potentially affected residents 
of impending dangers. Further, the dissemination of up-to-date information during a 
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disaster—road closures, space availability at evacuation centres, and location of 
essential resources for example—aids in the effective management of the disaster 
response by officials and cooperation with the affected public. More broadly, social 
media are affecting organisational cultures, generating dissonant perspectives 
towards their use and purpose within their organisational context.  
 
The use of social media platforms to engage the community and use them as a source 
of information is a valuable part of the disaster response process. Localised 
information from those directly affected improves the effectiveness of the response, 
while also ensuring it fulfils the needs of the community (Rive et al., 2012, p. 31). 
This is particularly important, as affected local residents often consider the 
mainstream media’s updates—particularly the national news media—irrelevant, 
factually incorrect and useless because of attempts to appeal to a wide audience 
(Sutton et al., 2008, p. 4). We cannot dismiss the role of the mainstream media 
during emergencies however, and advocates of new digital technologies do not view 
the latter as overtaking traditional mass media channels. Television, despite the 
popularity of online media and social media platforms, continues to be a popular 
medium for audiences as a source of news (Couldry, 2012, p. 18), especially during 
times of crisis, while radio (talkback radio specifically) can be a useful source of 
local information. Considering this, proponents of emerging digital technologies such 
as Bruns (2014), argue disaster events in recent years suggest an, “emergence of a 
new ecology of emergency media”; one that includes “many-to-many” 
communication channels such as social media platforms, which complement the 
traditional one-to-many mass media (p. 352). Social media function specifically as 
providers of locally relevant and specific information that those directly affected by a 
disaster can use as part of a suite of tools that, when successfully interwoven, 
“ensure[] effective crisis communication” (Bruns, 2014, p. 352). 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
This study involved a two-year organisational ethnography at the Queensland Fire 
and Emergency Services (QFES), to understand the role of social media during 
routine and non-routine operations. As I note at the beginning of the Chapter 2, this 
study is grounded within the discipline of media and communication studies and 
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draws on journalism studies, but also borrows from other disciplines that engage with 
organisational phenomena particular to this research. This study investigated how 
social media platforms disrupt current practice within emergency management 
organisations, and challenge their traditional ‘command and control’ structure. It 
establishes how the culture, ideology, and management of these organisations 
influence the way they use social media. Its overarching questions are:  
 
1. What are the factors shaping emergency management organisations’ use 
of social media? 
2. How do emergency management organisations use social media? 
 
I answer these research questions by combining observations at the Queensland Fire 
and Emergency Services and interviews with key stakeholders. In doing so, I build 
on the organisational factors that scholars including McNutt (2014) and Sanders 
(2014) have identified that are shaping public sector organisations’ use of social 
media, and explore them within the specific context of an Australian emergency 
management organisation. 
 
This study sits within the Australian Research Council (ARC)1 Linkage project 
‘Social Media in Times of Crisis: learning from recent natural disasters to improve 
future strategies’. ARC Linkage projects involve “national and international research 
partnerships between researchers and business, industry, community organisations 
and other publicly funded research agencies”, with the aim of facilitating “the 
transfer of skills, knowledge and ideas as a basis for securing commercial and other 
benefits of research” (Australian Research Council, 2015). An Australian 
Postgraduate Award Industry (APAI) scholarship funded my studies as part of this 
Social Media in Times of Crisis project. The project, which concluded at the end of 
2015, was a collaboration between researchers from QUT and industry partner 
organisations, the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (formerly the 
Department of Community Safety) and the Eidos Institute. The research team, led by 
Professor Axel Bruns, first brokered this project with the industry partners, before I 
                                                
 
1 The Australian Research Council is a federal government agency that allocates research funding for 
Australian universities. 
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began my PhD studies in April 2013, and commenced by fieldwork later that year. 
The Queensland Fire and Emergency Services is the “primary provider of fire and 
emergency services in Queensland” (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, 
2014b), while the Eidos Institute is a public policy think-tank.  
 
The larger project used mixed methods to explore how emergency management 
organisations, media and community members use social media during disasters. 
These mixed methods included: an extended ethnography with the partner 
organisation; a survey of Australian emergency management organisations and local 
governments to explore these organisations’ positioning, resourcing and uses of 
social media; workshops with stakeholders from relevant Australian emergency 
management organisations (including the Queensland Police, Victoria’s Country Fire 
Authority, and the NSW Rural Fire Service); and an examination of key natural 
disaster events on social media, undertaken by employing innovative new methods 
for analysing ‘big social data’ from platforms like Twitter.  
 
Queensland is a large, geographically diverse state. It is the second largest of 
Australia’s six states2 and two territories by area and the third most populous. It 
includes populous cities such as the state capital Brisbane (Australia’s third largest 
city) and the Gold Coast (Australia’s fastest growing city) in the southeast corner, 
and smaller cities (with populations over 100,000 people) along the eastern coast 
including Townsville and Cairns. While most of the population is located along the 
coast, there are many smaller and more isolated towns located inland.  
 
In Australia, each state manages and funds its own emergency management 
operations and each state’s disaster management legislation governs this. In 
Queensland, this legislation is the Disaster Management Act (2003). While there is 
an Emergency Management Australia (EMA) division within the federal 
government’s Attorney-General’s Department, this division primarily exists to 
deliver policies and programs rather than serve an operational function. As this study 
focuses specifically on the Queensland emergency services, it adopts key definitions 
                                                
 
2 The six Australian states are Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania 
and Western Australia, and the two territories are Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory. 
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from Queensland’s Disaster Management Act (2003). The Disaster Management Act 
(2003, s. 13.1) defines a disaster as “a serious disruption in a community, caused by 
the impact of an event, that requires a significant coordinated response by the State 
and other entities to help the community recover from the disruption.” Serious 
disruption refers to the impact on humans (death, illness or injury), property, and the 
environment (loss or damage) (s. 13.2). An event is natural or man-made and 
includes natural weather occurrences (such as cyclones, floods, and storms), 
incidents including fires, explosions, spills and leaks, health threats (epidemics or 
infestations), man-made crises (such as terrorist attacks) or incidents which can 
disrupt or cause essential services and infrastructure to fail (s. 16.1-2). While a 
disaster is often an event, not all adverse natural events are disasters. Finally, the 
Disaster Management Act (2003) refers to the “arrangements about managing the 
potential adverse effects of an event” across all phases of a disaster: mitigation, 
prevention, preparation, response and recovery (s. 14), while disaster operations refer 
to “activities undertaken before, during or after an event happens” to mitigate the 
impact on humans, property and the environment (s. 15). 
 
The annually reviewed Queensland State Disaster Management Plan (Queensland 
Government, 2015) stipulates Queensland’s disaster management arrangements, 
according to the requirements of the Disaster Management Act (2003). The Disaster 
Management Plan stipulates that, while the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services 
is responsible at the state-level for warnings, emergency supply and Rapid Damage 
Assessments (the latter in conjunction with the Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority), the Queensland Police Service is responsible for declaring a disaster and 
for search and rescue operations (p. 14). The State Disaster Coordinator, who 
coordinates the disaster response, is a Deputy Commissioner of Police by default 
(Queensland Government, 2015, p. 27), rendering the Queensland Police Service the 
lead agency for disasters in Queensland. This creates a somewhat confusing 
governance process; whereby the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services 
effectively manage emergency operations up until the point where the emergency 
escalates to state-level, when the State Disaster Coordination Centre is activated and 
the Queensland Police Service assumes responsibility. This creates a predicament for 
my participants—QFES media officers—who must work within these constraints, as 
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members of the public turn to them expecting them to manage and communicate 
operations given that their organisational title includes “emergency services”.  
 
1.2 ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The organisation I studied was originally called the Department of Community 
Safety (DCS). Having since undergone an organisational restructure, which I explain 
in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the organisation was rebranded as the Queensland 
Fire and Emergency Services (QFES). I have included a DCS organisational chart in 
Appendix B. The Department of Community Safety comprised four distinct 
divisions: 
 
i. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) is the fire and rescue arm of 
the Queensland government. QFRS includes both permanent (full-time) and 
auxiliary (paid part time) firefighters, who also maintain full-time jobs and 
are on call 24 hours a day. Aside from conducting firefighting activities, 
QFRS firefighters also attend road traffic accidents and technical rescues 
such as swift water rescues, confined spaces (entrapments) and Urban Search 
and Rescue (USAR) operations. Due to the geographic breadth of the state, 
QFRS also includes volunteer firefighters who are part of Rural Fire Service 
Queensland (RFSQ). The fire and emergency services provided to 
Queensland through this organisation are varied; its responsibilities also 
include: 
• Workplace and emergency management training 
• Fire investigation 
• Community education 
• Commercial and private building inspections (Queensland 
Fire and Emergency Services, 2014a) 
 
ii. Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) provides ambulance services for the 
state of Queensland. 
 
iii. Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ) is the disaster management 
arm of the Queensland government. EMQ prepares for and responds to 
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disasters in Queensland including frequently occurring floods, storms and 
cyclones. The State Emergency Service (SES) volunteers also sit under 
EMQ. In Australia, the SES is an organisation of volunteers who assist 
emergency services personnel after a disaster. It relies on funding from state 
and local governments as each state coordinates its own branch of the SES 
volunteers that the Australian Council of State and Territory Emergency 
Services (ACSES) oversees.  
 
iv. The Queensland Corrective Services is responsible for containing, 
supervising and rehabilitating offenders. 
 
1.2.1 Disbanding of Department of Community Safety  
As I explain in more detail in Chapter 4, in the early stages of my visits to the field 
site in late-2013 the organisation was anticipating the release of the Police and 
Community Safety Review, informally referred to as the Keelty Review, after Mick 
Keelty, who chaired the review (see Queensland Government, 2013). For the 
purposes of simplicity, throughout this thesis I refer to the Police and Community 
Safety Review as the Keelty Review. Following the public release of the findings of 
the Keelty Review in September 2013, the Department of Community Safety (DCS) 
disbanded. The disbanding of DCS meant QAS moved to the Queensland Health 
department and QCS moved to the Department of Justice and Attorney General 
(JAG). What remained – QFRS and EMQ – combined and rebranded as the 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES). The Queensland government also 
established a new agency called the Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA), 
combining the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services’ (QFES) business and corporate services into a distinct 
government agency. I provide more detail about the PSBA’s establishment in 
Chapter 4, as these changes had significant implications for the social media team 
and the positioning of the social media function within the organisation.  
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1.3 CONTEXT 
This study presents a case study of the organisational change within the Queensland 
Fire and Emergency Services, with findings that are applicable to other organisations 
as they, too, integrate social media into their operations. QFES is an ideal site for this 
research because the use of social media was relatively new to the organisation at the 
commencement of fieldwork in 2013, but is now well established, and I was able to 
observe the process of embedding and normalising over the course of the project. 
Moreover, Queensland experiences frequent diverse and extreme weather events 
every year—most commonly storms, cyclones, flooding and bushfires—which meant 
I could explore how the organisation’s use of social media evolved and adapted 
depending on experiences in previous events. 
 
Until the time when this study and the Social Media in Times of Crisis project within 
which it is situated were undertaken, Australian crisis communication research had 
mostly focused on bushfires. The Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative 
Research Centre (CRC), for example, brings together Australian and New Zealand 
fire and emergency services, non-government organisations, and multi-disciplinary 
academics to examine natural disasters and their effects (Bushfire and Natural 
Hazards CRC, n.d.). While the Cooperative Research Centre that began in 2013 now 
includes all natural hazards in its frame of reference, it builds on the work of the 
now-defunct Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre; therefore, the Bushfire and 
Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre’s research is grounded in earlier 
bushfire-focused research. This study thus provides a valuable contribution to the 
existing Australian disaster communication research. 
 
Social media were initially introduced somewhat experimentally to the then-
Department of Community Safety (DCS), following a mandate from government, 
rather than motivated by the organic need to fill a specific, organisationally 
determined communicative purpose. This generated initial resistance towards social 
media within the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) branch specifically 
(within which the social media function is positioned). This study found that 
operational resistance to social media has lingered. Operational personnel often did 
not understand its purpose within the organisation or recognise its potential 
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operational value. This generated differing degrees of support within the organisation 
towards social media and different levels of understanding. With little strategic 
oversight from the outset, this study found that members of the organisation base 
decisions about the use of social media—both the uses of particular platforms, and 
the curating of content—on individual judgement calls rather than evidence. 
 
This study found that, through its positioning within the existing Media and 
Corporate Communications (MACC) branch in the organisation, social media served 
a distinctly one-way communicative function. Operational uses of social media for 
intelligence gathering were largely overlooked, or conducted ad hoc and 
experimentally by individual social media champions, in their own time and in 
addition to their formal roles. This study found that the professional histories of the 
users of social media within these organisations (who manage social media on behalf 
of the organisation as part of their existing media and communications role) shaped 
their use of social media. That is, these users typically came from traditional 
journalism backgrounds, leading them to compare social media to traditional media 
tasks, in the process viewing it as separate to, not part of, their “actual” work and 
prioritising traditional media tasks over social media. 
 
Scholars, including Plotnick et al. (2015) and Mergel (2013b), have recognised the 
need for further empirical research examining the use of social media in government 
organisations more broadly. Scholars have acknowledged the tendency for research 
in this field to focus on the potential use of new technologies in emergency 
management and law enforcement agencies rather than on how these technologies 
actually function (see Sanders, 2014; Sheptycki, 2004; Mergel, 2013b). In 
ethnographically examining the current practice and uses of social media in one 
emergency management organisation, this study provides a valuable contribution to 
the field by addressing these acknowledged gaps.  
 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis loosely adopts the hourglass model proposed by Alasuutari (1995) as a 
way of situating the findings of a specific site of research in a wider context. After I 
explain the selected methods and existing literature shaping this study, the thesis 
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narrows as I specifically focus on one emergency management organisation. 
Towards the end of this thesis, I broaden these findings and apply the lessons learnt 
through this study to other organisations (Alasuutari, 1995, p. 156), both in Australia 
and internationally. I achieved this having kept abreast of emerging literature and 
technological changes throughout my study, attending both academic and industry-
focused conferences where participants described current practice in other 
organisations, and by co-organising workshops and meetings with industry contacts 
through the larger Social Media in Times of Crisis project.  
 
This introductory chapter has set the context for this thesis by outlining the 
transformative effect of social media on how individuals communicate, which has 
been demonstrated across a number of events including emergencies. I described 
how this has affected how government organisations communicate, particularly 
during emergencies, as members of the public now expect them to be open and 
accessible, and to provide timely information via these new communicative 
platforms. I then established the organisational, political and geographic context 
within which this study is situated, as well as provided an overview of the larger 
Social Media in Times of Crisis project within which this PhD study is situated. This 
chapter provides early justification for this study as I have noted the gaps in the field, 
some gaps that other scholars have already recognised, which I build on in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review that underpins this thesis and establishes the 
current problems. I position this study within broader discussions of the 
transformative effect of digital media in society, which has been exemplified by the 
introduction of social media platforms. I demonstrate how, as members of the public 
increasingly engage with social media, government agencies have responded to the 
public’s increased expectation that they, too, are accessible via social media, and the 
effect this has had on such agencies’ communicative practices. I then draw on the 
literature of journalism studies to compare the effect of the introduction of social 
media on government with its effect on the journalism industry, both industries 
sharing many similarities. Finally, in specifically positioning my study within other 
discussions of emergency communication, I examine how social media are now 
widely used across a range of events by both members of the public and emergency 
management organisations. I establish two key functions of emergency management 
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organisations’ social media use: for intelligence gathering, and information 
dissemination. In doing so, I acknowledge the gaps that other scholars have noted 
while also revealing hitherto unacknowledged gaps in this field, gaps that this study 
fills and which provide justification for my study.  
 
I present my research design, approach and methodology in Chapter 3, beginning by 
presenting the overarching research questions that guide the thesis. I introduce the 
organisational context to demonstrate the disruptive organisational environment 
within which this study is situated and that my participants were part of, which 
provides a foundation for the deeper examination of this context and the implications 
in Chapter 4. As I examine in Chapter 4, the organisational restructure that occurred 
early in my study directly affected the positioning of the social media function in the 
organisation. I explain how I combined participant observation and in-depth 
interviews as well as other forms of ancillary data within an ethnographic approach, 
to examine first hand, the uses of social media and the factors shaping those uses. I 
show how the different components of my chosen methods work effectively together, 
allowing me to further explore issues that emerged during observations, while also 
managing the restrictions of my university ethics clearance that meant I was unable 
to directly quote from my observations.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a chronological history of social media in the organisation. I 
identify the macro-level organisational factors shaping their use, beginning with an 
overview of the Queensland political instability that generated feelings of uncertainty 
amongst many of my participants about their work and their job security. I identify 
how the organisation’s decision to trial social media, which was before my study 
began, came about through a combination of both internal and external factors. I 
examine how the organisational restructure dramatically affected the positioning and 
use of social media, as it effectively disbanded the social media team. I outline the 
resistance to social media within the media team after they assumed responsibility 
for the social media function, demonstrating how this resistance was also shaped by 
managers’ assumptions that media officers were adequately prepared to manage 
social media. I end this chapter by describing what I term the “normalising” of social 
media within the organisation, to set up the analysis I present in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5 then analyses the micro-level organisational factors shaping the use of 
social media. The key theme running through this chapter is the competing views of 
social media that exist within this organisation and the prioritisation of existing, 
traditional communications responsibilities over social media. I draw on Stark’s 
(2009) concept of dissonance, while also drawing on Filby and Willmot’s 1988 
ethnographic study to examine how media team members’ professional histories 
shaped their uses of social media. I outline how the social media function operates 
alongside existing responsibilities, finding that media team members frequently view 
social media in addition to, not a part of, their “actual” media work. I outline the 
broader organisational perspectives towards social media, in particular the perceived 
misunderstanding that exists within the organisation, and outline the intra-
organisational tension that exists when these dissonant perspectives meet.  
 
Chapter 6 then examines the specific uses of social media; through the ordering of 
these three analysis chapters (i.e. Chapters 4, 5 and 6) I have set up an inevitability of 
use. I describe how the organisation primarily uses social media as a platform to 
disseminate information (a communicative function) rather than as a source of 
intelligence (an operational function). In doing so, I highlight the disjuncture 
between existing research that speculates about the potential uses of social media to 
gather intelligence with the actual practices that I observed. This is a useful 
contribution to existing scholarship, as researchers can take this new knowledge 
about intelligence-gathering practices in emergency management organisations to 
develop, in conjunction with these organisations, more user-friendly tools for them. 
While I do primarily address the use of social media to disseminate information in 
this chapter, where I do outline the intelligence-gathering uses, I note that it primarily 
occurs ad hoc and experimentally by individual champions in addition to their 
existing tasks. Building on the findings of Chapter 5, which outlined the competing 
expectations of media team managers and media officers about who should maintain 
responsibility for social media, in Chapter 6 I scrutinise the guidelines governing the 
organisation’s social media use.  
 
Having examined how political and organisational disruption affected the positioning 
and resourcing of social media in Chapter 4, the dissonant perspectives towards the 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 16 
purpose of social media for the organisation in Chapter 5, and the informal use of 
social media that extended the organisation’s existing communicative strategies in 
Chapter 6, I conclude in Chapter 7 by asking what would have to change to produce 
more desirable social media practices in these organisations.  
 
I explain how the thesis contributes a valuable first-hand examination of the ways 
social media are challenging current practice in emergency management 
organisations, describing how these changes have already occurred in comparable 
industries. I argue that emergency management organisations can learn valuable 
lessons from the findings of this thesis, suggesting that practitioners form a network 
to share knowledge, overcome common problems, and collectively agitate for 
changes to the way social media platforms affect them. I also propose that 
emergency management practitioners and social media platform owners and 
operators, who have already demonstrated an interest in the crisis communication 
space, should collaborate to ensure future developments are useful to both the public 
and responders during emergencies. I conclude the chapter by acknowledging the 
limitations of my study, primarily around the timeliness of my thesis, while 
suggesting that future research in this space might examine how social media 
technologies alter emergency management practitioners’ work/life balance, or how a 
closer examination of the perspectives of senior managers and/or operational 
personnel in such organisations might producing interesting, alternative perspectives. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study is grounded in media, communication and journalism studies; however I 
draw on other disciplines to better make sense of the organisational phenomena 
particular to this research. While this thesis contributes to an understanding of how 
social media disrupt current practice in emergency management organisations, I 
position the findings within the broader impacts social media are having on how 
individuals communicate with each other. Through this literature review, I make a 
connection between the changes observed in the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services with similar changes occurring in comparable organisations. That is, digital 
technologies are having a transformative effect on the way my participants enact 
their communicative functions, but their resistance to that transformation and 
attempts to ‘normalise’ these new technologies to fit with existing functions, mirror 
the practices occurring in other industries. I draw on literature from organisational 
sociology to understand how my participants construct their professional identities 
and negotiate their changing work conditions; similarly, I draw on literature from 
journalism studies as many of the changes associated with the introduction of new 
communications technologies in the organisation under examination mirror changes 
in the journalism industry. More broadly related to the organisational field examined 
in this thesis (crisis communication), I draw on literature from crisis informatics, as 
scholars have proposed new possibilities for extracting useful information from 
social media during crises, and the value of this information for practitioners, while 
literature from disaster sociology observes how affected members of the public 
behave during disasters.  
 
The literature review contributes to a broader examination of the digital 
transformation of media systems. As the following literature review describes the 
changing media landscape has been exemplified by the introduction of new 
technologies and platforms for communication, collaboration, content creation and 
distribution, which have been broadly termed ‘social media’. A frequently debated 
concept (Mandiberg, 2012), social media definitions encapsulate online interactivity, 
cooperation and the notion of community, along with content creation and 
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distribution (Terranova and Donovan, 2013; boyd, 2009; Shirky, 2008); definitions 
that collectively describe “online sociality” (Fuchs, 2014, p. 37). Eager to make use 
of this online sociality, and pushed by users to do so, there has been widespread 
social media adoption by government agencies hoping to engage with constituents 
and make government information and resources more accessible.  
 
2.1 DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION 
The introduction of new digital technologies has transformed media systems, 
revolutionised how individuals communicate, altered the speed and means with 
which we receive and engage with news, expanded the accessibility (and volume) of 
information, and ultimately changed the way we view what happens in the world 
(Couldry, 2012). Media industries as a result have ‘converged’, which Henry Jenkins 
(2006), widely recognised for his theory on convergence culture, describes as:  
“The flow of content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation 
between multiple media industries, and the migratory behavior of media 
audiences who will go almost anywhere in search of the kinds of 
entertainment experiences they want.” (p. 2).  
Convergence means that content now circulates “across different media systems, 
competing media economies, and national borders”, and is “heavily [dependent] on 
consumers’ active participation” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 3).  
 
Mobile technologies (mobile phones, tablets, and internet capable smart phones) 
have affected not only the way users consume media and communicate with one 
another, but also how they conduct everyday activities (Goggin and Hjorth, 2009). 
Early research into mobile technologies focused primarily on the mobile telephone, 
addressing concerns including how these new technologies would affect work/life 
balance (Wajcman, Bittman & Brown, 2009), while current research includes 
wireless and internet capable technologies (see Goggin, 2014). Mobile 
communication research has overwhelmingly focused on younger users (see Green, 
2003) who have been stereotyped as “digital natives” compared with older users who 
are often stereotyped as “clueless, reluctant adopters” (Goggin, 2014, p. 253); 
however there is a more recent acknowledgement of a growing number of older users 
of mobile technologies (Müller, Gove & Webb, 2012).  
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There are relevant debates in media and internet studies regarding how mobile and 
digital technologies are changing the work environment. Mark Deuze’s (2007b) 
Media Work for example offers a seminal account of modern media sectors 
(including journalism, advertising and film production), analysing the precarious, 
rapidly developing nature of work in the digital age. A review of the literature 
indicates there are two dynamics at play here: first, the working environment has 
changed due to the reactive adjustment to new technologies. The modern working 
environment provides the flexibility to work at any time and location, even home 
(see Gregg, 2011). This is blurring the boundary between work life and personal life; 
employees often use work-issued mobile phones as a personal phone for example, 
which links to their work email, calendar and contacts. The second dynamic at play 
is that industry practices have changed due to the proactive embrace of new (digital) 
possibilities. In this case, the organisation may consciously employ specific tactics 
and strategies in response to technological changes. These include, for example, 
news organisations developing sophisticated audience metrics to quantitatively 
measure the effect of short-term and long-term editorial strategies (Cherubini and 
Nielsen, 2016, p. 7). In their examination of European and North American 
newsrooms, Cherubini and Nielsen (2016) found that journalists were initially 
sceptical of audience metrics but eventually embraced them in order to better target 
desired audiences and “do better journalism” (p. 7). The introduction of these 
technologies has thus altered work routines, occasionally placing added demands on 
employees’ skill sets.  
 
Scholars in journalism studies have raised concerns about these changing dynamics, 
noting the complexity of this digital transformation. On the one hand, additional 
technical skills may make an employee versatile and increase their employability 
(Örnebring, 2016; Saltzis, 2012). Alternatively, the dependence on an employee’s 
additional skills could generate an increased workload, as some employees may be 
expected to manage additional tools, platforms and responsibilities (Singer, 2010, p. 
105). This is not uncommon in roles that rely on communications technologies; as 
Gregg (2011) notes, “online obligations add to existing job descriptions without any 
previous job expectations being taken away”, what she terms “function creep” (p. 
105). Where added technical skills do not overload an employee, the demands of the 
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new skills can pull them away from what they perceive as less important tasks, or 
their ‘actual’ role. In the case of journalists, additional technical skills may mean 
fewer opportunities to “do the journalism” (Örnebring, 2016). Maintaining an online 
social media presence is one such example, as it is a time-consuming activity that 
may take a journalist away from what they perceive are more pressing and important 
responsibilities (Parmelee, 2013, p. 300; Usher, 2014, pp. 205-206).  
 
The additional demands and time pressures that new communications technologies 
create have created some resistance to technological change. Throughout this thesis, I 
outline some of my participants’ resistance to the introduction of social media to the 
organisation and, in the case of some participants, their resistance to its addition to 
their existing responsibilities. When doing so, I distinguish between the types of 
resistance: whether participants resist its unfamiliarity because they do not know 
what to do about it or how to respond, or alternatively whether they do know what to 
do and they do not like it. This distinction is important to make because what I 
observed was more than just the changes to my participants’ working environment 
happening around them, the first dynamic that I outlined. Rather, some of what I 
observed was the industry’s proactive embrace of new possibilities, and some of the 
resistance I observed was in response to changes that some participants understood 
but did not like.  
 
The resistance that I describe is not particular to emergency management 
organisations but is frequently associated with many organisations experiencing 
digital transformation, and particularly in those working with communications 
technologies. Newspaper organisations are one such example. Pablo Boczkowski 
(2004a; 2004b) observed the innovation-resistant culture within many such 
organisations, describing them as being “marked by reactive, defensive and 
pragmatic traits” (2004a, p. 51). As Paulussen (2016) notes, Boczkowski (2004a) 
“comprehensively showed that with regard to digital developments, newspapers 
hardly encouraged experimentation and tended to move only when they were forced 
to by new players” (p. 192). 
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2.2 THE SOCIAL MEDIA MOMENT 
Social media have been mainstream since the mid-2000s (Burgess and Banks, 2014, 
p. 286) although the existence of blogs and wikis in the nineties and the introduction 
of Google in 1999 (Allen, 2012; Scholz, 2008) is, for some, evidence of their 
existence before then (Fuchs, 2014). Van Dijck and Poell (2015) outline the 
evolution of social media and academic scholarship, describing how “as social media 
are ubiquitously used, they become increasingly interwoven with various sectors in 
society” (p. 1). They reflect how initially, from 2004-2010, scholars focused on the 
creative offerings of platforms and the individual uses, but in subsequent years 
(2010-2015) scholars have explored the spread of social media into professional 
sectors of society and uptake for mass organisation (van Dijck and Poell, 2015).  
 
In the first issue of Social Media + Society journal, Editorial Board members penned 
short essays defining how they each understood social media. These scholars 
collectively pointed out the irony of the term ‘social media’ given “all media are 
social” (Bruns, 2015; Jensen, 2015; Papacharissi, 2015), in that the production, 
distribution and consumption of media content is by its very nature a social activity. 
Papacharissi (2015) takes issue with the term for that very reason, arguing “to term 
some media social implies that there are other media that are perhaps anti-social, or 
even not social at all—asocial.” (p. 1). Nonetheless, ‘social media’ as we know them 
are unique as they are “a particular sub-set of all media [which] are fundamentally 
defined by their sociality, and thus distinguished (for example) from the mainstream 
media of print, radio, and television” (Bruns, 2015, p. 1).  
 
boyd and Ellison (2007) provide a useful review of the history of social network 
sites. Despite their now out-dated description of social network sites as emergent 
when these platforms’ prominence is today undisputed, their comprehensive review 
of how these platforms have evolved and gained popularity remains relevant. They 
discuss commonalities of early platforms; the premise of being networked with a 
group of ‘friends’ (fellow users), the display of a publicly- or privately visible 
profile, and the ability to either publicly or privately message fellow users (boyd and 
Ellison, 2007). Although boyd and Ellison (2007) note that one of the distinctive 
characteristics of social network sites is that they “enable users to make visible their 
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social networks” (p. 211), Bucher (2015) emphasises that users “do so within the 
boundaries and constraints of software and adaptive algorithmic architectures” (pp. 
1-2). These constraints are important considerations for this thesis, as I investigate in 
Chapter 6, how constraints (or what I refer to as “uncontrollable external factors”) 
such as Facebook’s algorithm, fundamentally shape how page operators like 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES)—the organisation under 
investigation—can and do use social media platforms, as their communicative 
relationship with their audience can be constrained by factors outside of their control.  
 
Beyond interpersonal communication and socialisation, the integration of other 
technological features—such as photo and video distribution—varied greatly 
between different platforms when boyd and Ellison (2007) conducted their review. 
However, since then, platform operators have arguably prioritised the integration of 
new technological features as inter-platform competition for users has continued to 
grow. Examples include Instagram, which, although initially a photo sharing 
platform, has expanded to include video sharing. Similarly, Twitter has diversified 
beyond a microblogging platform to include its video sharing service, Vine, while 
reports suggest that the company is considering expanding the character limit for 
tweets to 10,000 characters, in order to grow its user base and develop into a long-
form (rather than micro) blogging platform, to better compete with platforms like 
Facebook (Koh, 2016). Platform operators are attempting to prevent competing 
platforms from monopolising the social network platform market by expanding into 
their domain. This variety and evolution of social media platforms makes it difficult 
for organisations to decide what platforms to adopt or ignore.  
 
Online platforms experience significant evolution; platform owners and operators 
change and develop them based on the company’s direction or to better suit users’ 
needs. boyd and Ellison (2007) argued that “the public display of connections is a 
crucial component of SNSs” (p. 213), providing examples of users of particular 
platforms that hacked their profiles to disable this function. In recent years, platforms 
such as Facebook have modified this function so that users can autonomously decide 
whether others can view their connections. Flickr has evolved from a platform to 
simply create and share content to one which, because of platform redesign and an 
increased data allowance, can now function as an online storage site for a user’s 
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photo collection (Burgess and Woodford, 2015). Similarly, YouTube users were 
initially encouraged to record and share videos, whereas over time the platform has 
primarily developed into a site for users to view not create videos (Burgess and 
Woodford, 2015). The evolutionary use of online platforms at times occurs as a 
direct result of changes introduced by platform owners or operators (as was the case 
with Flickr), while at other times, platforms introduce changes because of how the 
platform users are interacting with the platform.  
 
Social media facilitate the publication of both mass-scale (many-to-many) and direct 
(one-to-one) messages along what Castells (2007) terms “horizontal networks of 
communication”, as opposed to the one-to-many communication of traditional mass 
media (television, radio and newspapers), which has redefined what it means to 
participate and contribute (cf. Castells (2007) ‘mass self-communication’). In 
contrast to consumer culture, Jenkins’ (2006) concept of participatory culture refers 
to the simultaneous role performed by individuals as consumer and producer. There 
exists an interesting dichotomy in social media scholarship between participatory 
culture proponents and critics; critics who position themselves in opposition to those 
whom they argue are proponents, have created this dichotomy. Participatory social 
media ‘proponents’ include Bruns (2008a), whose concept of ‘produsage’ argues that 
there is an increasingly blurred distinction between producers and consumers as 
consumers are often (either active or passive) producers, and Shirky (2010), who 
states that users of new online platforms are increasingly constructive and employ 
them not only for consumption, but also for collaboration.  
 
Henry Jenkins’ notion of ‘participatory’ considers a culture in which there are few 
restrictions for expression and engagement; there are opportunities to collaborate and 
share with others, where members have a sense of self-worth in what they contribute, 
and in which there is an element of sociality with other members (Jenkins, 2009, pp. 
5-6). Contribution by all members is not necessary, but it is important that members 
feel they can contribute and that their contribution will be valued (pp. 5-6). This 
connects with the central concerns of this thesis, which investigates how the very 
participatory nature of social media reshapes emergency management organisations’ 
communicative relationship with their audience. As I note later in this literature 
review, the participatory nature of social media platforms theoretically allows 
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members of the public to contribute to the disaster response process by providing 
updates about what is occurring around them. As I show in Chapter 6, however, 
despite the participatory promises of these platforms, in practice the use of social 
media for these two-way communicative functions has remained underdeveloped. 
 
The notion of a participatory culture has had a transformative effect on many media 
and communications industries, with journalism being one example. ‘Participation’ 
connotes different meanings in different contexts. For example, it can refer to the 
inclusion of user-generated content (UGC)—what Hermida and Thurman (2008) 
define as “…a process whereby ordinary people have an opportunity to participate 
with or contribute to professionally edited publications” (p. 344)—into the 
mainstream news. This occurred during the London bombings in July 2005, when the 
BBC broadcast amateur photos and videos they received (Hermida and Thurman, 
2008), an example of users participating in the news creation process. Participation 
can also refer to new formats for audience involvement. Examples include polls, the 
ability to comment on stories and “have your says”, where journalists ask a specific 
story-related question of their readers, collate their responses and publish them 
(Hermida and Thurman, 2008, p. 345). Finally, ‘participatory’ can also refer to new 
cooperative practices such as networked journalism, which Jarvis (2006) describes as 
"the collaborative nature of journalism now: professionals and amateurs working 
together to get the real story, linking to each other across brands and old boundaries 
to share facts, questions, answers, ideas, perspectives" (para. 2).  
 
Social media platforms can facilitate this networked form of journalism, as amateurs 
can share updates from the scene with professionals located elsewhere. This was 
demonstrated during the 2015 Paris attacks, as evidenced by a BBC blog dedicated 
solely to social media coverage of the event from affected social media users located 
in the Stade de France, Bataclan theatre and neighbouring bars and restaurants (see 
BBC News, 2015). This form of journalism is comparable to emergency 
management organisations’ communicative relationship with the public, because 
affected individuals located on the ground of a disaster can inform official disaster 
responders of what is occurring around them. Therefore, in the same way that 
networked journalism challenges a journalist's authority and what was their 
traditional role (Usher, 2014, p. 187; citing Deuze, 2007a), emergency management 
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organisations' traditionally authoritative position as information holders, instructors 
and primary disaster responders is also challenged. 
 
Scholars such as Fuchs (2014) however disagree with the notion of ‘participatory’ 
described by Jenkins (2006, 2008, 2009) and Carpentier (2011), dismissing them as 
“reductionistic” and claiming they ignore the relevance of ownership, capitalism and 
class (pp. 55-56). Usher (2014), through her newsroom ethnography at the New York 
Times, similarly found that ‘participation’ for journalists in the digital age simply 
meant maintaining a presence on social media platforms, in contrast to Jenkins’ 
notion of participatory (p. 214). When users are shut out from social media platform 
operators’ decision-making processes, not only are they failing to participate, but in 
reality they are excluded entirely (Fuchs, 2014, p. 56). For Fuchs, participation 
means the ability to participate in discussions and have a degree of control over 
decisions that might influence them (p. 57).  
 
Fuchs’s arguments can be applied to organisations who use these technologies, 
particularly emergency management organisations in the case of this study. There is 
a recognised need for governments (and this case, emergency management 
organisations) to go to where the conversations are already occurring (McNutt, 2014, 
p. 55); in the crisis communication space, that increasingly means social network 
sites. However, the inability for users to have any control over the decision-making 
process of these platforms where the conversations are taking place, makes them 
exploitative and exclusionary for Fuchs (2014). As Gillespie (2015) reminds us, 
social media platform owners and operators shape users’ interactions as they police 
the platforms, facilitate and even remove user activity and show or hide content. 
While Gillespie acknowledges that this is widely known, he points out that what we 
know less about is the decision-making process that shapes users’ interactions, 
suggesting that we may consider, use and study these platforms differently if we did 
understand the internal operations. The platform operators’ interventions and the 
changeability of these proprietary technologies, whose changes may be useful to or 
otherwise significantly affect users, create an unmanageable external factor for 
public sector organisations (Mergel, 2015). I examine the implications of this for 
QFES, and the degree to which it influences the way they use particular platforms, in 
Chapter 6. 
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2.3 SOCIAL MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT 
As social media have become increasingly mainstream and adopted by a range of 
users including businesses and organisations, government agencies (and their elected 
representatives), too, have experimented with these platforms to communicate with 
and engage citizens, strengthen the delivery of information and services, and 
collaborate with other agencies (Dixon, 2010; Osimo, 2008; cited in McNutt, 2014, 
p. 49). Social media platforms are reshaping government interaction with citizens, 
opening up communication channels between elected officials and their constituents 
and, when used effectively, making government activities more transparent.  
 
Some critics though have highlighted the early, technologically deterministic 
approaches to new technologies. Sanders (2014, citing Sheptycki, 2004) noted that 
early organisational studies literature focused on the design of these technologies 
“rather than being attentive to the ways in which the actions of its users shape, and at 
times alter, technological functioning” (p. 2). Similarly, Mergel (2015) notes that 
early proponents maintained a position that government’s social media use would 
“radically alter the communication and interaction patterns between government and 
its constituents” (p. 456). In reality, Mergel (citing Gladwell & Shirky, 2011; Shirky, 
2011) continues, while social media have opened up channels for citizens to 
communicate, government agencies have maintained “centralized control of the 
message and increased rules and regulations to streamline and align social media 
interactions with the existing communication strategy” (pp. 456-57).  
 
Nonetheless, governments are responding to citizens’ increased expectations that 
they be accessible online (Mergel, 2015, p. 457)—especially during disasters 
(American Red Cross, 2011; cited by St. Denis, Hughes and Palen, 2012, p. 1)—and 
the relationship between governments and citizens is being redefined (McNutt, 2014, 
p. 50). In Australia, recent data has demonstrated that a steadily growing number of 
people use social media to connect with government agencies or their representatives 
(Sensis, 2015; 2016), and while detractors often mischaracterise social media as a 
young person’s activity, older social media users—particularly aged 65+—are the 
biggest age group using social media for this purpose (p. 34).  
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We can separate existing research addressing the use of social media by government 
into two approaches. The first approach concerns how online technologies (including 
social media) alter the governing process, which redefines the relationship between 
citizens and government and the delivery of government services. The second 
approach concerns how governments and politicians use social media to disseminate 
information and engage the community; in this instance, social media primarily 
serves a communications and public relations function.  
 
At its most basic level, these two approaches serve the same function: to improve the 
level of communication and the services that governments offer their constituents 
(Kavanaugh et al., 2012, p. 481). However, an increased supply of information risks 
overwhelming the community with information that is of little value or use 
(Kavanaugh et al., 2012, p. 481). Accessibility, Coleman (2013) argues, means 
information is “transparent and useable in ways that might be disruptive to the settled 
routines of its own bureaucracy” (p. 382). We can observe this in emergency 
management, as online technologies are altering the disaster response process. The 
community no longer solely relies on emergency management organisations for 
information, but increasingly the community in return provides valuable information 
to inform the disaster response process, which is challenging the traditional 
‘command and control’ structure of these organisations.  
 
The term ‘e-government’ concerns the use of new technologies by parties and 
politicians to improve communication flow and open up administration processes 
(Fuchs, 2008), the changing relationship and interaction between government and 
constituents, and the delivery of services (Bertot et al., 2010). The concept of e-
government has evolved over time: first, it refers to government’s passive 
engagement with the community by disseminating information online; second, it 
encompasses a more interactive engagement that facilitates community response; and 
thirdly, it includes the introduction of online services that were previously only 
available in person (Chun et al., 2010, p. 1). These three stages, referred to as Web 
1.0-based e-government or Government 1.0, concern information delivery (Chun et 
al., 2010; McNutt, 2014).  
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A fourth, nascent stage, termed Government 2.0, concerns a more collaborative and 
participatory process of governance from citizens to government, government to 
citizens, and between citizens (Chun et al., 2010; McNutt, 2014). Blumler and 
Coleman (2001) proposed “a civic commons in cyberspace” to harness the full 
democratising potential of new technologies. They suggested establishing a publicly 
funded but independent organisation “designed to forge fresh links between 
communication and politics and to connect the voice of the people more 
meaningfully to the daily activities of democratic institutions” (p. 15). They later 
acknowledged that the fragmented and diverse new media environment that emerged 
through the early 2000s makes it difficult to achieve this unified vision (Coleman and 
Blumler, 2009, p. 64), and shifted to a decentralised model instead. They argued that 
the goal of the twenty-first century should then be “to design more effective and 
sensitive ways of hearing and acknowledging the millions of voices and actions, not 
to mention silences and inactions, that constitute meaningful human interaction” 
(Coleman and Blumler, 2009, p. 168). 
 
This collaborative and participatory fourth stage of governance is increasingly 
occurring, but the degree to which it occurs differs across regions. The United States 
government’s Open Government Initiative emphasises government transparency and 
citizen involvement (Linders and Wilson, 2011; cited in Linders, 2012, p. 446), an 
initiative which the Canadian government has similarly implemented (McNutt, 
2014). Similarly, the Big Society policy was initiated in the UK to empower citizens 
and decentralise government power (Linders, 2012). In contrast, the then-opposition 
Australian Liberal Party campaigned in 2013 on a ‘Plan for the Digital Economy and 
e-Government’, proposing policies that conformed to a Government 1.0 definition of 
‘e-government’. These policies included optional paperless communication from the 
government, the opt-in availability of digital government services, increased 
transparency of government ICT expenditure via online channels and greater support 
for the use of cloud-computing services by federal government agencies (Liberal 
Party of Australia, 2013).  
 
It appears that a Government 1.0 model is far simpler to achieve than a Government 
2.0 model. However, the true potential of these new digital technologies will only be 
realised if a government’s goals are aligned with the “ethos” of Web 2.0 
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technologies, which value principles of “openness, participation, and collaboration” 
(McNutt, 2014, pp. 63, 54). This differs from the one-way Web 1.0 communicative 
practices (McNutt, 2014, p. 50), which instead refers to a “period of the web where 
individuals could only read and consume the content that was published on a 
particular website” (Baxter, 2015, p. 173). When emergency management 
organisations adopt the principles of Web 2.0, the disaster response process has the 
potential to become more collaborative. The decision-making process is more 
transparent and encourages members of the public to take responsibility for their own 
safety, and the public provides on-the-ground situational information to the 
organisation to help direct resources to the most vulnerable.  
 
Adoption of new technologies varies between organisations however, and there are a 
number of issues and hesitations underlying government social media adoption. 
There are practical issues when adapting social media to these public sector 
organisations’ structures, practices and culture (Criado et al., 2013, p. 320). These 
concerns are not particular to digital technologies; rather they are “manifestations” of 
problems that have long existed but are amplified and prioritised when concerning 
new technologies (boyd 2008; Leitch and Warren 2009; cited in McNutt, 2014, p. 
66). Mergel (2012) observed that the promise of social media to facilitate open and 
transparent conversations between these organisations and their constituents online, 
actually conflicts with the “highly regulated and practiced top-down decision-making 
and broadcasting culture” of these organisations (p. 284).  
 
Kavanaugh et al. (2012) highlighted three pervading issues regarding government 
social media use, particularly in crises. Of these three issues, the first two are 
particularly pertinent to this study. First, governments (local, state, and federal) adopt 
social media somewhat experimentally; there is uncertainty around which platforms 
to use, the purpose of their social media efforts, the make-up of their audience, 
whose responsibility within the organisation it is to monitor platforms, and the level 
of response offered to the audience (pp. 483-484). These uncertainties also applied to 
the organisation under investigation: Chapter 4 highlights how the organisation 
initially adopted social media on a trial basis in response to external successes and 
top-level government directives; Chapter 5 describes the conflicting expectations 
about who should maintain responsibility for social media; while Chapter 6 unpacks 
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their platform-specific social media uses and audience considerations. This 
demonstrates that, even though Kavanaugh et al.’s (2012) study took place in the 
United States, many of the issues associated with government’s social media 
adoption extend to other jurisdictions.  
 
Second, governments require usable software to mine relevant data. A range of tools 
that serve this purpose do exist; however there is a disjuncture between the needs of 
the practitioners who are utilising them, and the companies developing them 
(Plotnick and Hiltz, 2016). This is particularly relevant for this study. As I explain in 
the next section and in Chapter 6, despite the potential to use social media to gather 
intelligence (especially during disasters), in reality most emergency management 
organisations instead use social media as a one-way communications platform. The 
usability of intelligence-gathering tools is a contributing factor towards this.  
 
Finally, the collection and storage of data creates issues that need solving—
particularly, as Kavanaugh et al. (2012) note, during “crisis and social convergence 
situations” (p. 484). The storage of data collected on proprietary technologies is 
particularly concerning, as solutions must ensure the data stored outlives the 
technologies themselves. Storage considerations are of particular importance when 
data collated during an event may in the future be subject to a coronial enquiry, 
occurring some time after the event and the subsequent generation of more data. 
While these considerations are important to emergency management organisations 
more broadly, throughout my study this issue did not emerge as one of key 
importance for the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. This thesis will 
however unpack how QFES negotiated the first two issues highlighted by Kavanaugh 
et al. (2012).  
 
2.4 SOCIAL MEDIA AND JOURNALISM 
While social media has had a transformative effect on government communications, 
it is also changing the way journalists conduct their role and communicate with their 
audience. Drawing on the seminal research of Deuze (2005; 2007b), this section first 
lists the values of journalism, which I connect back to later in this thesis to analyse 
how my participants perceived their own roles. Then, I address the main ways that 
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social media have impacted news and the practice of journalism, which matters for 
two reasons.  
 
First, a lot of what is occurring in crisis communication in the Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services (QFES) is news. My participants’ primary responsibility 
involved communicating updates, warnings and information to the public via the 
mainstream media and now, due to the digital transformation of communications 
systems, via social media as well. Second, many of the ways my participants thought 
about what they were doing come back to journalism. As I explore in Chapter 5, 
many of my participants applied a journalistic framework to their roles as 
government communications practitioners. By drawing on the relevant journalism 
literature, we can see how the transformative effect of social media in journalism is 
comparable to the organisational context examined in this thesis. The social media 
function at QFES shares many similarities with the public relations function in other 
organisations. After completing my fieldwork I focused in on the journalistic values 
and ideologies of my participants, because I identified that this is what shaped their 
uses of social media. For that reason I focus on these journalistic values rather than 
the values of public relations throughout this thesis. 
 
This cross-industry comparison also provides a theoretical contribution to journalism 
studies. As Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009) highlight, there is a lack of 
empirical findings that compare the impact of technological change in news 
production with other industries. They note that such comparisons would 
demonstrate what is unique to journalism and what commonalities journalism and 
other industries share (p. 576). 
 
In Chapter 5, I draw on Filby and Willmot’s (1988) ethnographic study to observe 
how my participants’ journalism education and/or professional histories shaped their 
uses of social media. Viewing social media through the lens of their professional 
histories, I describe how my participants had competing understandings of the 
purpose and use of social media for their organisation. I draw on Stark’s (2009) 
concept of dissonance and Fiore-Gartland and Neff’s (2015) idea of data valences to 
examine these competing expectations and how they can be both productive and 
problematic for the organisation.  
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 32 
 
While journalists perform different roles from my participants, the values of 
journalism that Deuze (2005, pp. 446-447) outlines mirror the professional values of 
my participants as government communications professionals. Deuze (2005) 
acknowledges that he conceptualises journalism as an occupational ideology (p. 
443), and he later clarifies that these values extend to other professions also (see 
Deuze, 2007b, p. 163). Deuze (2005, pp. 447-449), in summarising existing 
literature, describes the following five journalistic traits or values. While these values 
endure, as I examine later in this section, new values are emerging as journalists 
adjust to the new online environment (Usher, 2014, p. 5):  
 
i. Journalism is a public service as journalists collect and disseminate 
information and “share a sense of ‘doing it for the public’” (p. 447). 
Comparably, QFES media officers are public servants whose roles involve 
disseminating information to the media and public; the description on the 
organisation’s Facebook page as “bring[ing] you news” and “provid[ing] 
important public safety information in a timely and efficient way” 
demonstrates this comparable ideology of providing a public service. 
 
Deuze (2005) contends, “a slow and subtle shift occurs in the consensual 
notion of serving the public, as it moves from a primary top-down meaning to 
an increasingly bottom-up application” (p. 455). We can see this occurring in 
the crisis communication space, as the introduction of new communications 
technologies like social media change the communicative relationship 
between organisations like QFES and their audience. 
 
ii. Journalism is credible. Journalists’ reputations hinges on their ability to be 
both credible and objective. Similarly, the public’s sense of trust in QFES 
media officers is dependent on their ability to disseminate accurate, credible 
information given that, during crises especially, individuals’ lives frequently 
depend on the accuracy of that information. 
 
iii. Journalists are autonomous and independent. Like journalists, QFES media 
officers are autonomous and independent insofar as they would not cover up 
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an emergency for political reasons. Journalists and media officers are not 
individually autonomous however, and the limits to their autonomy are the 
same. Editors sign off journalists’ work, while QFES media officers are 
subject to management approval and/or political instruction and depend on 
colleagues for updates and information. Chapter 6 investigates the problems 
associated with that collegial dependence.  
 
Citing the findings of McDevitt et al. (2002), Deuze also notes how 
journalists use the notion of autonomy as an excuse to resist forms of 
interactivity and community engagement (pp. 448-449). In this instance, we 
can draw comparisons with emergency management organisations who, as I 
note later in this chapter, have not fully embraced the interactive potentials of 
social media platforms, perhaps due to concerns about losing autonomy.  
 
iv. Journalism is guided by immediacy and ‘newness’. This value is perhaps 
most comparable to the work of QFES media officers, who must release 
accurate updates as soon as possible, especially given that they operate on 
often time-sensitive, critical, and frequently changing situations.  
 
v. Journalists understand their ethical responsibilities. As Deuze (2005) 
explains, “a sense of being ethical…legitimizes journalists’ claims to the 
position as (free and fair) watchdogs of society” (p. 449). While QFES media 
officers do not act as watchdogs, they understand their ethical responsibilities 
as government employees. The ethical responsibilities of journalists and 
QFES media officers are comparable as both apply similar judgements about 
how their sharing of information will impact the public.  
 
Usher (2014) argues that, through the digital disruption to the journalism industry, 
three new values have emerged: immediacy, interactivity, and participation. Scholars 
have noted that immediacy has always been a concern for journalists (Usher, 2014, p. 
88; Deuze, 2005); certainly, my discussion of journalism values above acknowledges 
this. Usher distinguishes between the “old world of immediacy” and the “new world 
of immediacy in online journalism”; whereas the former referred to breaking news 
the following day, the latter means producing fresh, frequently changing content (p. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 34 
122). In the new digital environment, the concept of immediacy evolves to mean the 
faster production of even more news (Örnebring, 2016, pp. 74-76; Domingo, 2008, p. 
692). As I have noted elsewhere in this chapter, this raises concerns about 
verification. Hermida (2012b) notes that the emergence of social media platforms to 
disseminate breaking news forces journalists to carefully balance the competing 
demands of information dissemination and accuracy (p. 663).  
 
The potential of interactivity for journalism in online media has been subject to much 
academic attention (Krumsvik, 2015, p. 780), with Boczkowski (2004b) describing it 
(along with multimedia) as one “of the most salient capabilities of new media” (p. 
199). Usher (2014) clarifies that her interpretation of interactivity draws on Bucy 
(2004) and refers to user-computer interaction (p. 15). Krumsvik (2015) adopts a 
broader definition, adding that interactivity also facilitates audience or reader 
interaction with the journalist through the inclusion of an email address or contact 
form, discussion forums, polls and surveys and/or the ability to comment on articles 
(p. 780). Usher (2014) explains that interactivity is reshaping how journalists 
perform their roles in the digital age as there exists a contradiction between 
journalists’ traditional role and the new demands of online (pp. 183-185). The 
concept of interactivity is particularly pertinent to this study, as new social media 
platforms facilitate new forms of interaction between emergency management 
organisation’s like QFES and their audience and introduce new demands for timely 
information. In this thesis, I borrow from some of the journalism studies definitions 
of interactivity to refer to the conversational potentials of new digital technologies 
(see Örnebring, 2016, p. 71), and it is against this definition that I measure QFES 
when discussing their audience interactivity in Chapter 6.  
 
Finally, participation connotes different meanings in different contexts. For example, 
it can refer to the inclusion of user-generated content (UGC) into the mainstream 
news. Williams et al. (2011) explain that incorporating UGC means, “allowing the 
audience to have an input into news production and eroding the traditional 
distinctions between producers and consumers of the news”, but they clarify that, in 
practice, “overwhelmingly, journalists have remained journalists and audiences are 
still audiences, and truly collaborative relations between the two groups remain rare 
exceptions” (p. 96). As I noted earlier in this chapter, the ‘participation’ that Usher 
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(2014) observed at the New York Times did not mirror the idealised notion proposed 
by Jenkins and other scholars (p. 214). As Usher explained, “‘participation’ was a 
buzzword for simply being on social media” (p. 226). The realities of ‘participation’ 
in journalism are comparable to notions of participation in this study. As I have noted 
elsewhere in this chapter and note throughout this thesis, government agencies 
typically use social media simply as platforms to disseminate existing information 
(Mergel, 2013a; 2016), rather than harness the participatory potential that these 
platforms offer.  
 
The emergence of these new values demonstrates that, although the values outlined 
by Deuze (2005) and discussed earlier in this section endure, the online environment 
and introduction of new communications technologies is disrupting the journalism 
industry. Grafström and Windell’s (2012) discussion of news journalism as an 
organisational field into which new actors and technologies intrude, has close 
parallels with the idea of crisis communication as a similar organisational field that 
social media technologies and actors are disrupting. Borrowing this concept from 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148), Grafström and Windell (2012) explain:  
A field exists empirically when the actors involved interact with each other, 
structures of domination have evolved, the organizations involved compete 
for the same information and a mutual awareness exists among the field 
members about their involvement in a ‘common enterprise’ (p. 66). 
In applying DiMaggio and Powell’s organisational field concept to news 
organisations, Grafström and Windell (2012) argue “technological developments 
have made it possible for actors that have previously been excluded to gain access to 
the field” (p. 67). This statement holds true for my study, as new communications 
technologies allow new actors to have an increasingly powerful position within the 
field. However, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, Grafström and Windell’s (2012) 
argument that “novel actors are not met with reluctance by already established field 
actors” (p. 74) does not apply to my study, as I demonstrate some resistance towards 
changes to the organisational field. 
 
Social media platforms enable these new actors to broadcast valuable, unique on-the-
ground disaster updates; platforms like Twitter for example—that has a large, flat 
network structure—enable users to incorporate hashtags to engage with a gathered 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 36 
audience and provide disaster updates. These updates would have previously only 
come from those in positions of authority: emergency management organisations, 
law enforcement agencies, prominent politicians and traditional media outlets. Given 
that organisational fields are held together by the actors’ shared understanding about 
their roles and function in relation to other actors within the field (DiMaggio, 1991; 
cited by Grafström and Windell, 2012, p. 66), the current disruption that crisis 
communication as an organisational field is experiencing, has significant 
implications for emergency management organisations like QFES. Having 
traditionally maintained a dominant role within the structure of the organisational 
field, the disruption caused by new communications technologies is challenging that 
dominance, as the roles and responsibilities of the actors within the field are evolving 
and changing. 
 
2.5 DISASTER COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Previous sociological studies have detailed how members of the public physically 
meet at disaster sites (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003; 
cited in Hughes et al., 2008); however online platforms now facilitate digital 
convergence during emergencies. During a disaster, members of the public 
frequently share personal experiences online, contributing to the disaster response 
process or satisfying curiosities (Hughes et al., 2008). The emergence of online 
media platforms has altered the way people communicate during disasters more 
broadly. Whereas members of the public have traditionally relied on the mainstream 
media for information and updates during a disaster, the accessibility of new online 
communication platforms facilitates a more open process of many-to-many 
communication during disasters (Bruns, 2014). This does not replace traditional 
forms of communication, but rather works alongside them to create “…a new 
ecology of emergency media” that is ultimately a more effective form of 
communication (Bruns, 2014, p. 352). 
 
Until recently, disaster research has focused on the potentially transformative role of 
technology in disasters, rather than resolving pre-existing co-operative issues that 
exist between and within agencies involved in disaster response (Sanders, 2014, p. 
464). Further, there has been criticism that researchers have hitherto explored the 
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potential uses of new technologies, rather than attempt to understand the actual uses 
of these technologies during emergencies (Sanders, 2014; Sheptycki, 2004). Sanders’ 
(2014) ethnographic study specifically is both topical and methodologically relevant 
to this study. It explores the organisational factors within emergency management 
and law enforcement agencies that shape their use of new technologies. By observing 
and interviewing personnel within Canadian emergency management organisations 
(fire, police and ambulance), Sanders sought to explore not only how new 
technologies disrupt current practice in these agencies, but also how the culture of 
the organisation shapes the use of technology and its impact on the cooperative 
efforts of agencies working together in disaster response.  
 
During the 2010-11 Queensland floods, the Queensland Police Service (QPS) began 
using social media in addition to existing communications strategies to communicate 
updates and warnings to the public. The shared ideology of a few key individuals 
within the organisation, supported by some managers, empowered them to 
experiment and achieve great success (see Shaw et al., 2013; Queensland Police 
Service, n.d.; Ehnis and Bunker, 2012; Bruns et al., 2012). In this case, what is 
significant is how individuals within the organisations worked to create possibilities 
(Queensland Police Service, n.d.), and how the ideology and culture of the 
organisation facilitated those possibilities.  
 
When emergency management organisations initially began adopting social media, 
Latonero and Shklovski (2011) observed that an emergency management 
organisation “often relies on the limited capacities of individuals, the information 
evangelists, who might not be supported by the organization as a whole” (p. 14). 
However, the changing direction of current research indicates that the call to action 
to adopt new technologies has already happened (McNutt, 2014), and the focus is 
now on how organisational contexts shape the use of new technologies, rather than 
on how the use of new technologies is shaping (or disrupting) the organisation. 
 
Recent academic and media attention to social media use in natural disasters and 
other crises has primarily focused on how the community contributes to the response 
process and the way community members communicate with one another during a 
disaster, primarily using platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Researchers have 
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analysed the role of social media in a wide range of incidents, including the Virginia 
Tech shootings (Palen et al., 2009; Vieweg et al., 2008), Haiti earthquake (Starbird 
and Palen, 2011; Yates and Paquette, 2011), 2010 Chilean earthquake (Starbird et al., 
2011), 2011 Queensland floods (Bruns et al., 2012), 2011 Christchurch earthquakes 
(Bruns and Burgess, 2012), Hurricane Sandy (Lachlan et al., 2014), and Typhoon 
Haiyan (Athanasia and Stavros, 2015). Research typically centres on major 
international disasters (Vieweg et al., 2008; Yates and Paquette, 2011; Meier, 2012), 
with a comparative lack of current research focusing on an Australasian context. A 
significant body of research has analysed social media use from the perspective of 
the community (Palen et al., 2009; Vieweg et al., 2008), though this has tended to 
overlook the perspective of emergency management organisations (Latonero and 
Shklovski, 2011).  
 
Where studies have considered the perspective of emergency management 
organisations, scholars suggest these organisations are underutilising social media 
platforms. In their analysis of Twitter communication during Hurricane Sandy, 
Lachlan et al. (2014) observed “a near absence of government and organizations 
communicating with the #sandy hashtag” (p. 510). The authors suggest this may be 
due to governments’ underutilisation of social media platforms more generally or 
that, due to character limitations on Twitter, this platform may instead serve as an 
initial alert service “but then redirects audiences to traditional media outlets for 
detailed, tangible relief information” (p. 513). This suggestion then supports the 
claims of researchers including Bruns (2014) who have noted that social media are 
not a replacement for existing communications channels for these organisations, but 
instead may serve as a valuable addition to their communications toolbox. 
 
Social media and information science research has also focused on the technical 
capabilities of social media platforms, which builds an appropriate foundation for 
investigating the potential for emergency management organisations to utilise social 
media intelligence during a disaster. The University of Colorado, Boulder Project 
EPIC (Empowering the Public with Information in Crisis) team are leaders in this 
area of enquiry, primarily investigating “the technical, social, and information 
aspects of disasters and crises” (Palen, 2008, p. 76), what they term ‘crisis 
informatics’ (see also Hughes et al., 2008; Palen et al., 2007a, 2009; Vieweg et al., 
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2008; Shklovski et al., 2008). This multi-disciplinary team, with contributions from 
computer-mediated communication studies, software engineering, socio-behavioural 
studies and computational linguistics, aims to build technological tools for 
information extraction by members of the public and emergency management 
organisations, given the increased focus on all phases of disaster management 
(Hughes et al., 2008, p. 2). Their research has been particularly significant in 
contributing to the disaster management field, which, until more recently, has largely 
ignored the role of social media.  
 
While there has been reluctance within some emergency management organisations 
to embrace new communication technologies, their adoption and use of social media 
has proven effective (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 369). Emergency management 
organisations’ social media use has become commonplace as governments meet an 
increased public expectation that accurate and timely information be made available 
online, particularly during disasters (St. Denis, Hughes and Palen, 2012). Despite 
this, researchers have found that government agencies mostly duplicate existing 
communications content for social media, using it to push out information (Mergel, 
2013a, p. 332), evidence that government agencies are normalising new and 
potentially disruptive technologies to fit with existing strategies.  
 
The ‘normalised’ practices that Mergel describes are not unique to social media or 
government agencies employing these technologies; journalism scholars have 
highlighted similar practices in their observation of journalists’ adaptation to new 
communications technologies. In her examination of journalists’ use of weblogs 
(blogs), Singer (2005) found that “journalists are ‘normalizing’ the blog as a 
component, and in some ways an enhancement, of traditional journalistic norms and 
practices” (p. 173). Other scholars have built on Singer’s findings to analyse 
journalists’ use of Twitter, finding similar normalising practices (see Lasorsa, Lewis 
and Holton, 2012; Parmelee, 2013.)  
 
It is evident that the practices that scholars like Mergel have observed are not unique, 
but instead point to broader adaptive practices amongst communications 
professionals. My understanding of these practices of ‘normalisation’ is shaped by 
May and Finch’s (2009) Normalisation Process Theory, which “is concerned with 
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the social organization of the work (implementation), of making practices routine 
elements of everyday life (embedding), and of sustaining embedded practices in their 
social contexts (integration)” (p. 538). In this study, this process involves 
‘normalising’ social media to fit into existing communication strategies, 
disseminating content created for mainstream media on social media and duplicating 
it across platforms, and prioritising existing communications strategies over social 
media. 
 
Disparities exist between various organisations’ different levels of activity on social 
media platforms. Rive et al. (2012) differentiate these levels of engagement as 
‘passive’, ‘active’ and ‘engaged’. They observe specifically how emergency 
management organisations can use social media in a ‘passive’ way to monitor 
relevant activity, for example searching @mentions on Twitter to ‘listen’ to what 
people are saying about their organisation. Using social media to respond to the 
public and strengthen the organisation’s image within the community signals a more 
‘active’ use. Building on this, using established social network sites to build a deeper 
relationship with the community by listening to its members and responding to 
public opinion, makes the organisation more transparent and demonstrates an 
‘engaged’ level of activity (Rive et al., 2012, p. 6). These different modes of activity 
lead to inconsistencies across different emergency management organisations in their 
approaches to social media.  
 
While it provides a useful framework to conceptualise the varying levels of activity, 
the passive/active/engaged hierarchy is problematic as each level implies an 
additional degree of commitment or time. The levels are ranked by how 
communicative they are, not by how time-consuming they are. Rive et al. (2012) 
present ‘passive’ social media activity as the lowest ranked level; the term ‘passive’ 
suggests less time commitment than ‘active’ and ‘engaged’. In practice, scrolling 
through tweets or discussion threads may make ‘passive’ social media monitoring 
more time-consuming and resource demanding than active social media activity. As I 
argue in the next section of this literature review, most of these organisations start 
out and are only ‘active’, neglecting to evolve into the other areas. My observations 
presented in this thesis examine the ‘active’ and ‘engaged’ levels of activity over an 
extended period of time at QFES, and further suggest that positioning ‘passive’ as 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 41 
the first level does not accurately reflect how social media use begins and evolves. 
Moreover, it privileges talking over listening; this devalues listening as a ‘passive’ 
activity despite the fact that it is an equally important form of online participation 
(see Crawford, 2009). 
 
2.5.1 Information dissemination  
Scholars have claimed that, when used effectively, social media platforms can 
provide a dynamic means of communicating with the public that is distinct from the 
“static, one-way process” that emergency management communication is 
traditionally characterised as being (Pechta et al., 2010, p. 1). However, research by 
Mergel (2013a) has demonstrated that government agencies more broadly, by 
default, primarily use social media as a platform to disseminate information, as an 
extension of their traditional communication strategies. What these organisations 
post on social media replicates or supplements existing strategies.  
 
The Queensland Police Service (QPS), who are widely regarded for their use of 
social media during routine and non-routine operations and whom I draw on in 
Chapter 6, are an example of this default use of social media to broadcast 
information. Bruns et al. (2012) investigated QPS’s use of social media during the 
2010-11 Queensland floods. The researchers concluded that QPS’s use of Facebook 
and Twitter during the event was wide-reaching due to its large audience and 
significant number of retweets, as well as informative due to the situational 
information and advice contained in tweets. However, they also noted that QPS’s use 
of Twitter during this event primarily demonstrated the significance of the platform 
as a tool to disseminate information (Bruns et al., 2012, p. 26). In a comparative 
study, Ehnis and Bunker (2012) argued that QPS could have utilised social media 
platforms more effectively, concluding that the organisation used social media 
“…more as a ‘megaphone’, and less to facilitate 2-way communication and 
collaboration” (p. 9). Scholars have observed similar default one-way communicative 
practices in other communication-oriented organisations. Usher (2014), in observing 
the New York Times first hand, noted “instances of journalists learning from each 
other about social media, but what tends to be emphasized is a one-to-many 
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relationship with the audience”, which suggests that the engaging, two-way 
communicative practices promoted by some theorists are yet to be realised (p. 29). 
 
Given Mergel’s (2013a) observation that social media act as an extension of 
traditional communication strategies for government organisations more broadly, 
questions arise around their propensity to overlook the two-way communicative 
advantages of these platforms. A recent Australian review of warnings and 
information (see Victorian Government, 2014), although not specific to social media, 
found that “there are increasing community expectations for emergency services to 
engage in two-way communication during emergencies via active listening, 
information exchange and engagement with communities” (p. 57). The review also 
noted that engaging in two-way communication “help[s] to foster shared 
responsibility and resilience” (p. 57), which suggests that using social media to 
engage in a two-way communication with their audience could have long-term 
benefits for the organisation.  
 
Outside of disasters, during ‘business as usual’, emergency management 
organisations use social media to network and foster a relationship with the 
community, in order to establish themselves as a source of information during 
disasters, promote the work of their organisation, and disseminate key messages and 
safety information to build community resilience (see Watson and Hagen, 2015). 
Emergency management organisations can use social media to strengthen community 
networks and build resilience during the prevention and preparedness phases of a 
disaster (Belblidia, 2010); however the majority of research investigates these 
organisations’ social media use during the response and recovery phases. Social 
media can also serve as a platform to educate their audience, encouraging individuals 
to maintain responsibility for their own disaster preparedness, thus building 
community resilience over time. When risk is clearly and effectively communicated 
to the community, they are more likely to appropriately prepare for an impending 
event, which ultimately influences their resilience in the situation (Mileti, 1999). 
Social media platforms can therefore nurture “strong community networks”, as their 
information-sharing capabilities can “be leveraged more effectively to provide 
communities with robust communication networks, thereby creating more resilient 
communities in areas at high risk of natural disasters” (Belblidia, 2010, p. 24).  
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2.5.2 Intelligence gathering 
While traditional communication channels (including radio, print media and 
broadcast media) and social media platforms both promote one-to-one, one-to-many 
and many-to-many communication flows, social media can facilitate rapid 
information exchange during a disaster (Crowe, 2012, p. 207). This potentially 
affords the community a more engaged role in disaster response (Chen et al., 2013, p. 
8). As local community members are typically the first on the scene of a disaster, it is 
important to involve them in disaster response efforts (see Palen et al., 2007b; 
Belblidia, 2010; Pechta et al., 2010). When equipped with smart phones with access 
to information-sharing applications including Facebook and Twitter, community 
members are a valuable source of information for emergency management 
organisations (Liu et al., 2009, p. 61; Palen et al., 2009, p. 478). A Twitter user 
tweeting four minutes after US Airways Flight 1549 crashed into the Hudson River 
in 2009, demonstrated the value of smart phone-equipped eyewitnesses, as they were 
the first to break news of the emergency (Hughes and Palen, 2012, p. 9). Athanasia 
and Stavros’s (2015) exploratory study of Twitter use during Typhoon Haiyan also 
found evidence of Twitter users providing valuable situational awareness, and the 
platform being a faster medium than others for disseminating information.  
 
Palen et al. (2009) analysed the intelligence gathering capabilities of the participants 
of Facebook groups set up to identify the victims of the Virginia Tech shooting 
before authorities publicly confirmed the victims’ identities. More recently, Twitter 
has been used to collect situational information in the recovery phase following the 
2010 Haiti earthquake, following the 2010 Chile earthquake, and during the Fourmile 
Canyon fire in Colorado in 2010 (Starbird et al., 2011), using the “crisis-specific 
hashtag syntax” model proposed by Starbird and Stamberger (2010). This model 
“…[trains] Twitter users to craft their tweets into a machine-readable format”, an 
alternative to researchers or emergency management personnel creating the technical 
tools required to extract important information relating to a given event (see Vieweg, 
2010), which was proposed as a means of extracting situational information for 
emergency responders. In addition, Meier (2012) analysed the value of crisis 
mapping software during emergencies, detailing instances where users employ online 
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mapping software to map near real-time updates of crises, including the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake and the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008.  
 
When emergency responders use social media as an intelligence or situational 
awareness-gathering tool, questions of information verification and source credibility 
undoubtedly arise. The availability of image manipulation software means deviants 
can manipulate and circulate disaster photos via social media, which has the potential 
to cause widespread panic and misinformation. This occurred during Hurricane 
Sandy and was problematic for emergency services agencies, as the virality of these 
manipulated images depicting apparently realistic weather events made it difficult for 
official agencies to stop the spread of misinformation (Virtual Social Media Working 
Group and DHS First Responders Group, 2013).  
 
Such incidents are concerning for emergency services organisations, especially those 
that are already sceptical of and unwilling to embrace new technologies. Various 
researchers propose potential technical capabilities that social networks could afford 
during a crisis, including platforms that could verify situational information received 
during a crisis and question the credibility of users submitting situational information 
(see Mendoza et al., 2010; Popoola et al., 2013). Tobias (2011) questioned the 
reliability of information received via social media, given that it is unverified when 
first received, and the deliberate posting of false information by some users during a 
crisis. The findings of Plotnick and Hiltz (2016) support this scepticism, noting 
reluctance amongst county level emergency managers in the United States to 
embrace the full intelligence gathering potential of social media. In contrast, 
Mendoza et al. (2010) argued “false rumours tend to be questioned much more than 
confirmed truths” by the Twitter community during a crisis (p. 78), which they 
suggest demonstrates, “…that the Twitter community works like a collaborative filter 
of information” (p. 76). In addition, the impact of the Queensland Police Service’s 
#mythbuster tweets during the Brisbane floods, analysed by Bruns et al. (2012), 
seemingly demonstrates a vigilance by many Twitter users regarding information 
credibility during crises. These #mythbuster tweets were the most widely circulated 
during this event, and other organisations’ adoption of this tactic suggests it is a 
useful way to directly address and dispel rumours that so frequently circulate (online 
and offline) during disasters. 
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These findings support those of the aforementioned researchers who analysed the 
actions of Facebook users identifying the Virginia Tech shooting victims (see 
Vieweg et al., 2008; Palen, 2008; Palen et al., 2009), suggesting vigilance amongst 
many social media users regarding information accuracy. Most important for these 
researchers, were the verification process that ensured the credibility of the 
information, and the fact that the group collectively did not misidentify any of the 
victims. Despite this vigilance, many emergency managers question the accuracy of 
social media intelligence and are hesitant to act on it (Plotnick and Hiltz, 2016, p. 
261). Members of the journalism industry share this reluctance. Social media are a 
valuable source of breaking, eyewitness news; however, journalists have concerns 
about the reliability and veracity of that information (see Hermida, 2012b). This 
presents a professional conundrum given that, as with emergency managers, 
journalists’ credibility hinges on their ability to produce accurate information.  
 
Nonetheless, emergency managers must develop and understand strategies to 
determine the credibility of information pertinent to their response efforts. The 
aforementioned examples of effective intelligence gathering did, however, largely 
occur after an event rather than as it unfolded, and were conducted by trained 
researchers in well-funded institutions. There is thus a demonstrable need for 
collaboration between researchers and emergency managers to implement some of 
these practices in emergency management organisations to improve the disaster 
response process. This is obviously an easy answer to building emergency 
management organisations’ intelligence-gathering capabilities. Emergency 
management organisations also need to structure themselves better to look at 
unverified information, which most likely also requires more staff to make 
observations. Emergency management organisations need to experiment more with 
both the technologies and the social media data, conducting their own internal 
research: that may consequently mean not getting everything right. The policy report 
produced by our Social Media in Times of Crisis project—outlined in detail in 
Chapter 7—also outlined specific recommendations to improve the effective use of 
social media in emergency management organisations (see Flew et al., 2015). These 
recommendations included developing a national framework for the use of social 
media in crisis communication and a network of Australian emergency management 
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social media practitioners, coordinated out of the Australia-New Zealand Emergency 
Management Committee (ANZEMC), as well as developing a policy-focused federal 
government social media task force to facilitate best practice in these organisations. 
 
By taking a model of different types of innovation within a field, we can determine 
what else might be possible in emergency management organisations beyond what 
has already occurred. Storsul and Krumsvik (2013; cited by Krumsvik, 2015) 
examine media innovation by applying Francis and Bessant’s (2005) four Ps of 
innovation to the newspaper industry: 
1. “Product innovation relates to changes in the products/services offered by an 
organization. […] 
2. Process innovation refers to changes in the ways in which products/services 
are created and delivered. […] 
3. Position innovation involves changes in how products/services are positioned 
or framed within particular contexts. […] 
4. Paradigmatic innovation includes changes in an organization’s mindset, 
values and business models.” [emphasis in original] (Krumsvik, 2015 p. 778) 
We have only observed the first ‘step’ of innovation thus far, as emergency 
management organisations have adopted new products (social media platforms). 
While social media adoption has somewhat changed the way emergency 
management organisations provide their services, as they can communicate with the 
public in new ways, the process of duplicating content for social media that Mergel 
(2013a) has described as occurring in many government organisations, is not 
particularly innovative. While I do outline some instances of process innovation, 
there is certainly some resistance too. In Chapter 7, I consider the implications of the 
findings of my study for practice in emergency management organisations. Using 
this model from Storsul and Krumsvik (2013), we can see how emergency 
management organisations can achieve these other forms of innovation, to transform 
and improve their current uses. 
 
While the use of social media for intelligence gathering is a growing research area, 
the use of this function by emergency management organisations is generally under-
researched. A significant body of literature has focused on emergency management 
organisations’ potential use of social media to gather intelligence. In practice, as I 
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note in Chapter 6, the uses of social media for this purpose are experimental and ad 
hoc, indicating that scholars’ claims about these potential uses have not yet been 
realised. Within Australia, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO)—the Australian government agency that conducts scientific 
research—have developed intelligence-gathering tools that emergency management 
organisations in a number of Australian states have already used. The CSIRO-
developed Vizie tool searches keyword trends across various online platforms, 
determining popular topics that are being discussed and the origin of the discussion 
to understand its context (CSIRO, 2011). It is useful across all organisations, not 
only emergency management. This tool is valuable to understand sentiment towards 
new government policies for example, while emergency management organisations 
can use it to understand public sentiment around the disaster response process and 
ascertain any publicly perceived failures of the organisation. 
 
Yin et al. (2012) outlined their development of Emergency Situation Awareness 
(ESA) software for Twitter, which is useful for “…explor[ing] the impact of 
identified incidents and monitor[ing] the evolution of events” (CSIRO, 2012). The 
software can provide a means of detecting relevant information, which can inform 
emergency management organisations’ disaster response. Their software uses “a 
burst-detection module that continuously monitors a Twitter feed and raises an alert 
for immediate attention when it detects an unexpected incident” (Yin et al., 2012, p. 
55). It has been utilised by the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre, a 
full-time, whole-of-government situational awareness facility operated by 
Emergency Management Australia to monitor unfolding events in Australia and New 
Zealand. It does this by detecting events based on “bursting words” and using “…the 
colour and size of the alert word [to indicate] the strength of the burst” (Cameron et 
al., 2012, p. 697). Further, the software maps tweets using geotagged information or 
a user’s location information listed on their profile where available (Yin et al., 2012, 
p. 57), providing geographical context to situational information gathered from 
Twitter. As I outline in Chapter 6, the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services did 
trial this software over the 2012-2013 storm and cyclone season, although one QFES 
employee told me that after finding the tool “clunky, difficult to use, [and] not very 
user intuitive” the organisation cancelled its contract (Emergency services personnel, 
June 2014). 
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Bruns et al. (2012) also briefly discussed the intelligence gathering abilities of 
emergency management organisations using social media. In their breakdown of 
tweets in the ‘information’ category, Bruns et al. found that almost 10% of 
#qldfloods tweets contained information requests from other tweeters; in contrast, 
less than 1% of the QPS’s categorised ‘information’ tweets contained information 
requests from their followers. This indicated that, during the 2010-11 Queensland 
floods, the QPS used Twitter more as a platform to communicate information and 
advice rather than to source information from the public.  
 
As I have shown, a significant body of literature has focused on emergency 
management organisations’ potential use of social media to gather intelligence 
during emergencies. As I discuss in Chapter 6, emergency management 
organisations’ actual use of social media for this purpose currently remains 
significantly underdeveloped. This indicates that the literature about the use of social 
media to gather intelligence is in conflict with what actually occurs in these 
organisations, as it occurs ad hoc and experimentally and this use is a second-order 
function after information dissemination priorities. Information overload issues also 
emerge when these organisations employ social media for two-way communication, 
but scholars note that a combination of manual and automated approaches can 
overcome these issues (see Verma at al., 2011; Plotnick et al., 2015). Even when 
suitable tools are available, a lack of staff to mine and interpret the data provides a 
barrier preventing the effective use of social media to gather intelligence. 
 
While intelligence-gathering tools may exist, the investment in them is not 
necessarily a priority of emergency management organisations, which likely 
prioritise quantifiable ‘on the ground’ resources. The development of such tools must 
consider not only potential uses, but also constraints that would prevent their 
adoption: budget limitations, time, staff availability and the complexity of the tools 
are important considerations. Significant barriers exist that prevent these 
organisations from investing in social media, with organisational factors 
(organisational culture and its management) rather than technological factors proving 
the main obstacle (Hiltz et al., 2014; McNutt, 2014). It appears that these barriers are 
inherently government-related and are not specific to emergency management. 
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Resource limitations—such as budget restrictions and a lack of sufficiently skilled 
staff—are examples of these government-wide factors preventing investment in 
social media (Hughes and Palen, 2012; Plotnick et al., 2015; Plotnick and Hiltz, 
2016). While budget constraints have been recognised as an issue for smaller 
organisations (see Plotnick et al., 2015), the prohibitive cost of sophisticated 
intelligence-gathering tools most likely also prevents larger or better-funded 
organisations from advancing their social media efforts beyond the default one-way 
communication approach.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
Following the rapid societal adoption of social media, emergency management 
organisations, too, have adopted these platforms, responding to the public’s increased 
use of particular platforms and their expectations that emergency agencies and their 
representatives are also accessible via these communications channels (St. Denis, 
Hughes and Palen, 2012). These new communicative practices have had implications 
for the way affected individuals communicate during emergencies. In reviewing the 
existing literature on social media use during emergencies, I discovered the gaps that 
currently exist in this scholarship that my study addresses. I found that research 
typically focuses on major global disasters—the 2010 Haiti and Chilean earthquakes, 
for example—and/or disasters that occur in the United States such as Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012. Research typically focuses on the use of social media by affected 
members of the public, and less on how official agencies use these tools to 
communicate. Where literature has addressed these new communicative practices, 
they typically do so from an external perspective or they speculate on potential uses, 
rather than observe current practice.  
 
A review of the literature has, however, established two functions of social media use 
by emergency management organisations: using social media to gather intelligence 
and to disseminate information. These two uses relate to different parts of the 
organisation. Using social media to gather intelligence—in disasters especially—
relates to the organisation’s operational response concerns (see Yin et al., 2012, pp. 
52-53). Emergency management organisations crowd-source the affected 
community’s knowledge of what is occurring around them, enabling decision-makers 
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to distribute resources more appropriately to those in need and plan future operations 
more effectively (see Crowe, 2012, p. 216). Using social media as a platform to 
disseminate information relates to the organisation’s communication priorities during 
disasters and public relations priorities during ‘business as usual’ events (see Heverin 
and Zach, 2011). Social media are useful channels for regularly updating the public 
with situational information including warnings, official instructions, road closures, 
and locations of vital resources. By default however, social media operate as an 
extension of existing traditional communication strategies (Mergel, 2013a; 2016), 
with resource limitations acting as barriers that prevent full investment in the 
intelligence gathering capabilities (Hughes and Palen, 2012; Plotnick et al., 2015; 
Plotnick and Hiltz, 2016).  
 
Beyond these broad functions, there is limited understanding of the specific uses of 
social media in these organisations, with scholars recognising a need for empirical 
research to observe first-hand what is actually occurring (Plotnick et al., 2015; 
Mergel, 2013b). I have also noted a lack of research investigating the post-
implementation stage (i.e. 2-3 years after organisations adopted social media). This 
thesis therefore seeks to fill these gaps, observing current practice in the post-
implementation stage at one Australian organisation over an extended period of both 
routine and non-routine events.  
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Chapter 3: Design, approach and 
methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This study focuses on the digital transformations that emergency management 
organisations are currently going through, and how they are changing the purpose 
and character of their work and their communicative relationship with the public. In 
the previous chapter, I built a foundation for this study by reviewing the existing 
body of literature in this field, in doing so highlighting the gaps that currently exist 
and thus building a case for the value of this study. These gaps include a tendency for 
research to focus on major global disasters. In addition, research typically focuses on 
the use of social media by affected members of the public, and less on how 
emergency management and law enforcement agencies use these platforms to 
communicate. Where literature has addressed these new communicative practices, 
they typically do so from an external perspective or they speculate on potential uses, 
rather than observe current practice. Consequently, scholars including Mergel 
(2013b) and Plotnick et al. (2015) have recognised a need for more empirical 
research in this space.  
This study involved an organisational ethnography that included an extensive, two-
year period of participant observation at the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services, supported by in-depth semi-structured interviews and document and 
artefact analysis, to explore first-hand the use of social media platforms in 
emergency management during routine operations and when used for disaster 
response. Ethnography involves: 
…Participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended 
period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or 
asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting 
documents and artefacts – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research. (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007, p. 3) 
This maps on to what I did throughout my study, as I typically spent two days per 
week within the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) branch of the 
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Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, which increased during significant 
weather events or periods of increased activity. In addition, I conducted individual 
and group interviews, and collected other forms of data relating to the social media 
function that I explain throughout this chapter.   
 
I begin this chapter by outlining the origins of this research project and describing 
the organisational context within which I embedded myself. This contextual 
information is central to this study because, as I explain in Chapter 4, the 
organisational restructure that occurred during my fieldwork had significant 
implications for the resourcing and positioning of social media within the 
organisation. I then describe my chosen methods in more detail, explaining my 
position within the organisation, how I conducted observations, and provide detail 
about my participant group. I then detail my ethnographic field notes, which not only 
included handwritten notes from my observations, but also policy documents that I 
accessed while on-site, government reviews and reports, and screen shots captured 
from QFES’s social media accounts. I combined my observations with in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the organisation, and towards the 
end of the chapter I show how the different components of my chosen methods work 
together to enrich my data. 
 
I received ethics approval to conduct this research from Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) (Approval #1300000355). Our Social Media in Times of Crisis 
project team submitted an ethics application, which QUT accepted in July 2013. This 
allowed me to conduct interviews with my participants. I submitted a variation to this 
application to conduct participant observation, which QUT approved in December 
2013. Per the conditions of this ethics variation approval, throughout this thesis I do 
not write specifically about what I observed participants say, but rather about general 
operations and interactions within the organisation. Consequently, I only attribute 
interview participants’ verbal statements if they have given me permission to identify 
them. If they have not given permission, I identify them generically throughout this 
thesis as a “media team member” or “media manager” if their seniority is of 
contextual significance, or “emergency services/operational personnel” if they are 
outside of the media team. To protect my participants’ identities, I maintain gender 
neutrality throughout this thesis when describing individuals. As the team was 
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relatively small, reference to particular participants by position and gender might 
identify some participants.  
 
3.2 ETHNOGRAPHY 
This study is based in an organisational ethnography of the Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services (QFES). It combined a two-year period of participant 
observation with in-depth semi-structured interviews and document and artefact 
analysis to examine how social media function in the Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services. Ethnography involves “observational work in particular social 
settings” (Silverman, 2013, p. 49). Scholars including Plotnick et al. (2015) and 
Mergel (2013b) have recognised that there is a need for first-hand observation of the 
uses of social media in these organisations; the literature interrogated in Chapter 2 
has highlighted other gaps in the existing body of crisis communication scholarship, 
thus providing a justification for this research project and its methodological 
approach.  
 
While existing literature frequently addresses the potential uses of social media in 
these organisations, ethnography facilitates a deeper investigation of these uses, 
interrogating the factors shaping those uses. On the topic of observing organisations 
first-hand, Salaman (1979) notes: 
To enter an organisation is to enter an ideational and cultural world, a place 
fertile with specialised idiosyncratic and esoteric vocabularies, values, ideas, 
knowledge, myths. …Clearly no worthwhile analysis of organisational 
experience would ignore this cultural dimension. (p. 45). 
Ethnography has proven a useful method to understand the effects of technological 
innovation in the context of newsrooms (Paulussen, 2016, p. 196), and in Chapter 2 I 
observed how many of the technological challenges experienced by emergency 
management organisations mirror those in the journalism industry. Given this, and 
the organisational similarities between newsrooms and my field site, I draw on the 
methods described by newsroom ethnographers to design my study and approach my 
fieldwork. Singer (2008) discusses how, in studies of newsroom convergence, 
ethnographic approaches are useful to establish the different views around this issue, 
noting how: 
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[Ethnography] is ideally suited to understanding not just causes or effects, 
not just products or practices, but also the processes that underlie them, the 
perceptions that drive and are driven by them, and the people who have 
always been at the heart of the journalistic enterprise, whatever its iteration. 
(p. 170). 
The participants in my study are similarly experiencing what Singer (2008) describes 
as an “enormous cultural transition” (p. 170). Given that one of the core themes 
running through this thesis are the competing views towards the use of social media 
for the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, ethnography similarly provides a 
useful means of determining those competing views that Singer describes.  
 
Rather than separating the research process into separate phases—distinct 
observation phases and interview phases—I decided early on that a more appropriate 
approach was to integrate these two methods into one concurrent phase. Given that, 
as my research questions indicate, I wanted to understand how emergency 
management organisations use social media. I recognised that these uses may evolve 
over time. The integrated research process thus gave me a better sense of changing 
attitudes and patterns of use over time so I could compare and contrast responses and 
views throughout the two-year period of observation. Moreover, it allowed me to 
follow up with participants on issues or incidents that I had observed shortly after 
they had occurred, while they were still relevant and fresh.  
 
The integration of my chosen methods into one concurrent phase proved a useful 
approach. For example, I conducted my first interview with one participant about 
four months after starting at the organisation. This participant moved to another 
government department following the organisational restructure brought about by the 
implementation of the Keelty Review recommendations, which I describe in Chapter 
4. The participant and I developed a rapport in the short amount of time we knew one 
another, and when I contacted them for an interview, they happily obliged. This 
participant provided useful contextual information about the history of social media 
in the organisation, which informed much of my early understanding. Unknown at 
that time, the participant would later re-join QFES and come back to their former 
role, following agitation by the QFES media team managers. In later interviews, this 
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participant often reflected—unprompted—on their evolving views of social media (I 
interviewed the participant four times in total over the course of my fieldwork). 
 
3.2.1 Participant observation 
The primary method employed for this study was participant observation. Participant 
observation is “a specific approach to the gaining of knowledge, based upon direct 
contact between the researcher and the social objects of interest.” (Brannan and 
Oultram, 2012, p. 296). Throughout the course of this research project, I was 
physically located at the Emergency Services Complex in Kedron, an inner-city 
suburb located on the north side of Brisbane, the state capital of Queensland. During 
the Social Media in Times of Crisis project team’s early negotiations with the 
industry partner to gain access to the organisation, it was apparent that the Media and 
Corporate Communications (MACC) branch of the organisation was the most active 
in managing social media. Consequently, I primarily positioned myself within 
QFES’s MACC branch to understand how they use social media to disseminate 
information, including important public safety messages, and how it fits within their 
traditional role as media officers. I provide more detail about the MACC branch and 
structure in Chapter 4.  
 
I started my fieldwork as soon as practicable within the broader logistics of the 
Social Media in Times of Crisis project. In September 2013, I began regularly 
visiting my field site for 2-3 days per week to make connections with key 
stakeholders in the organisation and learn more about the organisational structure and 
its operations. It was important for me to build those connections early on in the 
organisation, as I was dependent on key stakeholders for access to other personnel, 
meetings, and workshops that would enrich my research. As my ethics clearance did 
not cover this period, this thesis will not refer to anything I directly observed during 
this period. Rather, it informs my own contextual understanding of the organisation 
and of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements. Some of the key changes 
and events I refer to throughout this thesis occurred during those early stages, and 
even before I arrived in Australia to begin my postgraduate studies. For example, I 
provide an extensive background to the organisation’s adoption of social media in 
Chapter 4. My discussion of those changes and events—in particular, the release of 
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the Keelty Review findings which were publicised shortly after I began visiting the 
organisation, but before I received ethics clearance—is based on conversations I had 
with participants during my observations after I received ethics clearance, or during 
interviews throughout the entirety of my ethnography.  
 
In Appendix D, I illustrate MACC’s office configuration before and after the Keelty 
Review organisational changes, and illustrate my physical location during 
observations within this office. My approach to observations was similar to those 
described by Usher (2014), assuming a “‘campout’ spot” within the MACC branch 
pod in equal proximity to both managers and junior team members, in which the 
shoulder height partitions enabled me to overhear conversations occurring around me 
without needing to physically insert myself into the scene (p. 245).  
 
In the beginning, I sat in the social media team pod. Often, all four members of the 
social media team were in the office while I was present. This meant it was 
occasionally logistically difficult for me to sit in their pod and observe their social 
media activity, causing me to instead sit at an available media team desk across the 
aisle. While this was less intrusive for my participants, it meant I was less able to 
directly observe the social media team’s activity. Once the social media team 
disbanded and the social media function moved to the media team, I sat with the 
media officers to observe their day-to-day monitoring and posting on social media. I 
did occasionally sit back with the social media manager in the former social media 
team pod—the pods were not reconfigured until later in my fieldwork—as the social 
media manager continued sporadically posting and monitoring social media even as 
their role slowly moved away from social media to encompass digital 
communications more broadly.  
 
In addition to conducting observations in person at my field site, I also observed the 
organisation’s online social media activity. My observation of particular posts 
frequently generated questions and conversations with my participants. Through 
observing their online social media activity, I collected screen shots of social media 
posts and threads that I use and refer to throughout this thesis. I describe these in 
more detail when explaining my ethnographic field notes later in this chapter. These 
online observations also initiated some of the more telling anecdotes during my 
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fieldwork; for example, my analysis of the team’s swift water rescue post moderation 
in Chapter 6 came from my observation of QFES’s online activity and followers’ 
rule-breaking behaviour in response, which I followed up on in conversations with 
participants when I was next on-site.  
 
Employing participant observation allowed me to establish key individuals within the 
organisation who both formally and informally championed social media. Gold 
(1958) conceptualised four different roles of a field researcher; I adopted the 
participant-as-observer role. In this role, the researcher forms relationships with 
participants as she would with colleagues to develop a sense of trust between 
participants and the researcher. This approach suited my outgoing personality, as I 
was much more comfortable building an easy-going rapport and familiarising myself 
with participants this way to build a sense of trust between us. This approach differs 
from other roles defined by Gold, in that my participants were fully aware of my role 
as an observer (p. 220). The strategies employed by Boczkowski (2004b) during his 
newsroom ethnographies provided a useful guide for approaching my overt 
researcher role; he describes: 
I assumed an overt stance, explaining to my interviewees the nature of the 
project and the types of outlets where I expected to publish its results and 
asking them how they preferred to be identified should I quote any of their 
statements. (p. 202) 
The upfront, forthcoming approach that I similarly adopted not only towards 
interviewees but towards observed participants in general, proved fruitful on 
numerous occasions throughout my fieldwork, and is illustrated during particular 
incidents described in this thesis. For example, my observations of the two 
Queensland Reconstruction Authority web developers that I describe in Chapter 6 
came about via an introduction from one of their colleagues, whom I met while 
observing the Public Information cell (PIC). Describing my project to this individual, 
they offered to introduce me to their colleagues, recognising that their use of social 
media for informal intelligence gathering might be useful for my research.  
 
As Usher (2014) noted, it is not always possible to directly engage with every person 
you come across when observing a large organisation. Certainly when observing the 
State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC) during activation, it would have been 
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inappropriate for me to interrupt every person to explain my project while they were 
preoccupied managing the disaster response process. For that reason, while on-site I 
always wore a QUT-branded lanyard with my QUT identification card so 
participants could easily recognise me as an outsider. When I accompanied media 
team members to workshops or meetings I introduced myself at the beginning of the 
meeting and explained my project to any participants I had not met before, and sat in 
view so they could observe me note taking. Observations were both formal and 
informal (Gold, 1958, p. 220). During formal observations such as workshops or 
meetings, I took notes while also interacting or participating. It was not always 
appropriate to take notes during informal interactions—lunchtime conversations for 
example—lest doing so stifled the flow of conversation or made participants 
uncomfortable. During those occasions, I recorded brief notes as soon as possible 
afterwards, then expanded on these notes at the end of the day. As a participant-
observer, my data was of course shaped by my own experience of what occurred in 
the organisation.  
 
Stark and Girard’s (2009) ethnographic research provided another useful model for 
studying organisations, and I compare my study to their two-year observation of a 
start-up firm operating in a time of technological development at the beginning of the 
millennium. My research occurred during a period of uncertainty for emergency 
management organisations, which faced—and continue to face—a re-evaluation of 
the nature and purpose of their role due to the introduction of new technologies. In 
the same way, the research conducted by Stark and Girard (2009) found “a project 
perpetually ‘under construction’”, as the company they studied grappled with the 
execution of a project concurrently with the “relentless redesign of the organization”, 
which produced an environment of uncertainty (p. 81). Like any emergency 
management organisation, which could be described as enduring ‘peaks and troughs’ 
(the peak being a significant event, the trough being the routine operations), the 
organisation investigated by Stark and Girard (2009) endured “bouts of work 
followed by relative idleness” (p. 94). I draw on the ethnographic research of Stark 
and Girard (2009) as a comparative model to understand the influence of 
organisational frictions and heterarchical structure on the organisation’s practice, 
particularly in Chapter 5.  
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3.2.1.1 Participants 
I provide specific details about my Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) 
branch participants at the beginning of Chapter 4, as the structure and restructure of 
their branch significantly impacted the positioning and use of social media. The 
participants involved in this research project fall into two categories: observed 
participants and interview participants. I interviewed most of the MACC personnel, 
often on multiple occasions. While I observed many other QFES employees, often 
indirectly, the majority of them were not approached for an interview. During 
significant weather events, when the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC) was 
activated, I observed many hundreds of personnel conducting operations in the 
SDCC. Similarly, as I explain in Section 3.5, I participated and assisted in interviews 
with operational personnel as part of the PSBA social media review, although I did 
not observe them. 
 
Interview participants were employees of the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services who use social media in their day-to-day role. I had initially planned to 
interview other QFES personnel who were involved in community engagement and 
on-the-ground operations, and managers in particular across various branches. I soon 
found that, given social media operated in a silo within MACC with little strategic 
input from other teams beyond that, these interviews would be of little value and 
outside the scope of this research. I had also intended to interview QFES personnel 
who use social media for operational, intelligence-gathering purposes; however as I 
explain in Section 3.5, my attempts to arrange these interviews were unsuccessful.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I often refer to “operational personnel”. When referring to 
operational personnel I am broadly referring to specially trained fire and emergency 
management professionals, as well as specialists such as fire communications 
officers, community safety officers, fire investigators and engineers, swift water 
rescue technicians and HazMat scientists, as well as Rural Fire Service (RFS) and 
State Emergency Services (SES) volunteers. The QFES organisational structure I 
provide in Appendix E indicates where the operational personnel fit within the 
different branches of the organisation. I also include members of the executive—
“which includes the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant 
Commissioners and any staff at the Senior Executive Service level” (Queensland 
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Government, 2014, p 42)—within this broad “operational personnel” category. 
However, I do discuss the executive in Chapter 5 specifically, regarding their 
understanding of the purpose of social media for the organisation. 
 
3.2.1.2 Ethnographic field notes 
Like all ethnographers, I kept detailed field notes during my fieldwork. Field notes 
constitute “jottings, full notes [written up field notes], intellectual ideas, and 
emotional reflections that are created during the fieldwork process” (O’Reilly, 2008, 
p. 70). My field notes include approximately 300 pages of handwritten notes and 
diagrams, recorded during meetings and workshops, discussions with individual 
participants, or general observations while I was at QFES. I also frequently noted 
down things of interest and relevance while off-site, usually to follow up with my 
participants when next on-site. I typically kept bullet-point style notes during 
observations and would occasionally develop these into full-blown recollections 
including relevant contextual information about the incident, which I typed up at the 
end of the day to print and add to my field journals.  
 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, due to the conditions of my ethics approval, I only 
used my observations to establish general patterns within the organisation. I found it 
useful and important however to document quotes, as they expressed particular 
opinions towards the organisation or current practice at that point in time. I often 
referred to participants’ earlier comments in later interviews with them, to delve 
deeper into their opinions towards current practice and provide them with the 
opportunity to expand on their earlier comments, demonstrating how the different 
components of my chosen methods worked effectively together. Note-taking during 
the research process was relatively easy given that observed participants were aware 
of my role, which was not the case for the participants in the scenarios recounted by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), which required secrecy due to the covert nature of 
the research (p. 143). 
 
My field notes also include handouts from meetings and slides from internal 
workshops and training sessions, as well as publicly available legislation and media 
releases. While on-site during my fieldwork, I also had access to the QFES intranet 
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and shared computer drive. Through this access, I retrieved copies of numerous 
government policies, internal reviews and reports obtained with permissions granted 
by QFES and with their full knowledge, when they were not publicly available. Of 
particular relevance to this study, I accessed QFES’s social media policies and shared 
MACC documents such as team manuals, processes and templates for warnings or 
updates. These internal social media policies and guidelines were particularly 
important to my study. I discuss them in Chapter 6, explaining how my participants 
did not frequently refer to the organisation’s Social Media Strategy document as their 
use of social media evolved, and how some of the policies were cumbersome for 
those responsible for social media.  
 
Soon after commencing my study, I began following the organisation on Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram through my personal accounts on these platforms. When I 
began my fieldwork, the social media manager authorised administrative access to 
the QFES Facebook account for me. This allowed me to access insightful analytics 
about their Facebook page and audience, as well as detailed analytics about each 
post. These were useful for my own contextual information, but also for prompting 
discussions with participants. For example, being able to retrieve a graph detailing 
QFES’s dramatically increased Facebook page ‘likes’ in the lead up to key events 
such as Tropical Cyclones Ita and Marcia, provided interesting conversation starters 
with my participants about the public’s reliance on official agencies’ social media 
accounts as a source of information during events. I have provided screen shots of 
these graphs in Figure 1 for reference. 
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I regularly captured screenshots from social media to document noteworthy 
interactions (either agency-to-follower/s or follower/s-to-agency). My participants 
frequently referred to a particular social media post or follower comment; on those 
occasions I later found the relevant post, screen captured it, and documented it in my 
field notes with explanatory annotations such as “See screenshot ‘QFRS fire permit 
ban’”. I captured over 300 screen shots in total, primarily from QFES’s social media 
pages but also from other relevant agencies such as the Queensland Police Service, 
whose social media style and tone I interrogate in Chapter 6 in comparison to those 
of QFES.   
 
Figure 1 Increased QFES Facebook page 'likes' leading up to TC Ita (April 2014) and TC Marcia 
(February 2015) 
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My administrative access to the QFES Facebook page also allowed me to view 
hidden or removed comments; a participant’s decision to hide a comment often 
provided an interesting topic of conversation between participants and myself. The 
rule-breaking activity that I examine in Chapter 6 is one such example, as without 
this administrative access I would not have seen this interaction. My discussions with 
different participants about this incident also revealed their contrasting views on page 
moderation and the individual judgement calls about social media in general, a key 
finding of this thesis.  
 
In August 2013, four months into my research and before I had even begun my 
fieldwork, I began recording the number of followers the organisation had on 
Facebook and Twitter, and continued tracking these figures throughout the remainder 
of my study. As a point of comparison, and knowing how well established and 
popular they were on social media, I also tracked the Queensland Police Service 
(QPS). In mid-2015, towards the end of my fieldwork, after noting a growing 
enthusiasm for Instagram within the media team, I also began tracking QFES, QAS 
and QPS’s Instagram followers. I initially used this data to inform my contextual 
understanding of each organisation’s popularity and its rate of growth across the 
different social media platforms on which it maintained a presence. As I demonstrate 
in Chapter 6, I was eventually able to use this data to measure whether there was 
evidence to support some of my participants’ assumptions about their popularity on 
Twitter. 
 
3.2.2 In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
In addition to my observations, I conducted twenty-five interviews with QFES 
participants. The interview process provided relevant personnel at QFES an 
opportunity to reflect on the place of social media within their role and potential 
areas for exploration in the future. It also allowed me to explore the cultural, 
ideological and managerial conditions identified by McNutt (2014) that are shaping 
current practice within such organisations, which answers my first research question.  
 
As McCracken (1988) noted, in-depth interviews allow a researcher to “get under the 
commonplace view of the activity and see how the individual really sees and 
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experiences it” (p. 72). Although I had questions prepared, the semi-structured nature 
of these interviews provided an opportunity to further draw out issues I had 
observed, or comments that participants had made during observations that would 
have been inappropriate for me to address at the time in front of their colleagues. The 
semi structure also meant there was flexibility to explore particular topics as they 
emerged during the interview and to ask follow up questions. Interviews are a useful 
addition to the data gathered through observations because, as Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007) note, it is not possible to gather all information about an event by 
simply observing it (p. 98). Interviews allowed me to establish a conversation with 
my participations, and Kvale (2007) claims that it is, “through conversations [that] 
we get to know other people, get to learn about their experiences, feelings and hopes 
and the world they live in" (p. 1). This combination of observation and interview 
methods was particularly effective given the restrictions of my university ethics 
clearance, which meant I was unable to directly quote from my observations.  
 
I conducted three “phases” of interviews throughout this study. This occurred 
organically in response to internal and external events, and I conducted these phases 
at varying intervals across my two years of fieldwork. Interviews across all phases 
ranged in length depending on participants, averaging 45 minutes in duration. As I 
outline in Chapter 4, in mid-2014 the PSBA’s newly appointed executive director of 
media initiated a review of QPS and QFES’s social media activities. An external 
contractor—a former member of the Department of Community Safety’s All Hazards 
Information Management System (AHIMS) team who had intimate knowledge of the 
organisation’s social media history—conducted this review, which included 
interviews with key stakeholders at each organisation.  
 
The contractor permitted me to observe and participate in the eight face-to-face 
interviews they conducted with Kedron-based QFES personnel3 in early-June 2014. 
Participants included members of the media team (managers and media officers) as 
well as three operational employees from the Emergency Services Complex (within 
which the State Disaster Coordination Centre is located), to understand the 
                                                
 
3 The reviewer also conducted phone interviews with QFES operational personnel located outside of 
Brisbane, although I did not participate in these interviews. 
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organisation’s use of social media to gather intelligence. As a requirement of my 
participation, I agreed that I would not identify any of these participants because the 
reviewer maintained their anonymity in their report. Where I use quotes from these 
interviews throughout this thesis, I note either ‘media team member’ or ‘emergency 
services personnel’ after their statement.  
 
While the reviewer allowed me to ask questions, I did so infrequently, mostly to seek 
clarification from the participant or to ask a follow up question, largely observing 
rather than actively leading these interviews. I was cautious about how I used the 
material gathered from these interviews as I did not have autonomy over the format 
and the questions asked. I am critical in my interpretation of these interview 
transcriptions when referring to them in Chapter 4 especially, learning from the 
recommendations of Becker and Geer (1960; cited by Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007) who note: 
It is important to ensure that conclusions about the perspectives of 
participants are not entirely reliant on solicited answers, otherwise we may 
be misled by reactivity, by the effects of the researcher’s questions on what 
is said (p. 101).  
Nonetheless, these interviews were beneficial in developing my understanding of the 
factors shaping the organisation’s uses of social media, and the organisation’s ad hoc 
and experimental use of social media to gather intelligence, which I examine in 
Chapter 6.  
 
I conducted my second phase of interviews in late August 2014, about six months 
after formally commencing observations at QFES. I co-presented a paper at the 
International Communications Association (ICA) regional conference the following 
October (Potter, Newton, Burgess and Bruns, 2014). This paper investigated ‘The 
Roles and Self-Definitions of Key Crisis Communication Organisations in a Natural 
Disaster’, presenting Tropical Cyclone (TC) Ita that had occurred in April 2014 as a 
case study. I conducted five interviews with members of the QFES media team to 
understand their role in this event. These interviews were helpful in determining how 
the organisation uses social media differently during disasters than routine activities, 
in understanding my participants’ numerous responsibilities during events, and for 
expanding on some of the incidents I had observed during the event.  
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I conducted the third and final phase of interviews over a two-week period at the end 
of my fieldwork in mid-August 2015, and posited these interviews as wrap-up 
interviews. I conducted eleven interviews with every member of the media team 
including managers, except for one participant who cancelled due to a family 
emergency. I used these interviews as an opportunity to reflect on how the team’s 
social media use evolved during my fieldwork, and built on various discussions that I 
had with participants throughout my time on-site. The format of these interviews thus 
differed with each participant.  
 
Questions around participant identification also arose during some interviews. At the 
beginning of each interview, as per my ethics arrangements, each participant signed a 
consent form allowing me to record the interview. I also requested each participant 
check ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to being identified. I told participants that I would never identify 
them by name, only position. For example, I would identify someone as a “media 
officer” and as one of 5-10 media officers employed at the time this would mostly 
protect their identity. However, in the case of a social media manager, media director 
or others who are the only one in that position, identification by position is 
effectively personal identification. Some of these participants raised concerns, doing 
so in the interests of quality research outcomes for me rather than their own personal 
concerns. For those participants, we agreed that I would negotiate with them on a 
case-by-case basis regarding any of their statements about which I wished to identify 
them by position.  
 
I audio recorded all interviews, with participants’ permission, and hand wrote notes 
throughout interviews, adding contextual information to transcripts immediately 
afterwards. I transcribed all interviews with the assistance of a professional 
transcriber. While I transcribed all interviews verbatim, I edited the transcriptions to 
remove grammatical errors and verbal tics (“umms” and “ahhhs”, “you know”, 
“like”, stutters, and repeated words), unless these were relevant. As I have noted, the 
quotes that I use throughout this thesis come only from interviews or personal email 
communication, and I have edited the interview material I use in this thesis for clarity 
and flow.  
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3.3 RESEARCHER’S POSITION 
I explained earlier in this chapter how I adopted Gold’s (1958) participant-as-
observer role, however as scholars such as Denscombe (2014) have argued, it is 
important to reflect on and clarify the researcher’s background and biases to establish 
how they shape their depiction of events (pp. 88-90). First, I come from a similar 
education and employment background to many of my participants, having 
completed a media and communications undergraduate academic degree and 
subsequently worked for one year as a marketing and communications officer. My 
responsibilities in this role were similar to those of my participants, including 
managing social media accounts, disseminating media releases, and liaising with 
journalists. My academic qualifications and professional skills therefore provided 
suitable preparation to adopt this participant-as-observer role, as I was familiar with 
many of the responsibilities of a media team member when I began my fieldwork.  
 
Second, being a similar age to many of the media officers in particular—who, as I 
explain in Chapter 4, were typically in their mid to late-20s—enabled me to engage 
with them on a personal level from the beginning, which meant I easily built rapport. 
The relationship that I built with my participants meant that they were often frank in 
their discussions of their individual roles, the team, and the organisation more 
broadly.  
 
Finally, living in Christchurch, New Zealand during the devastating earthquakes of 
September 2010 and February 2011 (and subsequent aftershocks), fundamentally 
shaped my views of this research topic and provided some motivation for beginning 
this study in the first instance. Through this experience, I developed an appreciation 
for the value and necessity of timely information during a natural disaster, and 
recognised the role that social media could play in delivering such information. 
Therefore, I entered my field site as an advocate for social media, which undoubtedly 
shaped my perceptions of QFES’s social media activities.  
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the methods I have employed throughout this study to 
study the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services’ use of social media, and answer 
the following two research questions:  
1. What are the factors shaping emergency management organisations’ use of 
social media?  
2. How do emergency management organisations use social media? 
 
Scholars (Plotnick et al., 2015; Mergel, 2013b) have recognised a need for empirical 
research to establish what is actually occurring in these organisations; therefore the 
methodological approach applied in this study fills a gap in the existing body of 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The combination of observation and interviews as 
part of my overarching ethnographic approach was effective in drawing out some of 
my observations and providing participants with the opportunity to expand on any 
comments they had previously made. As I noted, this approach was also useful in 
overcoming the restrictions of my QUT ethics agreement, which did not permit me to 
quote from my observations. Having applied these methods, the next three chapters 
thus present the findings of my study. 
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Chapter 4: Situating social media in the 
organisation 
The organisational restructure discussed in Chapter 3 is more than just the 
background context for data gathering; it is a story in its own right. This chapter 
provides a chronological background narrative of the introduction of social media to 
the organisation, and its positioning and repositioning during a period of intense 
organisational disruption. I begin by providing an overview of the branch within 
which I embedded myself during my fieldwork to understand the key players 
involved responsible for social media. I then demonstrate how the broader 
organisational and political disruption had a direct impact on the positioning of the 
social media function, and the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) 
branch. The second half of this chapter then describes the introduction of social 
media, which occurred before I began my observations. I explain the resistance 
towards social media from some members of the MACC branch, which builds a 
foundation for later examining some media officers’ resistance once their role had 
expanded to include social media. This chapter, along with the following chapter, 
directly answers RQ1: what are the factors shaping the organisation’s use of social 
media. 
 
4.1 THE MEDIA AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS (MACC) 
BRANCH  
Figure 2 depicts the structure of the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) 
branch, which is the focus of much of this chapter. I highlight the new positions 
added during my fieldwork in green, while I have included short notes about specific 
positions below the diagram. That ‘social media officers’ is slightly blurred indicates 
these positions disbanded during my fieldwork, which I outline in this chapter. I have 
shaded the six manager positions to indicate that these are the positions I refer to 
when speaking about the collective “media team managers” throughout this thesis; 
note that “media team managers” refers to a group of managers and differs from 
“media manager” which is one participant’s specific role.  
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The size of the MACC branch fluctuated throughout my fieldwork; the 
organisational restructure brought on by changes recommended through the Keelty 
Review significantly impacted on the branch. When I commenced observations in 
late 2013, the branch included approximately 19 staff comprised of the media 
director, a team of media officers managed by two managers (media manager and 
media supervisor)4, a social media team managed by one social media manager, a 
small internal communications team and a sponsorship manager. Following the 
organisational restructure, the branch was reduced to 11 members, as the social 
media and internal communications teams were disbanded, with members reallocated 
to different agencies. The media team was reduced due to team member reallocations 
to other agencies and one staff member’s resignation. In addition to losing team 
members, the media team also assumed responsibility for social media.  
 
                                                
 
4 The media manager oversees all media activities in the team while the media supervisor oversees the 
day-to-day operations like rostering and administrative processes—although media officers approach 
the Manager and Supervisor equally for messaging approvals. 
1 Appointed following establishment of PSBA 
2 New role, re-added towards end of fieldwork, after position disbanded following organisational restructure 
3 New role, added in later stage of fieldwork 
4 Produces digital content of QFES operational activities to distribute to the mainstream media and public (via QFES social media 
accounts), such as the ‘Back to the Brass Helmet’ series.  
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Manager 
Multimedia 
Manager4 
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Figure 2 Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) branch structure 
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By the end of my fieldwork, the branch size had increased to about 20 members 
following the addition of new media officers, the reinstatement of an internal 
communications team, a new three-person multimedia team, and an additional media 
supervisor to deliver media training throughout the organisation. Details about 
MACC’s size increase and decrease provides a contextual background of the 
organisational instability that my participants were exposed to, which is common for 
government departments and not particular to this organisation.  
 
The media director oversees all activities within the Media and Corporate 
Communications (MACC) branch. As I note in section 4.7, an executive director of 
media was appointed upon the PSBA’s establishment to oversee the QPS and QFES 
media, corporate communications and public affairs functions. The media manager 
oversees two media supervisors and the team of media officers, who manage and 
respond to media enquiries, coordinate responses and interviews, compose and issue 
community warnings, promote the organisation and its personnel (including 
volunteers), develop media campaigns (including disaster preparedness campaigns 
for bushfire and storm/cyclone seasons), and deliver media training. After the 
disbanding of the social media team, the social media manager was the only former 
team member to remain at the rebranded Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. 
Their job title eventually changed from social media manager to communications 
manager—neither a promotion nor a demotion—to better reflect their adapted role 
that now (according to the QFES intranet description of MACC) broadly included 
responsibility for social media strategy, general communications advice, 
coordinating graphic design services on the organisation’s behalf, and monitoring 
compliance with corporate identity guidelines.  
 
I found however that after the social media team disbanded, this manager became 
uncertain about the scope and purpose of their role. As the media officers assumed 
responsibility for social media, the manager moved away from the social media 
space and did not maintain consistent responsibility for the social media strategy. 
Instead, as I explain in Chapter 6, the media team did not often engage in any 
strategic social media use. This communications manager’s role differs from that of 
the new communications manager appointed towards the end of my fieldwork, who 
manages a team of three communications officers and oversees the organisation’s 
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internal communication and corporate communication activities. The multimedia 
team, led by the multimedia manager, captures, edits and publishes multimedia 
content (photos, videos and audio) to promote QFES operational activities and 
distribute to mainstream media organisations and the public via the QFES social 
media pages.  
 
The team members with whom I primarily engaged—media team managers, media 
officers and social media team members—mostly came from print or radio 
journalism backgrounds. All had completed tertiary education. Most had journalism 
or communications degrees, and one media officer had a business degree and came 
from an advertising background. As I noted in Chapter 2 and observe in Chapter 5, 
many of my participants applied a journalistic framework to their roles as 
government communications professionals. The media officers were typically in 
their mid to late-20s to early-30s, while managers were approximately between 35 
and 50 years old.  
 
Many of the media team members—and managers especially—had completed 
tertiary education before digital and social media units became a core component of 
more recent university courses. None of my MACC participants had operational-
specific training in fire and rescue or emergency management. Many of the team 
managers had worked in other government departments before joining the 
organisation, and print or radio journalism roles before that, while media officers had 
typically worked in print journalism or local government communications roles. 
Unlike the Queensland Police Service and other law enforcement and emergency 
management agencies, which sometimes recruit ex-frontline staff that have moved to 
desk jobs, media team members were primarily external hires. Some appointments 
came following recommendations from other Queensland government departments; 
hence, a number of my participants had experience working in multiple government 
agencies. The social media team, appointed in January 2012, was an exception. As I 
note in the early parts of this chapter, two social media officers were external 
appointments while two were internal appointments. 
 
Many media team members—usually junior team members or new additions to the 
team—were on fixed-term contracts that were typically reviewed annually, while 
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senior media officers had permanent positions. MACC managers, to my knowledge, 
all had permanent positions. Social media officers, to my knowledge, were also on 
fixed-term contracts while the social media manager had a permanent position 
having worked for the Queensland government for some time.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate how the position and structure of the social 
media team was unstable in the organisation; frequent changes to the team structure 
and staffing demonstrated this instability. While the media team as a unit was 
relatively stable and secure within the organisation, individual positions were not 
always; new recruits were usually hired on an initial fixed-contract, and promotion 
from a fixed-term contract to a permanent contract was cause for celebration within 
the tight-knit team.  
 
4.2 POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN QUEENSLAND 
This study began and developed during a period of ongoing political and 
organisational disruption in Queensland. I unpack this organisational disruption 
throughout this chapter, as it had a significant impact on the organisation’s social 
media use. It is important to first situate this organisational disruption within 
Queensland’s political context. Even before this study begins, the outcome of the 
2012 state election shaped this project to some degree. In March 2012, the-then 
opposition Liberal National Party (LNP) beat the incumbent Anna Bligh-led Labor 
Party to win the state election in a landslide victory. Leading the LNP to victory was 
Campbell Newman, the former Lord Mayor of Brisbane who, until the election, had 
not held a seat in the state parliament. The change in government was particularly 
noteworthy, as the Labor Party had governed Queensland for five consecutive terms 
before the 2012 election.  
 
In the lead up to the election, Premier Anna Bligh had led Queensland through a 
particularly meteorologically turbulent period. The destructive Queensland floods 
began in December 2010 and lasted until mid-January 2011, impacting on central 
and southern Queensland and causing 33 fatalities5 and billions of dollars of damage 
                                                
 
5 In addition, three people remain missing (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2012, p. 386) 
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(Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2012). Tropical Cyclone Yasi—a 
category 5 cyclone—formed in late January and hit northern Queensland in early 
February 2011, causing additional billions of dollars’ worth of damage. Despite 
Bligh’s positively perceived handling of these events, Queenslanders’ disapproval of 
other Labor government policies caused an election defeat, bringing in the new 
Premier Campbell Newman.  
 
During his term as Premier, Campbell Newman became a somewhat disliked and 
divisive figure in Queensland, becoming unpopular with many Queenslanders 
because of controversial policies including significant cuts to public service jobs. 
These public service job cuts affected the-then Department of Community Safety 
(DCS), which lost over three hundred employees. Nevertheless, the cuts to DCS were 
not as severe as to other government departments such as Queensland Health and the 
Department of Transport and Main Roads. As the data in Appendix A shows6, a 
number of departments lost over 20% of their staff. A continual pattern of 
restructuring is not atypical of government, however in this case it also occurred 
during a period of political instability in Queensland. As I explain throughout this 
thesis, this instability generated feelings of uncertainty amongst many of my 
participants about their work and their job security.  
 
In early January 2015, Premier Newman announced the Queensland election would 
take place on 31 January, surprising many people who had anticipated the election 
would occur some time in the following months. Many speculated the announcement 
was intended to surprise the opposition Labor Party, who at the time held only nine 
seats in the Queensland parliament compared to the LNP’s seventy-three seats (see 
Beaumont, 2015 for a comprehensive review of this election). The Labor Party went 
on to win the election; although short of leading a majority government, they 
received the support of independent members of parliament (MPs) and formed 
government in February 2015 led by new Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk. These 
brief details about Queensland’s most recent political history are important, as they 
                                                
 
6 For reference, this appendix contains a complete list of the Queensland public servant redundancies 
under the Newman government. I have broken this down by department, while also separately 
ordering the data by number of jobs cut and as a percentage of staff made redundant in each 
department. In total, the government cut over ten thousand public servant positions, nearly 6% of the 
total Queensland government public servant workforce. 
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build a clearer picture to understand the ongoing political and organisational 
disruption within which my participants operated, which I explain throughout this 
chapter.  
 
4.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UPTAKE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
The origins of this study can essentially be traced back to when the organisation first 
decided to experiment with what was then a largely unfamiliar world of social media, 
establishing its own Facebook pages (initially), and later Twitter and other social 
media accounts once it had established a formal social media team. As I noted in 
Chapter 2, initial social media experimentation is typical of government (Kavanaugh 
et al., 2012), although the researchers note it can be problematic when 
experimentation creates uncertainty. For QFES, this early experimentation seemed 
advantageous rather than problematic. As I describe in Section 4.4, once the social 
media team began, team members shared a clear understanding of their purpose and 
role.  
 
When I began my fieldwork, I immediately tried to establish who was responsible for 
championing the organisation’s social media efforts and getting them off the ground. 
I wanted not only to establish who were social media champions in the organisation, 
but also to get an accurate reflection of any struggles or resistance that any 
responsible individuals may have experienced in the early stages of the 
organisation’s social media efforts. Previous research has established that resistance 
to technological change and innovation is common in many organisations (see Usher, 
2014 for examples of journalistic resistance towards the conversational potentials of 
social media, or Boczkowski, 2004a; 2004b for his observations of the innovation-
resistant culture in many news organisations). Therefore, I wanted to establish 
whether there were similar patterns of resistance in this organisation.  
 
I received conflicting accounts about who was responsible for establishing social 
media, most likely because either several individuals wanted to claim credit or 
because multiple people or teams were actually simultaneously championing the 
cause, perhaps even ignorant of other social media championing efforts occurring 
elsewhere in the organisation. In their government social media adoption model, 
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Mergel and Bretschneider (2013) suggest that instances of “multiple versions of the 
same technology being used at one time in different places or even in the same 
offices of an organization” are common during the first stage of adoption (p. 391), 
therefore this simultaneous championing is likely.  
 
From the beginning of my fieldwork, some within the existing Media and Corporate 
Communications (MACC) branch claimed responsibility for establishing social 
media. One particular team member informed me they had championed the cause for 
many months before the organisation established its two Facebook pages, the 
Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) and State Emergency Services (SES) 
being the first two social media pages established. This team member expressed 
frustration that for so long they had pushed for a social media presence and received 
persistent resistance from management, while QPS’s social media successes were 
widely cited as one of the reasons for the organisation’s social media adoption7. 
Mergel (2016) notes that “external triggers create motivation to adapt new 
technologies” (p. 147), therefore it is likely that a combination of QPS success and 
internal agitators contributed towards the organisation’s social media adoption.  
 
The release of the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Interim Report in 
August 2011 and Final Report in March 2012, and the Queensland government’s 
response to these reports, are also likely contributing factors for the uptake of social 
media by the organisation. Regarding public communication and information, these 
reports stipulated “[t]he need for improved information access, both within the 
Department of Community Safety (DCS) and in the broader disaster management 
community” (Fisher, 2012). Regarding social media specifically, the Interim Report 
commended the Queensland Police Service’s (QPS) social media use during the 
floods, noting “[w]here it was used, social media was found to be an effective way to 
provide information to the community” (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 
2011, p. 132). The report also noted that the Brisbane City Council’s Facebook and 
Twitter pages were widely accessed for information during the event (Queensland 
                                                
 
7 I have outlined QPS’s social media use during the 2010-11 floods in Chapter 2. For a 
comprehensive, internally produced account of their social media use see Queensland Police Service 
(n.d.); for an analysis of QPS’s use of Twitter during the Queensland floods see Bruns et al. (2012) 
and Shaw et al. (2013). 
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Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2011, p. 132). The Final Report ultimately 
recommended: 
Councils that have not already done so should consider how social media 
may be used effectively to provide accurate information about flood levels 
and local conditions to residents during a flood event. (Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry, 2012, p. 635)  
The impetus to use social media was quite clear. The Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry had recommended authorities (local councils specifically) 
adopt social media due to community members’ widespread use, and to employ a 
range of systems to disseminate warnings and not solely use channels that rely on the 
landline electricity grid (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2012, p. 635). 
Likewise, Queensland Police Service’s success in the lead up to and during the 2010-
11 floods was further proof of the potential value of social media for Australian 
emergency management organisations.  
 
In August 2011, the then-Queensland Premier Anna Bligh released a response to the 
Interim Report (see Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2011). The response 
explained that the Queensland government had already “improved local warning 
systems including SMS alerts and use of social media” (p. 3), while also outlining its 
new education and disaster preparedness campaign, ‘Get Ready Queensland’, which 
included a social media component (p. 8). Most relevant to this study, the response 
outlined the government’s $4.2 million allocation in the 2011-12 State Budget to 
establish the All Hazards Information Management System (AHIMS), in order “to 
provide an information pipeline to build capacity for information sharing across 
communities” (p. 28).  
 
According to the Queensland government’s response, one of the responsibilities of 
the AHIMS project team was establishing “a Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
Facebook and Twitter presence, and the Emergency Services website” (Department 
of the Premier and Cabinet, 2011, p. 28). The organisation established its QFRS 
Facebook and Twitter pages in mid-2011, according to information on the accounts 
themselves, recollections from participants, and information provided to members of 
the organisation via its internal publication (see Queensland Government, 2011). 
This statement in the Government’s response thus supports the claim made to me by 
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a former member of the AHIMS team. They claimed responsibility, on behalf of their 
former team, for partially establishing the organisation’s social media presence and 
driving forward the early stages of the organisation’s social media efforts. However, 
without having been there at the time I do not know for sure whether some behind-
the-scenes championing of social media also helped to establish their social media 
presence. The government’s investment in social media signals a top-down directive. 
While individual social media champions are important—Latonero and Shklovski 
(2011) stress the importance of “technological evangelists” within emergency 
management organisations—additional funding and staff are required to properly 
manage new functions, and the support of managers is valuable in attracting 
resources in all organisations (Paulussen, 2011). By funding this AHIMS project and 
specifically mentioning social media, the government signalled its view that social 
media serve a potentially valuable operational purpose. 
 
4.4 ENTERING THE SOCIAL MEDIA SPACE 
Out of the All Hazards Information Management System (AHIMS) project, and 
following a three-month social media trial in 2010 that was extended until the end of 
April 2011, the DCS established a twelve-month team in January 2012 to more 
formally trial social media. Managed by a social media manager, the social media 
team comprised of four social media officers (two externally appointed and two 
internally appointed) and one senior social media officer. These team members each 
had differing professional backgrounds, but came from traditional journalism, 
advertising, communications or administrative roles before joining the social media 
team. One former social media team member told me that they were always aware 
the position was only for twelve months in the beginning, but hoped the project was 
extended because the then Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) 
Commissioner Lee Johnson supported social media. The social media team was part 
of the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) branch and positioned within 
the Corporate Support Division of the DCS, which also included finance, business, 
information systems and corporate governance divisions. I depicted the MACC 
branch structure at the beginning of the chapter, while I have included the DCS’s 
organisational structure in Appendix B.  
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Former members of the original social media team told me that once they had firmly 
established social media, the team shared a clear understanding of their purpose. 
They recalled how the organisation adopted particular platforms because they were 
growing in popularity amongst the wider public; organisational decision-makers thus 
deemed it necessary to have an online presence on these platforms and in doing so 
reinforced the findings of scholars like Mergel (2015) who observed that 
governments are responding to citizens’ increased expectations that they be 
accessible online.  
 
One former team member recalled that establishing a presence on social media 
provided a means of making the organisation more transparent, accessible and 
relatable to followers: 
Social media obviously was this big upcoming thing and there was obviously 
a recognition for a need to be in that space as well as to break down barriers 
and get closer to the public I suppose. You know the public obviously are 
aware of Queensland Fire and what they did but didn't really have a way to 
engage with them unless they were involved in an incident I suppose. 
(Former social media officer, July 2015) 
We can see here that the organisation’s motivations for joining social media align 
with the e-government principles outlined in Chapter 2 (see Bertot et al., 2010): to 
change the relationship and interaction between government and constituents, thus 
making them more transparent. Ultimately, the team understood what their role 
involved. Primarily, they needed to grow the organisation’s visibility on social media 
through increased Facebook page ‘likes’ on the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
and Queensland State Emergency Services Facebook pages. Their role also involved 
establishing pages for the other agencies within the Department of Community 
Safety portfolio and expanding on to other platforms including Twitter, YouTube 
and Instagram. Recognising they were new to this space, they monitored other 
organisations for ideas, such as the already-successful Queensland Police Service: 
The role at the start was to basically familiarise ourselves with the page, 
familiarise what was on the page which wasn’t much at the time, look at 
examples of how we were going to get more people on board. That was the 
first sort of idea, really getting the message out there and getting people to 
‘like’ the page. (Former social media officer, January 2014) 
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Paulussen (2016) describes this as ‘interorganizational imitation’, noting risk-
aversity in media organisations stifles experimentation and results in “a high degree 
of mimicry and contingency” (p. 195). We can see evidence of this more broadly in 
the government social media space, as different agencies increasingly experiment 
with new, often witty ways to deliver what is typically dry content. As I point out in 
Chapter 6 however, QFES did not always agree with QPS’s boundary-pushing social 
media style, therefore it would be accurate to categorise this as “interorganizational 
inspiration” rather than imitation.  
 
According to former members, the social media team operated effectively with a 
well-balanced mix of skills between team members. This included a mix of written 
communication skills, graphic design skills, technical skills and strategic planning 
skills, with certain team members stronger in particular areas. While this was 
beneficial to the team at the time, as I explain later in the chapter, it did mean that 
when the team eventually disbanded and team members who had those skills left, the 
organisation’s social media endeavours suffered.  
 
From discussions with former members of the social media team, it was evident that, 
despite having government support to begin using social media, there was a lot of 
internal resistance towards them. This resistance was largely from personnel outside 
of their branch such as operational personnel, who did not understand the broader 
purpose of social media within the organisation or how it could be of value to them 
operationally. When social media functions are positioned within existing 
communications teams, we can understand how, by default, many organisations 
simply employ social media as an extension of existing communications strategies 
(see Mergel, 2013a; 2016), as there is not the buy-in from other personnel to employ 
social media in more advanced ways. As I explain shortly, some of this resistance 
also came from colleagues at a similar level within their branch. This behaviour 
mirrors the findings of other scholars in comparable organisational contexts, such as 
Paulussen (2016), who outlined similar intra-organisational tension in newsrooms 
between previously separated teams, each with distinct cultures, which must now 
work alongside one another.  
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One former member of the team outlined a series of phases they believed the 
organisation underwent—initial outright resistance shifting towards a slow 
realisation that social media could be beneficial to the organisation:  
We started off with total rejection. It was just total rejection of the idea and 
really active resistance. Then there was a reluctant acceptance that social 
media was around and [the organisation] might have to do it and that was 
because of what the cops [QPS] did. But there was little expectation that 
we'd succeed, so quite frankly they set up the team and the [attitude] was 
“set them up, give them six months, they'll fail and then we'll shut it”. Then 
there was token acceptance as we started to get things right and actually have 
some wins. Then the agency moved through what I'd call scrambling 
adoption, sort of where we are to some extent where it's like “oh okay, well 
this is actually useful” and there is bits and pieces and pockets everywhere 
scrambling to get hold of and get a handle of it and, but there's not a great 
understanding. (Former social media team member, June 2014)  
The resistance described above is evidently due to an organisation-wide lack of 
understanding about social media and its purpose in the organisation. The phases this 
participant described mirror and thus validate the ‘Three-Stage Adoption Process for 
Social Media Use in Government’ outlined by Mergel and Bretschneider (2013). 
Stage one, ‘intrapreneurship and experimentation’, involves informal 
experimentation by individuals with some experience of the technology that, as I 
noted earlier in this chapter, may lead to multiple instances of experimentation (pp. 
391-392). Stage two, ‘order from chaos’, leads to more consolidated uses with these 
social media “mavericks” beginning to engage with stakeholders (p. 392). Stage 
three, ‘institutionalization’, introduces protocols and policies for managing social 
media within the organisation (pp. 392-393).  
 
The above-quoted participant also describes slowly evolving views towards social 
media from others in the organisation. I explore this dissonant level of understanding 
in Chapter 5 where I discuss different expectations of social media across the 
organisation, depending on individuals’ experience and social media use. The 
participant above describes a slowly changing attitude towards social media in the 
organisation, which began with an outright rejection and a hope that the experiment 
would fail. The team’s successes no doubt boosted their morale and helped legitimise 
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them in the views of others in the organisation. However, this recollection of their 
struggle for recognition meant the team was disadvantaged from the beginning; not 
only were many of them new to the organisation, learning a new role with no prior 
model to follow, but they had to also prove their legitimacy to sceptical colleagues. 
Tensions about the role of social media are to be expected within a large public 
service organisation with diverse experience and stakeholders. As part of the project, 
I wanted to explore and unpack what this means for the way social media are used, 
which I examine in this chapter and throughout subsequent chapters.  
 
This resistance not only came from operational personnel or those with little 
understanding of the value of public information. A former social media officer 
recalled the tension between the media and social media teams, who often worked 
closely in generating and disseminating content. As I noted in the introduction, many 
of the existing media team members and managers came from, and had formal 
qualifications in, traditional (print or radio) journalism backgrounds. Having 
completed tertiary education at a time when social media were not mainstream—
compared with journalism degrees now which almost certainly include new media or 
online journalism components—these media team members had little understanding 
of the professional use and value of social media.  
 
The media team was also much larger than the social media team—around eight 
media officers plus two managers—compared with the social media team’s four 
social media officers, one senior social media officer and one manager. For media 
officers, this newly-introduced team, whose purpose they had little understanding of, 
most likely created in them a feeling of internal competition and insecurity about the 
long term impact of this new communicative function on them. A former social 
media officer described to me their perception that the media team did not view them 
as necessary or “legit”; being outnumbered by media team members most likely 
exacerbated this feeling: 
I think it took a little while for [the media team] to get used to the idea [of 
social media]. We were still very much a separate team to them. We were 
very segregated; it was very much an ‘us and them’ kind of feeling. Social 
media was so new; it wasn’t viewed as something of real importance I think, 
that’s how I felt at the time. (Former social media officer, July 2015)  
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This tension is not unique to the organisation under investigation here. Paulussen 
(2016; citing Gade, 2004) notes that tension can emerge in newsrooms between 
managers and journalists when existing work routines are significantly disrupted. In 
addition to describing such intra-organisational tension, Paulussen also notes that 
tension (or “culture clashes” as he describes them) can also exist within departments, 
giving the example of “formerly separated departments, each with their own work 
culture, who all of a sudden have to work together to make multi-platform news 
delivery possible” (p. 195).  
 
While the subjects of my study were not formerly separate departments—rather, a 
new team was created and added to an existing department—we can draw 
comparisons to the culture clash that also exists in such a situation, as the two teams 
(media team and social media team) had separate working cultures and directives 
that required amalgamation. The surfacing of such tensions becomes even more 
apparent later in this chapter, when I describe the resistance towards social media 
when the social media team disbanded and the media team adopted responsibility for 
their function. The diagram in Appendix D illustrates the positioning of the social 
media team and their manager in a separate pod across the passageway from media 
officers. This physical separation, while useful for collaboration amongst separate 
team members, perhaps further isolated the two teams and only exacerbated this self-
described segregation. 
 
This tension between the media and social media teams, and the media team’s 
resistance towards the latter, is arguably more significant than the resistance that 
came from elsewhere in the organisation. The media team, like the social media 
team, are responsible for public information. The resistance described by the former 
social media team member is again resistance to the unknown: for media team 
members, social media provided unfamiliar communicative territory, and they were 
unsure of the implications for them and their roles. Moreover, their initial resistance 
built a foundation for feelings of resentment towards social media when the media 
team eventually assumed responsibility for the function in early 2014. When the 
media team did take on this function, as I outline later in this chapter and in 
subsequent chapters, some media officers resented not only the added workload, but 
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also social media itself. As I explain, for quite some time the team viewed their 
existing media role as their primary focus, with social media an extra task to manage 
when their time, resources and attention allowed.  
 
The situation for the Department (and the MACC branch / social media team 
specifically) changed considerably with the defeat of the Bligh Labor government in 
the March 2012 Queensland state election. In October 2012, dramatic cuts to the 
public sector made by the new Queensland government, led by Premier Campbell 
Newman, meant two social media officers’ temporary contracts were not renewed. 
The configuration of the social media team changed with the loss of these two social 
media officers; however the team gained a new member through the addition of 
Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) to the Department of Community Safety 
around the same time.  
 
By now, the team had been using social media for nearly one year and had 
established a presence across multiple platforms for the various agencies under the 
DCS umbrella. The team by this point managed channels for Queensland Fire and 
Rescue Service (QFRS), Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS), Queensland State 
Emergency Services (SES)—part of Emergency Services Queensland (EMQ)—and 
Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) using Facebook and Twitter primarily while 
also maintaining profiles on YouTube, Instagram and Pinterest. The team operated 
on a roster, monitoring DCS’s social media channels from 6am until 6pm from 
Monday-Friday, and at reduced hours over the weekend during what the team 
referred to as ‘business as usual’ activities. Outside of rostered hours the manager 
was on call to respond to and report on emergencies; however rostered media officers 
from the media team would also monitor the social media channels during routine 
operations as they were on call overnight and at the weekend when out of office. 
(During an event, rosters within the MACC branch were oftentimes disregarded and 
staff would work around the clock if an event demanded this of them, as was 
required of other—particularly operational—staff at DCS). This arrangement 
remained in place throughout 2013 across a particularly active storm/cyclone season, 
which included the destructive and deadly Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Oswald. 
This was also the arrangement when I began visiting the organisation in September 
2013.  
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4.5 COMMENCING FIELDWORK AMONGST ORGANISATIONAL 
DISRUPTION 
When I commenced my fieldwork, the organisation was anticipating the release of 
the findings of the colloquially known Keelty Review, a review of the Queensland 
government’s emergency services agencies announced by Queensland Minister for 
Police and Community Safety Jack Dempsey in November 2012. The purpose of the 
review was to “investigate current organisational structures, decision making, 
emergency response capabilities and inter-agency cooperation” of the agencies 
within the Police and Community Safety portfolio (Dempsey, 2012). The former 
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Mick Keelty, led the review. The 
reviewers handed over the findings to the Queensland government in late-July 2013, 
and the ‘Sustaining the Unsustainable: Police and Community Safety Review’ was 
tabled in Parliament and publicly released a week later on 10 September 2013.  
 
Upon the government’s release of the Keelty Review, existing questions about 
organisational structure and job security remained largely unanswered. The release of 
the review confirmed the widely circulating rumour about the split and redistribution 
of the four divisions (Queensland Fire and Rescue, Queensland Ambulance Service, 
Emergency Management Queensland and Queensland Corrective Services) of the 
Department of Community Safety. The Department of Community Safety disbanded, 
with QAS relocating to Queensland Health and QCS relocating to the Department of 
Justice and Attorney General (JAG). What remained—QFRS and EMQ—combined 
and rebranded as the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES). An 
organisational chart of the now-established Queensland Fire and Emergency Services 
is provided in Appendix E. 
 
Members of the MACC branch later told me they initially feared that, given Review 
head Mick Keelty and Police and Community Safety Minister Jack Dempsey’s law 
enforcement backgrounds, the Review would serve as an “ordered by the Police, for 
the benefit of the Police” exercise. Despite fears that the review would unfairly target 
their organisation and leave the Queensland Police Service largely unaffected, some 
felt their organisation actually fared better in the review than QPS. As a participant 
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noted in a later interview: “QPS in particular had some really good hits a few years 
ago but the Keelty Review identified a few misses” (media team member, June 
2014).  
 
When discussing this with a team manager some time after the review’s release, the 
team manager referenced the review’s observation that the “outstanding contribution 
made through social networking by the Queensland Police Service media section 
during the 2010–11 floods…was not as evident in 2013” (Queensland Government, 
2013, p. 41) as somewhat of a win for their team. To them, it seemingly indicated 
that while MACC may feel somewhat overshadowed by the Queensland Police’s 
media (and particularly social media) efforts8, the Queensland Police did not 
effectively adapt to changing conditions to continue successfully using social media 
in future events. Team members were genuinely optimistic that their unit would 
remain largely unaffected. Although the Review did suggest merging QPS and DCS 
corporate support services (including media management) into a new portfolio 
(Queensland Government, 2013, pp. 36-38), managers hoped this would result in 
more staff not less.  
 
Within the following weeks, it became clear that initial optimism was premature, as 
the social media team was not only significantly affected but cut altogether. I found 
about this via an email from the social media manager: 
BTW [By the way], I lost the entire team yesterday ([name] and [name] to 
QAS and [name] QCS) as part of Keelty review changes. 
 
So it’s just me now and I have no idea what the agency’s intention is for SM 
[social media]. Needless to say, I’m a little bewildered. Let’s see what next 
week brings. (Social media manager, Personal communication, September 
2013) 
In a further follow-up, the social media manager indicated not only their view about 
the impact this restructure would have on social media as a function within the 
organisation, but also gave some insight into how this change and decisions made 
regarding the restructure were being internally communicated: 
                                                
 
8 I examine these comparisons to QPS, where one participant for example referred to themselves as 
“poor cousins” (media team member, June 2014), in Chapter 6.  
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I can only assume there’s stuff going on in the background that we’re not 
being told, so hopefully whoever is pulling the strings know what they’re 
doing and it’ll all make sense in the future. But SM as we knew it is dead. 
That might turn out okay yet. (Social media manager, Personal 
communication, September 2013) 
 
I soon learned that the senior social media officer was also relocated, leaving only 
the social media manager. The team of eight media officers were also reduced, losing 
two members to QAS and one to QCS. The remaining media team—managed by one 
media manager and one media supervisor—no longer had enough team members to 
roster media officers on-call throughout the night. This was particularly concerning 
for the team as they were in the middle of the annual bushfire season, a busy period 
of the year when the team must regularly release bushfire warnings and alerts to the 
public during the day and overnight. The Queensland Police Service (QPS) media 
and public affairs team assisted the media team by managing the on-call function 
overnight for some months as they had staff rostered 24/7, until the media team 
managers successfully agitated for extra media officers about six months later and 
could fulfil this function again. While the QFES media team fortunately had the 
support of the QPS media team, the severity and extent of these cuts were 
demonstrated—albeit temporarily—as they were unable to fulfil their communicative 
responsibilities. 
 
The social media team did not immediately know whether the loss of the social 
media officers would mean that the responsibility for their remaining QFRS and SES 
social media accounts would move to QPS or whether the remaining social media 
manager would take on additional social media content creation, moderation and 
monitoring responsibilities. This uncertainty within the team indicated not only that 
they were they not kept abreast of changes until after they had taken place, but that 
those within the team who were responsible for particular functions were not 
consulted about their resourcing needs before decisions were made. 
 
While the future for social media within the organisation remained unclear over the 
following months, and the social media and media officers designated to move to 
their new agencies following the organisational restructure remained in their existing 
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roles, the former social media manager anticipated a future where they might have to 
single-handedly manage social media. They later reflected to me that there was a 
previously unappreciated dependence on the individual skills of team members, and 
insufficient skill crossover. This meant that the absence of one or multiple 
individuals from the team also removed that skill set from the team entirely.  
 
Scholars have considered in detail the implication of gaining additional digital skills 
for employees, noting that employees may become more versatile and they may 
increase their employability (Örnebring, 2016; Saltzis, 2012). Alternatively, there is 
the possibility of an employee becoming overworked due to what Gregg (2011) 
terms “function creep” (p. 105). These previous studies clearly focus on the 
implications for the individual worker. However, this concern shared by the former 
social media manager indicates that these additional digital skills also put the 
organisation in an under-appreciated vulnerable position should the employees with 
those skills leave the organisation. The team manager often covered absent team 
members, which, while effective, was not a permanent solution to their strained 
resources and skill dependency. It also meant that the manager set aside their 
strategy-developing responsibilities in place of more pressing tasks. Thus far, the 
social media team had managed to find an approach for day-to-day operations that 
worked reasonably well, although they had not yet developed a framework for skill 
development, staff training, and knowledge transfer. While the current system 
sufficed providing nothing changed, external factors brought about significant 
change and revealed the precariousness of the arrangement. As this had until now 
remained unacknowledged, they were unable to anticipate and plan for the changes 
that they clearly saw coming.  
 
This social media team arrangement demonstrates another source of dissonance 
around the prioritisation of support for, and value of social media—including 
resourcing and staff—in the context of competing demands and agendas confronting 
senior public servants and decision makers. In order to continue operating, the social 
media team—or, what was left of it—was expected to manage by readjusting. In 
contrast, the media team received external support from QPS’s media and public 
affairs team to perform existing tasks. I describe the concept of dissonance, and the 
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sources of dissonance towards social media within the organisation, in more depth in 
Chapter 5.  
 
Within two months, the Keelty Review recommendation that the QPS and remaining 
QFRS business support services merge was confirmed, called the Public Safety 
Business Agency (PSBA). The remaining divisions of the former Department of 
Community Safety rebranded as the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. 
Rather than the merge confirmation alleviating concerns about team structures, I 
found that team members only had additional questions; questions that managers 
could not answer as they too were unaware of impending changes and their effects 
on their branch. In the meantime, team members who had been designated to move 
to their new agencies (Queensland Ambulance and Corrective Services) were still 
uncertain about the timing of this move, and would go on to have their move date 
delayed multiple times. An existing positive team culture within the media team only 
made this more difficult, as team members were unhappy about the impending split 
of their hitherto tight-knit unit.  
 
What was known at that point was that media and social media officers who were 
designated to move to their new agencies would be responsible for both social media 
and media in their new positions, regardless of their existing roles. It became clear 
also, although no one ever explicitly told me of the decision, that the remaining 
media officers in the now-rebranded QFES would assume responsibility for 
managing social media, evidence of the “function creep” described by Gregg (2011) 
and outlined in Chapter 2. For the remaining few months of 2013, the focus of the 
media and social media officers was teaching one another their roles. Media and 
social media officers job shared, teaching one another how to respond to media 
enquiries, distribute media releases, deal with regions and manage media events (in 
the case of media officers), and create social media posts, respond to and moderate 
comments, and manage the pages (in the case of social media officers). The above-
mentioned precariousness of the social media team’s existing arrangement became 
apparent, and the media and social media officers were now scrambling to do the 
knowledge sharing and training they should have done much earlier. The former 
social media manager expressed concern to me early on about this new process, 
specifically about the need to “school up” the media officers because of their 
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inexperience in the social media space. They noted that uncertainty about the future 
of social media in their organisation meant that any social media strategising within 
their team had fallen by the wayside, leading to it becoming reactive rather than 
proactive.  
 
4.6 ESTABLISHING THE PUBLIC SAFETY BUSINESS AGENCY (PSBA) 
As of 1 November 2013, the Queensland government established the Public Safety 
Business Agency (PSBA). In this section, I explain the PSBA and my participants’ 
response to its establishment and implications for their role. Some of the detail about 
the PSBA in the later part of this section—specifically its review and subsequent 
restructure—sits somewhat outside of the chronological historical narrative of this 
chapter. However, I include it at this point because the agency was established 
through the implementation of the Keelty Review changes. This section therefore 
presents somewhat of a standalone historical narrative of this new agency 
specifically. 
 
PSBA integrated corporate support personnel (including media and communications) 
from QFES and QPS with the purpose of delivering a singular support service. The 
Queensland Police Service and Queensland Fire and Emergency Services already sat 
under the same Minister for Police, Fire and Emergency Services and Minister for 
Corrective Services, although operated as distinct departments. The PSBA’s 
establishment administratively combined the two organisations’ corporate support 
services. This agency now sat alongside the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services; I have provided the organisational structures of the PSBA in Appendix C 
and of QFES (indicating where the PSBA fits alongside QFES operations) in 
Appendix E.  
 
MACC branch members speculated to me that the PSBA’s establishment might lead 
to a merge of the QPS’s public affairs team and QFES’s MACC branch. This did not 
occur, and based on my observations this adapted organisational structure did not 
affect the way MACC functioned. For that reason, I refer to my participants as 
MACC when discussing the branch more broadly, or QFES media officers or the 
QFES media team (or just the media team) rather than the PSBA media team or 
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PSBA media officers, to clearly distinguish between the QPS and QFES media 
functions.  
 
Upon the PSBA’s establishment, an externally recruited executive director of media 
was appointed. This executive director oversees the QPS and QFES media, corporate 
communications and (in the case of QPS) public affairs functions; I illustrate the 
executive director’s positioning in relation to existing MACC personnel in the 
MACC branch structure included at the beginning of this chapter (see Figure 2)9. As 
I noted in Chapter 3, in mid-2014 the PSBA’s newly appointed executive director of 
media initiated an internal (thus not publicly available) review of QPS and QFES’s 
social media activities. This review included interviews with key stakeholders at 
each organisation, an online survey for other members of each organisation, and an 
online survey for members of the public that each organisation’s respective social 
media accounts publicised. 
 
I received a copy of the report in late January 2015, about one month after it was 
finalised10. In total, the review made 21 recommendations; some recommendations 
suggested broad, overarching cultural changes such as fostering a culture within the 
organisation that values social media, with little suggestion as to how the 
organisation could achieve such change. Key recommendations that directly related 
to my participants included: 
• Developing social media strategies and policies, including a style guide for 
media officers 
• Developing a social media schedule 
• Introducing social media training for operational staff 
• Establishing a separate team in QFES to create proactive posts and campaigns 
                                                
 
9 This individual oversees the media, social media, public relations, communications, marketing and 
corporate affairs (sponsorship) functions of the PSBA and its partner organisations, the Queensland 
Police Service and Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. The media directors of both the QPS 
and QFES report directly to the executive director. During my fieldwork, the executive director 
primarily positioned themself with QPS in their Roma Street headquarters in Brisbane City, so I did 
not have much interaction with them beyond the larger Social Media in Times of Crisis project 
Industry Partner meetings. 
10 I was provided with a copy of this report; however in this thesis I treat it the same way as internal 
documents. The report noted that only nine internal staff completed the survey, which the review 
author attributed to staff’s lack of engagement with the survey or to the survey’s invisibility. 460 
people completed the public survey. 
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• Incorporating humour into posts 
• Increasing the use of Instagram, and 
• Developing partnerships with social media platform operators 
 
I noted that current practice in QPS informed some of the recommendations relating 
to QFES, for example encouraging the use of humour in posts (which QPS are 
renowned for) and establishing a separate team to create proactive posts. When I 
spoke to some QFES participants about the review after its release, they disagreed 
with some of the recommendations. Some participants felt aggrieved throughout my 
fieldwork about their constant comparison to QPS; “poor cousins” (media team 
member, June 2014) was one participant’s description of their team compared to 
QPS. Many participants felt strongly that QFES should not incorporate humour into 
their posts. I describe the reasons for this—questions about what constitutes 
appropriate government social media tone emerged constantly throughout my 
fieldwork—in Chapter 6, where I examine QFES’s use of social media to externally 
communicate.  
 
Following the change of state government that I noted earlier in this chapter, the new 
Minister for Police, Fire, and Emergency Services Jo-Ann Miller announced in June 
2015 a review of the Public Safety Business Agency, led by the Public Service 
Commission. According to the Terms of Reference, the government sought to: 
Review the scope, function and structure of the Public Safety Business 
Agency (PSBA) to ensure that it is effectively supporting public safety 
service delivery to the community, and transparent administration and 
decision-making on critical corporate decisions (Queensland Government, 
2016, p. 64).  
Discussions with participants towards the end of my fieldwork in mid-August 2015 
indicated that many anticipated the review would cause the disbanding of the PSBA. 
I discussed this in passing with one participant towards the end of my fieldwork. 
Anticipating that the PSBA would disband and that MACC would again become part 
of QFES, the participant joked that in their last seven years working for the 
organisation they would have worked for four different agencies, despite having only 
moved a few metres around the same office as role promotions necessitated, such is 
the cyclical restructuring of government agencies. While admittedly amusing, it does 
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highlight the unstable organisational environment that my participants were part of, 
and the significant amount of change that comes from the differing political priorities 
of frequently changing governments. 
 
In February 2016 my participants’ anticipation that the PSBA would disband proved 
true to a degree, with the release of the Review of the Public Safety Business Agency 
(Queensland Government, 2016). The government accepted seven of the eight 
recommendations, and while the PSBA would continue to operate as an agency, 
many of the services—including media and public communications—would shift 
back to their respective agency (Queensland Government, 2016, p. 38). During my 
fieldwork, I did not observe any impact of the PSBA’s establishment on my 
participants’ work, as it only seemed to affect their administrative duties. Its 
establishment and re-evaluation again demonstrates the impact of political and 
governmental volatility on organisational stability.  
 
4.7 MOVING THE SOCIAL MEDIA FUNCTION INTO MEDIA TEAM 
Following the Newman government’s implementation of Keelty Review 
recommendations, the social media function formally shifted into the media team in 
late 2013, as the designated media officers and social media officers transferred to 
their new agencies. The formalisation of this change came at a tumultuous time for 
the team. The organisational change, team restructure and added tasks occurred soon 
after the bushfire season and leading into the impending storm/cyclone season11, a 
busy period for the organisation. The now-reduced team experienced further strain 
with one media officer’s recent resignation and team members on leave over the 
holiday period. The first real test of the media team’s capabilities came soon after 
taking on social media, when large bushfires broke out on North Stradbroke Island 
over the 2013-14 Christmas/New Year period. At the popular tourist destination 
located a short ferry trip off the south-east Queensland mainland (between Brisbane 
and the Gold Coast), these fires continued for about two weeks and were severe 
                                                
 
11 Bushfires occur during hot, dry weather, and in Queensland the bushfire season usually extends 
from around August until December. The storm/cyclone season in Queensland typically extends from 
November until April. 
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enough for Queensland Fire and Emergency Services to issue multiple warnings, 
including one Emergency Warning (the most severe bushfire warning).  
 
Many media officers were resistant towards the addition of social media to their role, 
feeling that the additional responsibilities made their workload unmanageable.  
This raises broader questions about labour and specifically task delegation in roles 
impacted upon by evolving communications technologies (see Gregg, 2011). In the 
QFES media team, the additional workload caused resentment and some tension; 
media officers had differing understandings of social media and how it fit into their 
now adapted role. Even before they had actually assumed the responsibility, media 
officers were concerned about—and resented—how they would manage the added 
workload. Journalism scholars have observed similar tension in newsrooms, noting 
that time restrictions are a key barrier preventing journalists from adopting the 
interactive features of new technologies, with journalists instead prioritising their 
traditional roles (Paulussen, 2012; Singer et al., 2011, p. 64). This traditional role 
prioritisation is particularly relevant to this study, as I observed how my participants 
prioritised their traditional media responsibilities over social media in Chapter 5. 
 
Managers were aware of this resistance, as many media officers vocally directed 
their concerns about how they would manage the added workload towards them. As 
one manager recalls media officers’ response to their adapted role:  
Initially, a lot of resistance, not to social media, to the sheer workload. 
[Media officers said]: “My god, how are we going to do all of this?” Yeah, a 
lot of resistance. And it wasn’t to doing that [social media] it was just “how, 
how do we do all that? How do we make all this happen?” (Media team 
manager, June 2014) 
In recalling, this manager emphasised that the resistance was not towards social 
media itself but rather towards the growing workload, particularly as they had to 
manage this with a dwindling team. However, during my time at the organisation I 
did also observe some occasional resistance towards social media itself, including 
jokes about “hating” social media, frustration when dealing with disgruntled 
commenters, and occasional groans from media officers when they realised they had 
forgotten their turn at monitoring social media. Joking as it may have been on some 
occasions, it nonetheless demonstrated that while media officers directed their initial 
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resistance towards the increased workload, there were occasional instances of 
resistance towards the actual function. 
 
If we consider this in the context of the above-mentioned recollection about the 
media team’s early resistance toward social media (“…it wasn’t viewed as something 
of real importance I think…” former social media officer, July 2015), we can better 
understand this resistance. For some of the media officers, a number of whom were 
working in the organisation when the social media team started, their negativity 
towards social media originated during a time when social media was new to the 
organisation, used experimentally, and was perhaps something the media officers 
viewed as threatening their roles. Now that media officers had to assume that 
responsibility, existing hostility—and a possible fear of the unknown (a new 
technology) and their inability to adapt to it—underpinned this. 
 
This resistance towards social media perhaps also stemmed from a feeling amongst 
the media officers that they were inadequately prepared for this new responsibility. 
Not only did media officers not have formal tertiary social media education, but the 
absence of in-house training when they took on social media left many feeling 
unprepared. Media officers described some managers’ assumption that, given their 
age and personal social media use in their private time, they could manage with the 
additional responsibility. For example:  
There [were a] few comments of “you’re all Gen Y, you use social media so 
you know it”. (Media team member, June 2014) 
This assumption mirrors the findings of other scholars who have observed 
technological adoption in organisations. Gregg (2011) for example refers to the 
“generational divide [that] characterised the forms of expertise that were valued in 
information jobs” (p. 109). In her study, Gregg differentiated the (typically younger) 
recent graduates, who benefited from an interest in new technology, from the 
(“particularly older”) employees “who simply gave up trying to keep up to date with 
technology as it developed” (p. 109). A comment made by a manager in a later 
interview corroborated this media team member’s claim:  
They’re all involved in social media outside of work so they had the basics 
down pat. If you had applied what happened to our team to an older group of 
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people, and I’m not saying very old I’m saying mid-30s maybe, I would’ve 
been very interested just to see how well that would’ve been picked up. 
(Media team manager, June 2014) 
The media officer’s recollection, and the manager’s corroborating comments, is 
interesting. It indicates that managers assumed that media officers, because of their 
age (generally, between 25-35 years old compared to the roughly 35-50 year old 
managers), were proficient social media users simply because of existing evidence 
about social media user demographics. As I demonstrate shortly, this assumption was 
unreasonable. Irrespective of their age, media officers had differing understandings 
and views about the organisation’s uses of social media.  
 
Even if these assumptions about prior experience were correct, it assumes that the 
skills acquired via personal social media use adequately prepare media officers for 
professional social media use. When applying this analogy to a comparable context it 
is clearly flawed: one does not assume that someone with basic writing skills is 
equipped to work as a professional journalist. Similarly, someone who can use a 
camera is not automatically assumed to be prepared for professional photography. 
Yet, in this case, managers expected personal social media use to be adequate 
preparation for professional social media use, seemingly indicating that while social 
media may become core business, it is still seen as trivial enough, such that it does 
not require specialist skills. (Cf. Rogers’ (2014, pp. ix-xxvi) foreword in Twitter and 
Society (Weller et al., 2014). Rogers debanalises Twitter, arguing that it is not only a 
platform worthy of scholarship, but also that it is no longer a source of “pointless 
babble” but a news-sharing site that has demonstrated its value particularly during 
significant events like elections, natural and man-made disasters. 
 
Finally, the manager’s comment indicates that, even if expectations about media 
officers’ existing social media use are correct, managers are assuming equal 
experience among team members, which does not account for their differing degrees 
of knowledge and experience. This is problematic as it pools together multiple 
different platforms with different purposes, uses and functions into one unified 
concept of social media. If we again apply the journalism analogy, we can compare 
this to assuming one’s experience in radio and print journalism is adequate 
preparation for a role in online journalism. In reality, while the fundamentals are 
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similar, journalism scholars including Örnebring (2016), have noted that a degree of 
up-/re-skilling is required to manage the demands of new technologies in the 
workplace.  
 
This assumption about media officers’ individual social media use ultimately 
privileges particular platforms, though. Across my two-year fieldwork, I found that 
media team members primarily used Facebook in their personal time, mirroring 
trends of platform preferences amongst Australian social media users (see Sensis, 
2016, p. 19). Thus, managers’ assumption about the team’s preparedness by default 
privileged Facebook because of media officers’ familiarity with the platform. This 
also served to homogenise social media platforms in that it ignores that different 
social media platforms have different users, demands and requirements. This 
tendency to collapse different communication ecologies into one unified concept of 
social media can then overlook the potential affordances of some platforms’ features; 
a homogenised view towards social media platforms can lead to homogenised uses 
of social media platforms. I address this homogenised use of social media by noting 
the team’s duplication of Facebook content for Twitter in Chapter 6. Suffice to say, 
by acknowledging the differences between platforms and their users, QFES could 
adapt its content to best appeal to and have an effect on different platforms’ audience 
members. 
 
Despite managers’ apparent assumptions, it became evident throughout later stages 
of my research that members of the media team continued to feel inadequately 
equipped to manage the additional social media responsibility without any training. 
Even after managing the organisation’s social media accounts for more than six 
months, many media officers felt training would still be beneficial to give them 
confidence and additional expertise. The exception to this was one particularly 
outspoken (now former) media officer. As one team member recalled during 
interviews for the internal social media review (explained in Section 4.6), this former 
media officer received additional training in the form of one-on-one guidance 
because of their self-acknowledged inexperience:  
One of the [media officers] in the team had never used Facebook or Twitter, 
so [they] found it really difficult, [they were] quite alarmed to be honest and 
[they] made a big point of saying, “I can’t do it, you need to help me”. I 
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think if [they] sat there quietly and didn’t say anything [they] might not have 
got the training but [they were] a very vocal person in the team and made a 
point of [saying] “I just can’t make up how to do it, you need to help me 
out”. (Media team member, June 2014) 
The media officer received additional training because they had no prior social media 
experience and let that be known. Even with prior experience, media officers did not 
feel adequately prepared to take on the role and that, from my observations, only 
contributed to their reluctance towards social media. Moreover, there was an 
implication that media officers’ communications expertise provided additional 
adequate preparation. In actuality, there was an unappreciated gap between general 
communications practice and professional social media use.  
 
This ignores the specificity of social media. While there are general principles that 
do apply to both traditional and new media, specificities such as audience and 
platform considerations are overlooked. This oversight is not particular to this 
organisation, and it is not particular to emergency management organisations either. 
As I noted in Chapter 2, despite early social media proponents’ optimism that social 
media might “radically alter the communication and interaction patterns between 
government and its constituents” (Mergel, 2015, p. 456), in reality government 
agencies typically “recycle” existing communications content for social media 
(Mergel, 2013a, p. 332). This suggests that government communications departments 
more broadly are ignoring the specificities of social media, positioning social media 
within existing communications departments with little additional training.  
 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, former social media team members demonstrated a 
shared understanding of their team’s purpose and expectations around social media 
use. This understanding continued once the social media team disbanded, as former 
social media team members often described a greater educational and resilience-
building purpose that meant the organisation’s social media use could have lasting 
impact: 
We try to make sure that we are helping the public, we are answering their 
questions, we are guiding them where they can find information and we are 
educating them. Especially with bush fire season, so “I smell smoke”—“Yes 
it’s here” or “no we don’t have anything here but next time why don’t you 
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look at this” you know, trying to educate them as well. (Media team 
member, emphasis added, June 2014) 
This recollection describes not only informing the public, and responding to their 
needs at present, but also trying to introduce behavioural change. As the following 
quote from another former social media team member demonstrates, their view about 
social media is that it serves as a platform for them to engage with members of the 
public, ultimately helping them to become more responsible for their own safety and 
thus less reliant on the emergency services:  
I believe our purpose is to build resilience in the community through 
behaviour change. […] Through social media we can change their attitude, 
one Queenslander at a time, one family at a time, one street at a time to 
sharing an attitude online they don't see it as a burden or something they 
have to do, they see it as an important thing as just part of life and living in 
Queensland. If all we're doing is shouting at them, I don't think it's actually 
that effective as a tool. (Media team member, emphasis added, June 2014) 
Former social media team members often recalled their purpose as putting the public 
first: serving their needs by sharing vital information. But for them, it served a 
broader purpose that resulted in long-term change.  
 
In contrast, once the social media function moved to the media team, existing media 
officers’ understanding about the purpose of social media became less clear, and I 
noted conflicting priorities and purposes in discussions with individual team 
members. Team managers assumed media officers’ communications expertise 
provided adequate preparation to use social media, as I noted above. For that reason, 
media officers often described social media as fulfilling a specific promotional or 
(one-way) communications function. This contrasts with former social media team 
members who viewed social media as serving a broader educational and behaviour-
changing purpose. That is not to say that media officers did not care about the 
community’s interests; one media officer told me towards the end of my fieldwork, 
“we’re basically holding the hand of the community as they go through a big event or 
through a disaster” (Media officer, August 2015). This demonstrates team members’ 
genuine concern and support for community members currently experiencing 
frightening severe weather events.  
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The following quote from one media team member demonstrates their view that the 
“goals” and purpose of social media relates primarily to information dissemination. 
In their opinion, QFES’s social media platforms should prioritise warnings and 
information, ensuring followers are aware of impending dangers to appropriately 
prepare themselves: 
My perception is the Facebook page is to promote the Fire and SES services, 
to engage with the community, to give them practical information about how 
they can prepare themselves for either bushfire season or storm and cyclone 
seasons, and to give them warnings. [B]ut that’s my idea of it, it could be 
definitely incorrect but that’s just what I’ve decided over time our general 
goals are. But no I’ve never been told, “this is what we’re seeking to 
achieve”. (Media team member, emphasis added, June 2014) 
Their emphasis that these are their personal views that they “decided”, and that they 
have never been told otherwise, only further demonstrates what I observed across the 
duration of my fieldwork: that there is an underlying expectation that media officers 
must use their own judgement when deciding what to post, how to monitor different 
platforms and moderate comments.  
 
It also indicates a lack of any higher-level strategy. Although a Department of 
Community Safety Social Media Strategy document existed, media team members 
did not regularly refer to it. I discuss this in detail in Chapter 5 when analysing the 
consequences of this individual decision-making, and in Chapter 6 when I examine 
the effect of this on the organisation’s strategic social media use.  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
The introduction of social media to the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services 
came about through a combination of top-down government directives, external 
successes, and internal champions agitating for change. Like many government 
departments, QFES first employed social media somewhat experimentally with the 
eventual allocation of staff and resources later demonstrating a more formalised 
approach towards social media in the organisation. Despite this formalisation, the 
social media team’s struggle and tensions around organisational legitimacy and 
recognition for social media were evident, not only from the organisation more 
 Chapter 4: Situating social media in the organisation 101 
broadly, but from their immediate colleagues alongside whom they worked closely 
every day. The role of the social media team from the outset was thus two-fold: 
employing specific skills and expertise required to build the organisation’s social 
media presence, while simultaneously working hard to achieve wider 
acknowledgement of the significance of social media and its role in the organisation. 
 
As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, the organisational restructure caused 
by the implementation of the Keelty Review recommendations had a significant 
impact on the MACC branch. This organisational restructure disbanded the social 
media team, within which I initially embedded myself, by shifting the social media 
function to the media team. This change created tension within the team as the media 
officers, many of whom did not have formal social media training, resisted the 
additional workload for their already stretched team. Team managers, although 
aware of this resistance, assumed media officers’ personal social media use 
adequately prepared them for their expanded role. This change also revealed early 
competing views of social media and its purpose, views that frequently differed from 
those of former members of the social media team, which I build on in the following 
chapter.  
 
The chronological history of social media within the Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services in this chapter paves the way for my examination of what I 
describe as the normalised social media use in the next chapter. I use the term 
“normalise” to describe a phase of social media use in the organisation that moves 
beyond the novel towards standardised practice. I borrow the sociological concept of 
Normalisation Process Theory from May and Finch (2009) to frame this 
understanding. This theory describes how “material practices become routinely 
embedded in social contexts as the result of people working, individually and 
collectively, to implement them” (p. 540).  
 
Other scholars have previously observed the process of ‘normalisation’ in 
comparable organisational contexts, to understand the effect of technological change 
on work practices. Singer (2005) examined journalists in the context of blogging (or 
“j-blogging”), and found that “journalists are ‘normalizing’ the blog as a component, 
and in some ways an enhancement, of traditional journalistic norms and practices” 
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(p. 173). Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton (2012) extended this study to analyse 
journalists’ tweeting practices (“j-tweeting”), and found that journalists were both 
“adopting features of Twitter in their microblogging and adapting these features to 
their existing norms and practices” (p. 30). Drawing on these examples, we can see 
how the normalised use of new communications technologies is not particular to my 
participants or even the organisation under examination. Rather, it is a practice that 
other communications professionals also perform when negotiating the digital 
transformation of their working environment.  
 
This practice of normalisation that I describe in the next two chapters differs from 
the social media team’s early practices. The social media team worked to build a 
social media presence and developed new ways to build awareness of the 
organisation and engage with their audience, while simultaneously struggling for 
recognition and legitimisation amongst their colleagues. One former social media 
team member suggested that, because the media officers did not have to struggle for 
the legitimacy and presence on social media like the social media team had to in their 
early stages, they did not have an appreciation for the careful consideration that went 
into crafting engaging content: 
When we set the team up everything we did we started off with one hundred 
fans, you know like we celebrated when we got to five thousand. We had to 
fight for every single fan and we had to fight for every little bit of 
engagement and that's what we were focused on rather than just publish, 
publish, publish. Now there's a hundred thousand fans, they can throw 
anything up there and it will go to twenty thousand people and get a hundred 
comments and twenty shares. They haven't had to fight for that so I'm not 
sure they understand that hunger or that focus of how hard it is to get 
engagement, and I think there's a little bit of an attitude of just throw it up 
and move on, tick the box, take the credit. (Former social media team 
member, June 2014) 
This chapter has only addressed social media use in the organisation from the period 
of initial discussions and social media trials in 2010 and 2011, to the social media 
team’s establishment in 2012, to the organisational restructure and media team’s 
acquisition of the role in late-2013, until the early stages of use in early-2014. These 
are important stages, but many occurred before my fieldwork began and only the last 
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six months directly relate to my fieldwork. The following two chapters cover the 
remaining 18 months of my fieldwork, and examine how the early dissenting views 
about social media influenced media team members’ views about social media, 
constituting a part of their role. I also unpack MACC branch members’ 
understanding of the views held about social media by those outside their branch, 
including operational personnel and the organisation’s executives. This chapter 
helped answer RQ1: what are the factors shaping the uses of social media in 
emergency management, achieving this by examining the organisational and 
structural factors shaping the uses. The following chapter adds to this by building on 
the social media resistance already outlined in this chapter, unpacking these 
competing views and how they influenced the media team’s social media use.  
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Chapter 5: Mapping the competing internal 
attitudes towards social media: a 
case of dissonance 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the organisational dissonance that exists around social media 
as a function. My use of the term ‘function’ to describe social media in this thesis is 
two-fold. Much as ‘human resources’ (HR) describes both a function (hiring, staff 
training, administrative duties) and a role (the individual or department responsible 
for those tasks), ‘social media’ in this thesis refers to a) a role or an activity that a 
branch or a specific member of the organisation maintains responsibility for, and b) a 
communicative task. In this chapter, my use of the term ‘function’ to describe social 
media focuses on the first component: how social media exists as a role or activity 
within the organisation. In the following chapter, I focus on the communicative 
purpose to examine how the organisation uses social media as a platform to 
communicate with their audience, and address the organisation’s use of social media 
for both one-way and two-way communication.  
 
The dissonance that I describe operated on both a macro level more broadly in the 
organisation, and a micro level within the Media and Corporate Communications 
(MACC) branch. On a macro level, there was intra-organisational disagreement 
about which branch within the organisation should drive the strategy and direction, 
and maintain responsibility for social media. On a micro level, the addition of social 
media to the media team reshaped media officers’ roles. There were competing 
understandings within the media team about social media and its purpose, and who 
had overarching responsibility for social media. 
 
Much of what I report through this chapter concerns (perceived or actual) power 
within the organisation to make decisions about who does what with social media. 
When discussing power, I am not discussing the type of coercive power proposed by 
Robert Dahl (1957), in which “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202-203). Towards the end of this 
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chapter and in Chapter 7, I make suggestions that equate to measures that would 
empower the media team, as to how QFES could change its internal culture, which 
refers to the type of cooperative power described by Follett (1973; cited by Coleman 
and Voronov, 2003), which describes: 
That type of power that brings about constructive outcomes for all. It 
motivates people to search out each other’s abilities and to appreciate their 
contributions, to negotiate and influence each other to exchange resources 
that will help them both be more productive, and to encourage each other to 
develop and enhance their valued abilities. (p. 231) 
 
As I revealed in Chapter 4, the old social media team felt that they had less power in 
the organisation than the media team. But once the social media function transferred 
to the media team, nobody within the team seemed to have (or want) the power to 
define how social media are positioned within the day-to-day activities of the team. 
The managers (who formally have the power) actively avoid exercising it, while they 
all feel that the media team members are less empowered within the organisation 
than operational personnel. The executive are perceived to have power, and to 
exercise it in a general fashion; however, as I demonstrate through this chapter they 
do not have the necessary knowledge or information to make more meaningful 
decisions about social media. Adding to this, the constant uncertainty about the 
organisation's structure is fundamentally disempowering, and organisational 
disruption especially is linked to feelings of stress and a sense of helplessness 
amongst employees (Savery and Luks, 2001). I establish this question of power, 
particularly as it relates to the key theories framing the analysis in this chapter, at key 
moments throughout the chapter. This and the previous chapter combine to answer 
RQ1: What are the factors shaping the use of social media in the organisation? This 
builds a foundation for understanding how those factors influenced how social media 
operates as a communicative function within the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services, which I address in the following chapter when answering RQ2: How does 
the organisation use social media?  
 
Dissonance is a key theme of this chapter. I borrow this term and its description from 
David Stark’s (2009) The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life. 
As well as drawing on Stark’s ethnographic case studies, I also draw on Filby and 
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Willmot’s (1988) observations of a public relations department in a large public 
sector organisation and their concept of ‘professional histories’ to examine how my 
own participants’ professional backgrounds shaped their current practices as 
government communications professionals. Moreover, Filby and Willmot’s field site 
shares many similarities with my own. I begin this chapter by unpacking each of 
these two concepts, before applying them to my own analysis throughout this 
chapter. I describe in detail how social media disrupt current practice in an 
emergency management organisation and the broader impacts social media are 
having on how individuals communicate with each other. 
 
5.2 KEY CONCEPTS UNDERPINNING THE CHAPTER  
5.2.1 Dissonance 
Stark’s monograph draws on three ethnographic case studies to examine how 
multiple companies undergoing significant organisational change manage competing 
viewpoints. Stark (2009) contends that dissonance can be both productive and 
problematic, explaining:  
Where the organizational environment is turbulent and there is uncertainty 
about what might constitute a resource under changed conditions, 
contending frameworks of value can themselves be a valuable organizational 
resource (p. 6) 
The organisational environment that I observed was, as I examined in the previous 
chapter, particularly turbulent, while the introduction of social media to the 
organisation only added to and illustrated this turbulence. While some of my 
participants acknowledged that dissonance can be productive, dissonant views also 
created tension within the organisation—and in the MACC branch especially—
meaning dissonance was oftentimes problematic.  
 
Towards the end of the chapter, I suggest cultural change needs to occur before all 
branches of the organisation accept and value social media, and suggest ways to 
achieve this through empowering employees. Currently, the organisation largely 
ignores the dissenting views of social media. By directly engaging with those 
dissenting personnel, acknowledging their misgivings about social media and 
determining how social media could be relevant and valuable to them, the 
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organisation can potentially undergo cultural change. Stark is interested in how 
organisations or organisational cultures effectively embrace dissonance to either 
realise the value opportunity or diminish it. Connecting Stark’s concept of 
dissonance to my field site, I suggest that by embracing dissonant views of social 
media, the organisation could understand why it is not perceived to be of value, 
receive input to understand how it could be of more (operational) value, and 
simultaneously empower dissenting employees by giving them a stake in 
organisational decision-making.  
 
Similarly, Fiore-Gartland and Neff’s (2015) idea of data valences, “to describe the 
differences in expectations that people have for data across different social settings” 
(p. 1466), is also relevant. Drawing on two years of ethnographic material, Fiore-
Gartland and Neff (2015) uncovered the tensions between different groups (health 
care professionals and patients) with competing expectations of the same data. They 
note how data valences “are neither neutral nor stable, and instead can change across 
multiple contexts, stakeholders, and interactions” (p. 1470). Comparable tensions 
existed on a micro and macro level in QFES; participants described competing 
expectations across various levels within the organisation about the purpose and uses 
of social media. While Stark and Girard (2009) suggest that misunderstandings in 
organisations may be positive—and certainly, some of my participants 
acknowledged they could be positive in specific situations—as I illustrate with 
specific examples, oftentimes these misunderstandings were actually problematic. 
Fiore-Gartland and Neff (2015) also note, “how people talk about data may not be 
consistent with what they do with data” (p. 1470), which is also comparable to the 
treatment of social media in QFES. As I examine in this chapter and build on in 
Chapter 6, while my participants recognised that they should use social media for 
two-way communication with their audience this does not necessarily mean they did 
use it for this purpose.  
 
I found Stark’s chapter (co-authored with Monique Girard) ‘Creative Friction in a 
New Media Start-Up (pp. 81-117) particularly relevant to my research. I found 
myself drawn to this chapter because of some organisational similarities between the 
pseudonymous NetKnowHow, a start-up web development company in the late-
1990s/early-2000s, and QFES. First, NetKnowHow, a new media company operating 
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in a rapidly emerging and changing industry, is comparable to QFES’s uptake and 
use of social media, which occurred rapidly and consequently challenged and 
reshaped the organisation’s communicative function. Stark and Girard’s description 
of the “relentless redesign of the organisation” (p. 81) also resonated, as QFES 
underwent continual organisational restructure and personnel redistribution during 
my fieldwork, as I outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 and build on in this chapter.  
 
Finally, their description of participants’ work conditions and levels of activity is 
comparable to descriptions of the QFES media team’s conditions and activities. Stark 
and Girard describe “bouts of work followed by relative idleness, rush work to meet 
deadlines could be followed by less intense, typically short, period ‘between 
projects’” (p. 94). This is comparable to the media team who experience bouts of 
intense activity during protracted incidents that sometimes require them to work 
extended hours, followed by sporadic periods of downtime when there is sometimes 
a lack of work. Consequently, Stark and Girard note that NetKnowHow employees 
must have “an ability to get along with others in an extraordinarily stressful and fast-
paced environment” (p. 103). Working in emergency management means that 
employees must similarly remain calm during often-stressful disaster response and 
recovery phases. As the key conduit between operational staff and volunteers, 
members of the public and the media, the QFES media team often endures the worst 
of frustrations (via social media channels or repeated telephone calls from persistent 
journalists) when members of the public are at risk or there is uncertainty about the 
incident. QFES media team members must remain calm and flexible during ever-
changing conditions, and rely on supportive colleagues for assistance. 
 
In one example in Stark and Girard’s chapter, the authors explain NetKnowHow 
actors’ dissonance around claims of knowledge and expertise, and ability to speak on 
behalf of their users. A changing perspective within NetKnowHow prompted “the 
user” to become increasingly central to their work, which meant the various actors 
within the organisation “developed [their] own distinctive claims to represent the 
user” (pp. 105-106). This is evidence of Dahl’s (1957) concept of power described in 
the introduction of this chapter. Dahl’s concept of power describes how “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do” (pp. 202-203). In the case of NetKnowHow, actors’ claims to 
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represent the user sought to establish their knowledge and expertise as a way of 
maintaining authority (synonymous for power in this context) over other actors. In 
contrast, my participants were actually avoiding ownership of social media rather 
than claiming ownership as a way of minimising authority and avoiding 
responsibility.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I explain how social media remained undervalued within 
the organisation. While competing views existed about the purpose of social media 
and its positioning in QFES, particular (managerial) actors sought to maintain their 
inexperience (versus experience in Stark and Girard’s case) and lack of expertise as a 
means of rejecting authority over and ownership of social media, and responsibility 
for the function. I build on this in the following chapter, explaining how this 
rejection of ownership created a system (and thus a power vacuum) whereby media 
officers maintained the organisation’s social media platforms with little strategic 
oversight or direction, meaning they largely had to use their own judgement.  
 
Stark and Girard conclude the incident about claims of knowledge and expertise by 
noting: 
Disputes such as this were vital for firms like NetKnowHow. If the firm 
locked in to a single performance criterion, it would not be positioned to 
move with flexibility as the industry changed and the Web evolved. (p. 106). 
If I flip their example to apply it to my own field site, it might then be appropriate to 
claim that QFES, in this instance, is thus largely “locked in to a single performance 
criterion”. By ‘single performance criterion’, I refer to a largely unchanged way of 
conducting their role. Because no one has the power to change the way things are 
done, this ‘single performance criterion’ prioritises information dissemination and 
the mainstream media, normalising social media to fit existing communicative 
strategies. This occurs in other industries also, see for example Hermida (2012a, p. 
324), and Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton (2012) for examinations of ‘normalised’ social 
media use in journalism. 
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5.2.2 Professional histories 
Although almost thirty years old, Filby and Willmot’s (1988) research is still relevant 
as there are many striking parallels between their field site and my own. Both studies 
take place in communications departments of public sector agencies, while the team 
size, its gender composition and team members’ ages (which, for QFES, I outlined in 
the introduction of the previous chapter) compare in both studies. While their job 
titles differ—‘public relations officers’ versus ‘media officers’ in my own study—
Filby and Willmot’s description of the public relations department’s responsibilities 
also applies to my own field site. Responsibilities include: “writing of press releases, 
answering national and local press calls and responding to enquiries from 
journals[,]…organizing training courses to instruct other departments in the 
appropriate procedures for managing press relations [and]…disseminat[ing] 
statements on specific areas of interest” (p. 337) This demonstrates that while job 
titles may evolve—a quick scan of Queensland government job listings indicates that 
some derivative of media/public affairs/information/communications officer is a 
typical title for such roles today—the responsibilities remain largely unchanged.  
 
Organisational and role similarities aside, the competing professional identities of 
Filby and Willmot’s participants, and specifically the influence of their participants’ 
career history on their current role, are similar to those of my own participants. Filby 
and Willmot categorise their participants—public relations professionals—as “non-
journalists” or “ex-journalists”: similar professional backgrounds to those of my own 
participants, which I outlined in the previous chapter. Filby and Willmot differentiate 
the competing ideologies of these two groups: 
The contrasting ‘informational’ and ‘promotional’ ideologies of public 
relations within the department identified what were considered to be its 
legitimate tasks. Just as important, they defined how these tasks were to be 
undertaken. The ex-journalists were primarily concerned with getting the 
‘correct’ information into print. In contrast, those expressing a promotional 
ideology placed greater emphasis on the appearance of the product. (p. 341).  
Not only do their divergent career histories inform their priorities as public relations 
professionals, but they create tensions between these two groups because of 
competing ideologies about their roles. As Lewis (2012) notes regarding the tension 
for journalists around maintaining professional control, “occupational actors do not 
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easily abandon jurisdictional claims once they are established” (p. 852), which 
demonstrates journalists exert a form of power-as-control (see Coleman and 
Voronov, 2003, pp. 230-231). Similarly in this chapter, I illustrate how my 
participants did not easily abandon their claims about what the role of a media officer 
entailed. There were two similarly competing groups in the early stages of my study: 
the social media team versus the media team. Even after the social media team 
disbanded and the social media function moved to the media team, many of my 
participants’ professional media (journalism) backgrounds shaped their professional 
identities in their roles as QFES media professionals. I ground Filby and Willmot’s 
ideas in my ethnographic data, and draw them out throughout this chapter to examine 
how the addition of social media to the media team’s responsibilities conflicted with 
team members’ perception of their role.  
 
As Filby and Willmot note though, it is not enough to say that the differing views 
about social media within the organisation are the result of “differences in skill 
previously acquired in distinct labour markets”, or professional histories (p. 342). 
Rather, “ideologies were sustained as members of each group identified themselves 
with their past experience and possession of specific skills.” (p. 342). That is, media 
officers allowed their professional histories as media professionals to continually 
shape their current ideology of what it means to be a media officer, an ideology 
grounded in a traditional view of journalism. In examining how social media disrupt 
current practice in newsrooms, journalism scholars such as Hermida (2012a) have 
noted that: 
As with every communication technology, there is a process of negotiation 
as new affordances collide with established norms and practices. Research 
suggests that many journalists are normalizing social media tools to fit in 
with existing values [emphasis added]. (p. 324).  
By examining how media officers with a background in journalism allow their 
professional history to shape their current professional identity, we can understand 
how participants privilege existing traditional communications tasks and view social 
media as something to reshape and normalise. 
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5.3 “JUST THIS TACKED-ON THING”: DECENTRALISING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
In order to explain the competing understandings of social media and link them to 
broader questions about their disruptive effect, it is necessary to first unpack these 
understandings within the organisation. Generally, these competing perspectives 
could be categorised based on the participant’s position within the organisation (for 
example, media officers versus managers), although there were variations in 
perspectives amongst these participants too. For example, while the media officers 
became used to social media being a part of their role despite initial concerns about 
workload implications, they prioritised their existing traditional media tasks over 
social media and viewed social media as separate and different from, as well as less 
important than these traditional media tasks. Moreover, as I explain in Chapter 6, 
they normalised social media to fit existing tasks (see Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton 
(2012) for an example of similar social media normalisation practices in the 
newspaper industry). 
 
The workload distribution within the team, which I describe shortly, contributed 
towards a view that social media was not a formal part of their role. As I outlined in 
the previous chapter, the addition of social media to the media team’s responsibilities 
caused some disharmony, as many of the media officers were concerned about the 
workload implications. Although the team’s role expanded, during my observations I 
noted that social media did not immediately become a central part of team 
discussions. I frequently attended the fortnightly media team meetings. These 
meetings typically addressed upcoming events, potential media opportunities, and 
provided team members the opportunity to update one another on their current tasks. 
When the team did discuss social media, it typically related to an issue—negative 
internal feedback about a post or complaints from the public, for example—or 
warned of anticipated upcoming problems. Strategic discussions around planned 
posts or campaigns were rare.  
 
Beyond media team meetings, I did not observe any formal discussions about social 
media for most of my two-year observation period. Media team members would 
occasionally raise ideas or issues with each other in their team pod—the 
configuration of which I illustrate in Appendix D—and would approach managers to 
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ask questions about issues at hand. These discussions occurred informally, and only 
team members present contributed. When I asked media team members about their 
team planning and discussions of social media during interviews towards the end of 
my observations, most acknowledged that it is not a significant part of their team 
meetings. The media team managers, whose roles and responsibilities I outlined at 
the beginning of Chapter 412, also met separately; however towards the end of my 
time at the organisation one manager informed me that these meetings occurred 
infrequently. Although I was never invited to participate in the managers’ meetings13, 
one manager told me during an interview that social media does not generally feature 
in these meetings either (“There’s not a lot of discussion about social media, to be 
honest”, Media team manager, July 2015).  
 
The prominence of social media in team discussions did begin to change towards the 
end of my observations, when media team managers introduced an informal social 
media leadership role within the team. This was one of four informal roles 
introduced for the four junior media officers, to strengthen the team’s relationships 
with internal and external stakeholders. Part of the social media leadership role 
included developing more strategies for the team’s use of social media. I discuss this 
social media leadership role in detail in Chapter 6, as I explain the competing views 
of a social media strategy—and who should drive it—that existed within the team, 
and the role of internal social media champions in the organisation. 
 
Media team managers assigned media tasks similarly to the way the organisation’s 
operational tasks are delegated. Queensland is a largely and geographically diverse 
state. While there are metropolitan hubs scattered along the coast, and major cities 
including Brisbane and the Gold Coast in the south east corner and Townsville and 
Cairns in the north and far north respectively, much of inland and western 
                                                
 
12 I refer to these six individuals collectively as “team managers” for simplicity, although I am 
referring to individuals with differing levels of seniority within the leadership team and I use their job 
title where relevant. I depict these managers’ seniority in relation to one another in the previous 
chapter (see Figure 2, p. 70). 
13 While no managers ever directly told me that I could not participate in these meetings, I was never 
explicitly invited to participate. In contrast, the media manager emailed me an appointment series for 
my calendar to notify me of media team meetings and I always felt welcome at these meetings and 
was occasionally asked to contribute.  
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Queensland is, in contrast, vast and remote: “the outback”. Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services operations are divided into and managed out of seven regions. I 
provide a map and geographical detail about these regions in Appendix F. Each 
media officer managed one or two of these regions, although all media officers were 
located at QFES’s headquarters in the city of Brisbane, part of the Brisbane region. 
Responsibilities included making regular contact with personnel in the region, 
arranging media coverage of events (fire station open days, training days), and 
offering support and media management advice. These responsibilities extended to 
arranging, receiving and posting photos and updates from the regions on social 
media, once the media team assumed responsibility for social media. Maintaining 
responsibility for a particular region or regions gave media officers’ ownership over 
their particular area and task, and media officers were proud of their regions. 
However, the location of Brisbane in the bottom corner of the state—which might be 
thought of as closer to Sydney than to some parts of Queensland—means that some 
media officers were geographically isolated from their regions. 
 
In contrast, media officers shared responsibility for social media upon its addition to 
their team list of responsibilities, independent of “their” region. Media officers 
equally monitored accounts, responded to comments and generated content, and were 
informally rostered to social media for an undefined number of hours during the day, 
depending on their shift. It was clear that team members frequently prioritised 
existing media activities over social media tasks. When a media officer had a 
deadline to issue a media release, or an impending event in their region that they 
needed to arrange media coverage for, they prioritised those media activities over 
social media monitoring. This prioritisation was not always logical or necessary; a 
strategy that integrated communications across mainstream and social media—and 
most importantly, existed in documented form—might have prevented this 
prioritisation and view of social media as separate from existing media tasks.  
 
In line with this prioritisation, at times some media officers viewed social media as a 
burden. One media officer, when asked in an interview for their perspective on how 
social media was functioning since its addition to their team, commented that social 
media “kinda takes it away from our actual media work” (Media officer, June 2014). 
The use of the word “actual” here first emphasised the importance of existing 
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traditional media activities over social media. Scholars have documented similar 
discursive exclusion in comparable organisational contexts, observing how 
newspaper journalists view the prestigious, hardcopy newspaper as the “real thing” 
compared to the secondary online version (Singer, 2003; Saltzis, 2012, p. 468). For 
QFES media officers, social media could be a burden and could distract from what 
they deemed more important or pressing tasks. The use of “actual” also revealed an 
ideology that social media were not a formal part of their role; it served to contrast 
social media tasks with media tasks. The workload division within the team—
delegating media tasks to media officers versus sharing social media tasks amongst 
media officers—again demonstrated the prioritisation of traditional media activities 
over social media. It also allowed the team’s initial resistance against social media to 
remain; media officers continued to conceptually separate media responsibilities 
from social media.  
 
The (above) media officer’s discursive exclusion of social media from legitimate 
media work is comparable to the competing ideologies of Filby and Willmot’s 
participants (“ex journalists” and “non-journalists”) and how they worked against 
one another. Filby and Willmot’s participants sought to devalue and dismiss their 
adversaries’ professional histories, as they noted:  
The relationship between those holding to the promotional and informational 
ideologies of public relations was characterized by a mutual discrediting of 
the others’ ideology as each was labelled as peripheral to the ‘real work’ of 
public relations. (p. 341).  
 
Drawing on Filby and Willmot’s research for my own study, I position the social 
media function as the primary adversary to the media team’s existing tasks. With the 
introduction of social media to their role, a role that had until then remained largely 
unchanged, media officers sought to devalue it as a function. We can see this 
demonstrated in the above statement, as this media officer attempts to devalue social 
media by categorising it as not part of “our actual work”. Taking Filby and Willmot’s 
description of their participants’ views (quoted above) and applying it to my own 
participants, we can conclude that many media officers sought to label social media 
as “peripheral to the ‘real work’” of the media team. 
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The above-quoted media officer may have, at the time, thought the addition of social 
media to their role was temporary; this interview occurred within six months of its 
addition to media officers’ roles. Consequently, media officers were still learning 
new processes, and their team (and the organisation more broadly) was in a state of 
flux. 
 
As this media officer managed work disruptions, they may have also been speaking 
out of a position of frustration; later in that same interview, they described having “a 
love-hate relationship with social media at the moment” (Media officer, June 2014). 
However, in a wrap-up interview in my last month at the organisation (over a year 
after that first comment), that same media officer again referred to their “actual” job 
in contrast to social media, although quickly correcting themselves:  
Sometimes you get caught up with your actual job—I mean, [laughs] 
traditional media job—that you kind of forget about the social media and 
then you know an hour or two later, “Fuck! I was [supposed to monitor] 
social media!” (Media officer, July 2015) 
Again, the use of “actual” here—despite their quick rectification—indicates an 
ideology that this media officer did not consider social media a legitimate part of 
their role. Deuze (2007b) argued, “an occupational ideology develops over time, as it 
is part of a process through which the sum of ideas and views of a particular group 
about itself is shaped” (p. 163), and the corroborating views of other media team 
members demonstrate this shared ideology about social media’s illegitimacy.  
 
One media officer, in response to a question about the team’s then-underuse of 
Instagram in April 2014, informed me that maintaining the organisation’s Facebook 
and Twitter channels was enough responsibility in addition to existing tasks. In doing 
so, the participant distinguished social media from existing responsibilities:  
We’re doing Facebook and Twitter on top of all of our normal media work. 
(Media officer, emphasis added, August 2014) 
Again, as noted above, this position is perhaps unsurprising, as this interview 
occurred within six months of social media becoming part of media officers’ role. In 
describing their perception of their role, another media officer takes care to 
emphasise existing media responsibilities as the key part of the role and social media 
as subsidiary: 
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We are media officers and we do social media as well, that is how I 
[perceive]14 my role. (Media team member, June 2014) 
The implication here is that social media are insignificant compared to existing 
media tasks, and not an integral part of their work. Although Burgess and Banks 
(2014) noted that social media were initially viewed as “amateur” and “trivial” but 
are widely used today both professionally and personally (p. 285), these quotes 
demonstrate that widespread use (even professionally) and engrained views of social 
media as insignificant, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many social media 
platforms began as personal, social spaces for friends to communicate (see van 
Dijck, 2013, pp. 5-9) and, as I outlined in the previous chapter, media officers’ 
personal social media use informed their professional use. For that reason, my 
participants perhaps did not distinguish between the social media that serves a 
professional communicative function and their own personal social media practices.  
 
Media officers also differed in their understandings of their audience make-up. Some 
media officers viewed their audience as being primarily members of the public with 
some members of the organisation (mainly State Emergency Services (SES) and 
Rural Fire Service (RFS) volunteers) amongst them. But one media officer insisted 
that as many as 50% of their audience were members of the organisation (including 
volunteers) and/or their friends and relatives. Some media officers then felt they had 
a particular responsibility to serve that part of the audience with content of interest to 
them. These media officers viewed their social media audience as being distinct from 
their mainstream media contacts (journalists), and as a result they were more likely 
to distinguish social media from mainstream media.  
 
In contrast, other media officers considered mainstream media journalists a part of 
the imagined audience that they sought to address through their social media 
activities; the ‘imagined audience’ being what Litt (2012) explains is “the mental 
conceptualization of the people with whom we are communicating, our audience” (p. 
331). They specifically viewed their Twitter audience this way, and their own uses of 
the platform in prior journalism roles, before their becoming a QFES media officer 
                                                
 
14 In the interview, this media officer actually said, “that is how I imply my role”. I have edited it in 
the body of this thesis to reflect the media officer’s intended meaning. 
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influenced this view. These media officers were newer to the organisation; 
importantly, they joined the team after social media became part of the media officer 
role, so they had little comprehension of the role before the addition of social media. 
They did not have the experience of contending with an adapted role, which suggests 
why they were more accepting of social media.  
 
During both formal and informal conversations, these media officers would 
sometimes draw on their own journalistic experiences when referring to journalists’ 
social media use. For example, in a discussion with one media officer about whether 
the QFES media team should post incident updates on social media as an incident 
unfolds, they recalled their professional experience as a journalist using QFES’s 
social media as a source of information when media officers were unreachable via 
phone or email:  
I know from a journo’s point of view if I heard of a fire I would either ring 
but if you can’t get in contact, I would look up QFES social media to see if 
they had posted anything. So that is a good way, if our phones are all busy, 
to get those basic details so they [journalists] can at least [get] some sort of 
report straight out. (Media officer, July 2015) 
This media officer was new to the role and had immediately come from working as a 
journalist, therefore their identification with a journalist’s perspective in light of 
relative inexperience in their new role was unsurprising. Nonetheless, the account is 
useful in understanding how and why they view the makeup of their audience. More 
importantly, it demonstrates how my participants’ professional ideologies created a 
lens through which they could view their current role, as Filby and Willmot (1988) 
outlined. 
 
There are risks associated with posting too early however, which may lead to 
confusion and danger within the community. During a fatal café explosion in the 
small far north Queensland town of Ravenshoe in April 2015, the Queensland 
Ambulance Service (QAS), for example, tweeted there had been one fatality. This 
information was incorrect; QAS soon withdrew that confirmation via Twitter, 
although there was confusion amongst many in the media—who were primarily 
reporting from afar—and uncertainty around the condition of those injured. This 
meant that misinformation continued to circulate via the mainstream and social 
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media, even after QAS withdrew this confirmation. This incident highlights that, 
while it may be beneficial to post incident updates as the incident unfolds to satisfy 
the media’s demands, there are risks. 
 
The use of descriptors like “from a journo’s point of view” to demonstrate a 
connection to something was common for some participants. It served as a way of 
connecting with some of their stakeholders (journalists) but it also served to 
demonstrate their professional ideology. Not all media officers came from a media 
background, as I noted earlier in this chapter, although the majority did. One media 
officer had a background in business and advertising and, similarly to their 
colleagues with backgrounds in journalism, this media officer demonstrated this 
professional ideology by occasionally employing business terminology to describe 
something in their current role. The following example demonstrates how this 
particular media officer viewed their audience: as a consumer. It also served as a 
means of differentiating themselves from their colleagues with a journalism 
background, to describe their different perspective of social media compared with 
that of others in the team: 
I have not come from a journalist background, I have come from an 
advertising background so this whole concept of media is new, is foreign to 
me. I have always done B2C: Business to Consumer so I will always go with 
B2C in the past (Media officer, August 2014).  
We can see how, like their colleagues, this media officer’s professional (advertising) 
history shapes the lens through which they view aspects of their current role.  
 
While media officers’ opinions and understandings of social media varied, media 
team managers generally agreed in their understandings of social media. Like the 
media officers, the media team managers’ prior experience as journalists largely 
informed their views of social media. Many of them had started out as media officers 
in the organisation, rising through the ranks to leadership positions within the Media 
and Corporate Communications branch. Some had also come from working at other 
government agencies; including Queensland Ambulance and the Queensland 
government-owned energy company Energex.  
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Outlining their approach to disseminating information on social media during an 
unfolding incident, and the importance of exercising caution, one media team 
manager described instructing media officers: 
“An extra 3 minutes isn't going to matter”. I think I have a little bit of better 
perspective than a lot of people on that, because that's the way it used to 
work in radio. It'd be 2 minutes until the top of the hour and you'd only be 
halfway through writing your story. But the view was that if the story wasn't 
right it didn't go in the news. That kind of translates to social media where 
you have to have a little bit of calmness and get it right rather than just [get 
it] out. (Media team manager, August 2015) 
In this anecdote, the participant seeks to make sense of the unfamiliar (social media) 
by comparing it to the familiar (mainstream media), having come from an extensive 
background in radio journalism. Like the participants that Filby and Willmot (1988, 
p. 342) observed, this participant also demonstrates how their professional history 
continues to shape their current professional practice, as it explicitly influences their 
approach towards information dissemination.  
 
5.4 “THE GUYS HAVE A FAR BETTER UNDERSTANDING THAN THE 
MANAGERS DO”: AVOIDING MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
As I explained in the previous chapter, after the organisation restructured, the social 
media officers moved to new agencies, which left only the social media manager in 
the rebranded Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. I observed how this created 
something of a managerial predicament for the social media manager. They no 
longer managed a team of social media officers, yet they still technically had a social 
media function to oversee in addition to the other communications responsibilities 
their adapted role now also included15. The social media manager explained to me 
how their approach now was to leave social media to the media officers but be 
available to provide assistance if they required it.  
 
                                                
 
15 At the beginning of Chapter 4 I noted that the social media manager’s job title eventually changed 
to ‘communications manager’ to better reflect their adapted role. For simplicity and clarity—and 
because I do not know when their job title officially changed—I refer to them as social media 
manager in this section.  
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However, the social media manager’s explanation of their managerial relationship to 
the media officers conflicted with media officers’ expectations; they frequently 
expressed confusion about their relationship with the social media manager. When 
they encountered a problem on social media—for example a criticism from a 
commenter or an inappropriate comment on a post that they were unsure if they 
should delete—media officers did not know whether to approach the social media 
manager or their media manager for advice. Typically, they would approach the 
social media manager in the first instance. The uncertainty about managerial roles 
demonstrated that a lack of communication and established guidelines around roles 
within the context of a restructured team could create confusion and a lack of 
accountability and responsibility. 
 
This demonstrates how the power dynamics within the team changed after the 
MACC branch restructured; when they managed the social media team, the former 
team manager had power over the direction of the organisation’s social media efforts. 
After the disbanding of the team, their managerial responsibility was not only 
reduced, but their degree of control over this function was effectively removed. 
Media officers’ confusion about managerial roles also demonstrates again that the 
team thought about ‘social media’ and ‘media’ differently. Despite social media now 
being part of their role, media officers did not always adhere to their existing chains 
of command because they considered ‘social media’ as different from ‘media’. 
Again, as I outlined earlier in this chapter, this performed a delegitimising function; 
traditional media tasks have existing media managers to call on for advice, while 
social media, not necessarily part of their “actual” or “normal” work, demand 
different and specialist advice.  
 
The social media manager’s uncertainty about their managerial role reflected broader 
uncertainty within MACC’s management team about how their roles related to one 
another. The media manager expressed similar feelings of uncertainty around their 
role in light of the restructured team. This also reflects broader societal patterns, as 
communications professionals across many different industries must contend with 
new communications technologies challenging and reshaping their roles and 
functions (see Lewis (2012) for an examination of how journalists are renegotiating 
their professional control following the emergence of new participatory forms of 
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journalism, for example). The media manager explained to me how the lack of 
definition around managerial roles for social media could be both productive and 
unproductive in their team:  
At any given time, there could be three or four managers’ input into social 
media. That can be a really good thing in terms of accessibility for the team. 
It can be a good thing in terms of generating new ideas. But when it’s about 
providing a clear direction on something that’s new, then it becomes 
opinion-based sometimes and that’s fraught with problems. (Media manager, 
emphasis added, August 2015). 
In a space like social media, flexibility to experiment is necessary and often valuable. 
This manager’s account thus demonstrates Stark’s concept of dissonance at play 
within their team. In the first chapter of The Sense of Dissonance, Stark (2009) 
remarked: 
I write of organizing dissonance because some forms of friction can be 
destructive. When personalised, differences can be petty as opposed to 
productive. To be constructive, rivalry must be principled, with the adherents 
of the contending frameworks offering reasoned justifications (p. 27).  
As the above-quoted manager acknowledged though, because social media are still 
new and evolving in their organisation, managers often make opinion-based—
“personalised”, as Stark observes—rather than evidence-based decisions. That is not 
to say managers’ opinion-based decisions caused pettiness amongst them; managers 
may have disagreed, but they always maintained professionalism. However, this 
dissonance did often prevent productive outcomes for the team, as managers did not 
always base their decisions on what Stark describes as “reasoned justifications”. This 
manager’s comment came during the end of my fieldwork, indicating that this 
dissonance amongst managers was not an immediate consequence of teething 
problems following the addition of social media to the media team, but rather an 
established yet implicit—and perhaps even worsening—issue amongst some team 
managers, given that it remained an unresolved structural issue.  
 
This situation created a co-managerial predicament for the media manager. As the 
following quote demonstrates, the media manager did not feel they had enough 
expertise to provide adequate guidance to the media officers about social media, and 
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that their own level of social media experience did not hold equal weight to that of 
other managers. This complicated the managerial chain of command within the team:  
Because I’m not considered to be the expert or the one with any background, 
it’s very difficult to manage a team who’s responsible for a function—being 
social media—but not to really be considered the manager of that function as 
well (Media manager, August 2015). 
While the media manager had a wealth of experience to advise on media tasks, social 
media provided a new and unfamiliar territory that the media manager did not feel 
prepared to manage. This feeling was not implicit, and not specific to this team 
manager. The media director also explained to me that media officers’ everyday 
exposure to social media gave them a better understanding of the function than the 
managers’ degree of understanding: 
I don’t think myself or the media manager have enough of a grasp on [social 
media], but that’s because we don’t have the day to day exposure that our 
team do to it. The guys [media officers] have a far better understanding than 
the managers do. (Media director, June 2014) 
Managers did not suppress their feelings of inexperience. As one participant told me, 
many of the managers routinely told the media officers they had more social media 
expertise than managers did. This concerned the participant:  
The line “you know more than me” is often bandied around, which [laughs] 
does not fill me with confidence sometimes. (Media team member, June 
2014). 
Fiore-Gartland and Neff (2015) describe the tensions that emerge between people 
from different social settings with competing expectations of the same thing. In this 
example, we can see how members of MACC across differing levels of authority—
who, I should note, come from similar educational and professional backgrounds—
had competing expectations about managerial ownership of social media. In 
maintaining their lack of expertise, team managers evaded responsibility for the 
social media function while also emphasising their belief that the media officers, not 
the managers, should drive the social media strategy. This created an environment 
where media officers often felt they were not receiving enough direction for social 
media. This, coupled with the existing workload division arrangements that I 
outlined earlier, meant that the team often prioritised media tasks because of a lack of 
ownership and responsibility for social media in the team.  
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From an evaluative perspective—and momentarily positioning myself as an advisor 
and not only a researcher—these arrangements for managing social media were not 
necessarily wrong, but they were problematic because they were implicit rather than 
explicit. As media officers—rather than the managers—are the experts, giving them 
the responsibility for social media was a smart first move, in principle. This is 
because—and once again connecting back to Stark’s (2009) explanation of 
dissonance cited above—for friction to be constructive, “rivalry must be principled, 
with the adherents of the contending frameworks offering reasoned justifications” (p. 
27). If media officers disagreed, their daily experiences using social media provided 
such “reasoned justifications” for why they should or should not use social media in 
a particular way.  
 
Putting this media officer-directed situation into a hypothetical context, one media 
officer may want to respond directly to an irate, rule-breaking Facebook commenter 
to reason with them in the hopes of changing their opinion. A different media officer 
may disagree, insisting on outright blocking that commenter because a comparable 
prior experience may have proved fruitless. Debating these dissenting views, while 
perhaps creating internal friction, could prove productive as the media officers could 
ground their positions in “reasoned justifications” (Stark, 2009, p. 27). The next step 
is to move from these day-to-day, one-off practices towards formulating strategy and 
policy. Media team managers could task media officers with formulating (and 
formalising) a set of strategic aims, in a collaboratively-developed working paper or 
draft policy document, which then could have been considered and endorsed by the 
managers. 
 
5.5 “NONE OF THESE EXECUTIVES HAVE A DEEP UNDERSTANDING 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA” 
More broadly in the organisation, I noted disagreement between branches about who 
should maintain responsibility for social media. Superiors who did not have an 
understanding of the day-to-day use of social media in their organisation drove this. 
As one participant described to me, some superiors have a perception that because 
“social media” contains “media”, the function should sit within the MACC branch. 
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While I did not interview any top-level supervisors outside of MACC or anyone from 
the executive16 about social media, I spoke to other participants at length about their 
perceptions of the executive’s understanding of social media and the purpose of 
social media in the organisation. Broadly speaking, the consensus amongst my 
participants was that, while the executive was happy with and supportive of social 
media, and the Commissioner was happy to have a Twitter account (@QFES_chief) 
that the media team mostly maintained on his/her17 behalf, my participants perceived 
their satisfaction as underpinned by a lack of understanding. As one participant stated 
in an interview earlier in my field work:  
Is the executive happy with how [our] social media platforms [are] going? 
Yes. Is that because they don’t understand it enough? Probably. (Media team 
member, June 2014). 
The implication of this, the participant told me, is that the executive are not in a 
position to guide the organisation’s social media strategy, and rather than advising 
the media team (and specifically its managers), the media team advises the executive. 
This was not necessarily problematic. As I suggested at the end of the previous 
section, formal arrangements whereby the media officers manage social media then 
formulate strategy and policy for managers to consider and endorse, could be 
valuable for the organisation. This would explicitly formalise arrangements that were 
hitherto already implicit. Bringing this to a formal organisational level, the media 
team managers, having considered and endorsed the media officers’ strategies, could 
then inform the executive. Based on conversations with my participants—and again 
to stress, I did not interview anyone from the executive about social media—the 
“direction” the executive provided involved suggesting largely cursory 
improvements, including audience growth and increasing content dissemination.  
 
                                                
 
16 ‘The executive’ refers to the management team that governs the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services. The Queensland Fire and Emergency Services Commissioner leads the executive, which 
also includes “Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners and any staff at the Senior Executive 
Service level” (Queensland Government, 2014, p. 42). 
17 I use “his/her” in this instance not to maintain gender-neutrality, but because I refer to two separate 
people. When I began my fieldwork Lee Johnson was the QFES Commissioner. However, following 
the release of an independent review of the organisation’s handling of sexual harassment and 
workplace bullying in December 2014 (see Queensland Government, 2014), Commissioner Johnson 
suddenly and unexpectedly resigned. Assistant Queensland Police Service Commissioner Katarina 
Carroll commenced as the Acting QFES Commissioner in January 2015, and was appointed 
Commissioner in August 2015. 
 Chapter 5: Mapping the competing internal attitudes towards social media: a case of dissonance 126 
Some outside of MACC shared the view that the senior executives had little 
understanding of the purpose of social media. This topic arose during interviews with 
SDCC-located members of the organisation as part of the PSBA social media review. 
These three anonymous participants have used social media informally in their roles 
and, being located in the State Disaster Coordination Centre during activation, they 
typically use social media for informal intelligence gathering. One participant 
maintained that the lack of understanding around social media is neither particular to 
this organisation nor senior executives, but is instead a problem with government 
more broadly. They explained their view that the organisation uses social media not 
because of the specific benefits to the organisation, but because of current trends 
around social media adoption and the organisation’s fear of appearing out of touch if 
they do not engage in this new communicative space. This position supported the 
findings of Mergel (2016), who highlighted how “external triggers create motivation 
to adapt new technologies” (p. 147).  
 
The reasons for the executive’s lack of detailed understanding were unclear, although 
some of my participants ascribed their age as a contributing factor. In the same way 
that some of the media team managers expected media officers’ relative youth to 
contribute to their existing understanding of social media (examined in Chapter 4), 
some media team members also used the executive’s age as justification for their 
lack of understanding about social media. As one media team member explained: 
 [The executive] have a broad-brush direction they want to go in but I don’t 
think they necessarily understand social media and that’s probably a 
generational thing more than anything. Most of them are over 50 and yes 
some of them have embraced it but have the vast majority of them embraced 
it? Probably not enough to understand or provide…an informed direction. 
(Media team member, June 2014) 
The maturity of the executive reflects wider age trends in the organisation. In a 2014 
independent government review of the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, 
report author Margaret Allison noted “the average age of QFES operational staff, 
including communications staff, is 46.66”, which is older than the average age of 
public servants which is 44.02 (Queensland Government, 2014, p. 41). At the time of 
publication the report also noted 65% of the QFES executive was over 55 years of 
 Chapter 5: Mapping the competing internal attitudes towards social media: a case of dissonance 127 
age, although the makeup of the executive has changed since the publication of the 
report with the appointment of a new, slightly younger female Commissioner. 
  
However, ascribing the executive’s lack of social media understanding solely to a 
generational issue is unfounded. While social media platforms continue to be most 
popular amongst younger users, recent research from the Pew Research Center has 
demonstrated a significant growth amongst older users in the United States (Perrin, 
2015). Australian trends mirror these findings; the annual Sensis Social Media 
Report indicates that the number of older social media users (age groups 40-49, 50-
64 and 65+) accessing social media sites at least once per day has steadily increased 
over the past four years (see Sensis 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016). I did also find that 
some older operational members of the organisation (i.e. over the age of 40)—some 
in senior positions—supported and were active on social media, although they were 
rare examples. They maintain personal social media profiles to promote their work 
and their region, or send the media team content to post on QFES’s social media 
pages. One of these individuals, a senior manager within the SES located in northern 
Queensland, is so active on Twitter, for example, that I observed the media team’s 
jovial frustration once when the individual posted photos from a local event on their 
personal Twitter account instead of sending it to the media team to share on the 
QFES social media accounts in the first instance. The point here is that individual 
examples of older social media champions within the organisation indicate that an 
older workforce is not a blanket reason for a lack of understanding of the purpose of 
social media in QFES.  
 
5.6 “I THINK THERE’S STILL A FAIRLY BROAD 
MISUNDERSTANDING AMONGST THE OPERATIONAL SIDE OF 
THINGS ABOUT WHAT SOCIAL MEDIA’S FOR” 
This lack of understanding amongst the executive, instead points to a broader, 
organisation-wide misunderstanding about social media. The media team and its 
managers recognised this broad misunderstanding within the organisation, and one 
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participant compared the media team’s understanding of the purpose of social media 
to operational personnel18 to demonstrate this misunderstanding: 
I think that there’s still a fairly broad misunderstanding amongst the 
operational side of things about what social media’s for. We understand at 
our end that the platform should be used for increased engagement, and you 
know a back-and-forward conversation with our audience. I think our 
operational people are still stuck in the “here we are at a training session” 
type scenario or “this is what we want to tell people” and just leave it at that. 
But I think that we still have a fair bit of work to do within our department 
about how we educate our operational people to use social media. (Media 
team member, June 2014) 
In comparing the media team with the wider organisation, this participant describes a 
shared understanding within the media team about how they should use social media. 
As I outline in Chapter 6, however, despite a supposed shared understanding that 
they should use social media for two-way communication with their audience does 
not necessarily mean they did use it for this purpose, highlighting the inconsistencies 
that can exist between what people say and do (Fiore-Gartland and Neff, 2015). 
Nonetheless, this quote illuminates the internal competing views about social media. 
 
My first observation of operational personnel’s dissenting views of social media 
came in the first few months of my fieldwork, when I observed a one-off one-day 
media-training workshop with senior managers from the former Emergency 
Management Queensland (EMQ) division19. Approximately 20-30 personnel 
attended this workshop. This workshop focused largely on building the profile of 
MACC within the organisation, discussing the importance of public information, and 
developing participants’ media interviewing skills. A component of this workshop 
briefly covered social media, which a senior member of the social media team 
presented. It covered the platforms the then-DCS social media team managed, the 
                                                
 
18 “Operational personnel” refers broadly to specially trained fire and emergency management 
professionals, as well as specialists such as fire communications officers, community safety officers, 
fire investigators and engineers, swift water rescue technicians and HazMat scientists, as well as Rural 
Fire Service (RFS) and State Emergency Services (SES) volunteers. 
19 For an outline of the organisational history and later restructure during my fieldwork, see Chapter 3 
and 4.  
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team’s responsibilities, and the type of advice the team could provide for local 
groups wanting to use social media.  
 
Towards the end of the social media presentation, the presenter encouraged 
participants to join social media platforms including Twitter, Facebook and 
Instagram. In response, most of the audience laughed, which seemed to make the 
presenter uneasy and admittedly made me slightly uncomfortable. This laughter 
served to dismiss the presenter’s suggestion that they should join social media for 
personal use, to follow the organisation’s accounts and to send the social media team 
content. More importantly, it served as a way of dismissing social media and 
signalled that the attendees did not take it seriously. Attempting to diffuse the 
laughter, one participant did somewhat obviously point out the diverse level of 
understanding of social media within the room, and requested the presenter provide a 
social media fact sheet for participants. Nonetheless, this laughter at the end 
combined with the quiet chatter amongst participants that persisted throughout the 
social media presentation demonstrated to me, an external researcher new to the 
organisation, some of the dissonant views of social media within the organisation20.  
 
Where I did identify social media enthusiasts or champions within the organisation, 
they were typically either volunteers—members of the Rural Fire Service (RFS) or 
State Emergency Services (SES)—or paid personnel attached to these volunteer 
organisations. The media team identified internal social media enthusiasts quite 
easily; such enthusiasts proactively informed a media officer of upcoming events in 
their region or emailed the team photos after the event, and frequently liked and 
commented on posts on the QFES Facebook page. In engaging with the Facebook 
page, these enthusiasts usually revealed themselves as members of the organisation.  
 
Figure 3 captures comments on a QFES Facebook page post. In the comments, two 
self-identifying (anonymised) members of the organisation use their personal 
Facebook pages to provide commentary on the photos. Such individuals frequently 
                                                
 
20 Before the workshop began, the workshop coordinator introduced me to the attendees as a QUT 
PhD student studying social media in emergency management organisations. I made a conscious effort 
to observe this workshop in an overt rather than covert manner, taking hand-written notes and sitting 
to the side of the group rather than at the back so they could see me in action. 
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interact with other users (both fellow members of the organisation and regular 
members of the public) by responding to other users’ comments and criticisms, 
answering questions, and clarifying misinformation. Existing research has already 
highlighted the value of “social media evangelists” in emergency management 
organisations (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011), and some of my participants 
expressed similar sentiments. One media officer told me that this often spontaneous 
approach, which is self-initiated rather than at the media team’s request, is 
sometimes more effective than having a faceless QFES media officer responding via 
the QFES account, telling me that a response from an operational staff member has 
more “guts”. Another media officer also said that it is an effective way of responding 
to critics because some operational staff are well known and highly respected in their 
community.  
 
Some Rural Fire Service brigades also maintain their own privately- or publicly-
accessible social media accounts (typically Facebook) outside of the QFES media 
team, using them primarily to promote events such as local fire station open days, 
trainings or gatherings and to post photos from these events. Such accounts are 
usually separate from the QFES media team. While the official QFES Facebook 
account may have ‘liked’ the Facebook page, allowing media team members to 
access their content or keep up to date with new posts, from what I observed, QFES 
media officers do not provide the Rural Fire Service brigades with content to post 
(and vice versa) or have any official authority over what they post.  
 
Figure 3 Self-identifying operational staff 
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Such practices conflict with the risk-averse nature of these organisations. The media 
director, for example, told me that they recommend that media officers apply caution 
when releasing information via social media, always taking extra time if necessary to 
ensure the information is correct. However, in permitting local groups to maintain 
separate social media accounts without oversight from the QFES media team, such 
caution is not always applied. Further, it conflicts with the organisation’s Social 
Media Strategy and Policy. This document, which I accessed through the intranet and 
which is not available publicly (hence I have not included it as an appendix), states 
that only approved personnel with adequate training and resourcing can create social 
media accounts. It also states that “the selection, establishment and use of social 
media accounts must have strategic, tactical or operational intent and follow the 
relevant departmental processes. Only DCS authorised sites can use DCS official 
logos” (p. 25).  
 
In practice, some members of the organisation disobeyed such policies. While the 
Media and Corporate Communications branch is responsible for “overseeing the 
approval process and establishment of official social media sites that pertain to 
DCS”, according to the organisation’s policy, one media team member told me that 
“because of resourcing, we don’t have a lot of capacity to monitor what all of them 
are doing” (Media team member, July 2015). We can see here that, in this instance, 
QFES is engaged in decoupling, an institutional theory within organisational studies 
that “refers to creating and maintaining gaps between symbolically adopted formal 
policies and actual organizational practices” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; cited by 
Tilcsik, 2010, p. 1474). This exposes the organisation, and the MACC branch 
especially, to significant risks when such unsupervised practices occur with little or 
no oversight.  
 
I became aware of the risks associated with such disobedience and the potential risks 
associated with the organisation’s ad hoc adherence to its social media policy during 
a conversation with a Rural Fire Service volunteer at a full-day media training 
session that I observed towards the end of my fieldwork. In a side conversation over 
lunch, one volunteer recalled an incident while managing their local brigade’s 
Facebook page. During a house fire that their local Rural Fire Service brigade 
responded to, the confusing configuration of three driveways—which met at the 
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road—and the absence of street numbers meant that responding firefighters had 
difficulty locating, then accessing the burning house. As a learning experience for 
other members of the public, the participant posted a photo of the three number-less 
driveways on their brigade’s public Facebook page, accompanied by a message 
requesting followers ensure their street numbers are visible should firefighters need 
to locate their property. The homeowner saw and objected to the Facebook post, 
angered that it portrayed them as an irresponsible homeowner. A local journalist 
picked up the story, approached the participant for comment (which they provided) 
and then, according to the participant, twisted their words and printed a negative 
story about the incident. The closeness and size of the local community compounded 
the issue, as the participant knew the journalist personally, which likely contributed 
to their willingness to comment. Consequently, the participant recalled that the 
brigade unsuccessfully attempted to eject them from the organisation, but 
successfully banned them from managing and posting on their Facebook page.  
 
This incident did not have any long-term consequences for QFES. It does 
demonstrate how the risk-aversity of emergency management organisations in 
general, which traditionally maintain a “command and control” approach to 
operations and information release, can conflict with their social media use. 
Referring to emergency managers in the United States government, Plotnick, Hiltz, 
Kushma and Tapia (2015) note that they have “traditionally been part of a top-down, 
‘command and control’ system with lots of ‘red tape’: information sources must be 
official and vetted, and written policy documents followed, in order to deal with 
issues of trustworthiness and security.” (p. 2). These issues often prevent such 
organisations from engaging with social media platforms. However, such conditions 
exist in emergency management organisations more broadly, as I illustrate in this 
study, and are not particular to the United States.  
 
In QFES, that risk-aversity conflicts with the at times unregulated use of social 
media, as demonstrated in the aforementioned example. Not all MACC members 
were unaware of the risks. During our wrap-up interview, one team manager 
acknowledged that the existing arrangements are “fraught with danger” and that the 
organisation could “benefit from some more structure around it” (Media team 
manager, July 2015), thus noting some areas for improvement. These tensions 
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demonstrate the disruptive effect of social media. Organisations may not be able to 
easily re-write existing communications policies to apply to social media platforms, 
and while caution is necessary to protect the organisation and its reputation, social 
media requires a degree of flexibility.  
 
5.7 INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL DISSONANCE FRONT AND CENTRE  
The organisation’s initial experimentation with a popular new communications 
technology within a specific part of the organisation, with little strategy developed 
from the outset, most likely caused internal misunderstanding between different 
branches about the purpose of social media. The following quote demonstrates what 
can happen when stakeholders with competing interests disagree during high-stress 
events, in this example regarding the use of social media: 
We had that fight on the floor in the SDCC during the last event where I had 
a [senior firefighter], who is now [position redacted], abusing us for not 
putting up bad photos of nothing because it was just uniformed officers, s/he 
just wanted to promote them and promote what the firies21 were doing. It 
was in the middle of an event. I didn't have an agenda spelt out that I could 
fall back on and say that's not a priority, but I was able to articulate that 
anyway. His/her interest was “we've got this system and we're getting 
pictures from the field, why aren't you putting them up? It's a waste; they're 
all there and you're not doing a good job!”22 (Media team member, June 
2014) 
The above quote is one participant’s recollection of a disagreement they had with a 
senior operational representative over their use of social media during an event in 
early 2014; in this case, over what content the media team should post. Dissonance 
was not productive in this incident, as the two parties’ inability to ground their 
competing positions in “reasoned justifications” (see Stark, 2009, p. 27) caused an 
argument between two branches of the organisation.  
 
                                                
 
21 ‘Firie/s’ or ‘firey/s’ is a colloquial term for ‘firefighter/s’. It is widely used internally, by members 
of the public, and by the media. 
22 I have modified this quote to maintain gender-neutrality and redacted the subject’s position to 
protect their identity.  
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Connecting this incident to Filby and Willmot’s (1988) study, we can see the 
operational employee’s and the media team member’s competing ideologies surface, 
which their differing professional histories likely inform. In the case of the 
operational employee (the “senior firefighter” above), their professional experience 
with media is most likely limited to interviews with journalists (mostly on-scene) 
during an incident, or to staged, promotional media stories about successful rescues, 
or to providing promotional or information-disseminating experiences. With the 
social media function sitting within the MACC branch, the operational employee 
may have assumed that the social media function simply extends (what they know 
of) the media function, to promote the organisation and its personnel or disseminate 
information.  
 
Fiore-Gartland and Neff’s (2015) idea of ‘data valences’ is particularly relevant here, 
to describe differences in expectations and how the tensions around those 
expectations emerge. While Fiore-Gartland and Neff (2015) refer specifically to 
health and wellness data generated by new digital technologies, we can observe the 
emergence of similar tensions around social media, “Through the way different 
people talk about what they want from data and how they expect data to perform 
socially, organizationally, and institutionally” (p. 1480). The operational employee 
evidently views social media as a platform to promote the organisation; the 
organisation’s needs are central and provide motivation for using social media. In 
contrast, in other conversations, the participant described their belief that social 
media should serve as a platform to inform and educate, to develop relationships 
with their audience and build community resilience; thus, the community’s needs are 
central and motivate this participant when operating the organisation’s social media 
accounts.  
 
We could consider this incident symptomatic of the culture of emergency 
management, whereby uniformed operational personnel hold a higher hierarchical 
position than plain-clothed, non-operational staff, including media team members. In 
this instance, this culture creates a situation where rank and uniform exceeds 
professional expertise and experience. The participant did not tell me how they 
resolved this incident. Irrespective of the outcome, we can see how the culture of this 
particular organisation shapes the use of social media. This mirrors the findings of 
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other scholars in this field, who have already established that organisational factors 
more so than technical factors, shape the use of social media in these organisations 
(see Hiltz et al., 2014; McNutt, 2014; Sanders, 2014); issues that are not particular to 
emergency management but, according to these studies, extend to government more 
broadly. 
 
Ultimately, the sudden introduction of a new communications technology—that 
many branches within the organisation had a stake in—with little organisation-wide 
social media training contributed towards these competing understandings. I will 
note here that two participants told me how, when the organisation first introduced 
social media, the All Hazards Information Management System (AHIMS) project 
team hosted three lunchtime information sessions at the organisation’s Kedron 
(Brisbane) headquarters, to explain social media and its purpose in their organisation 
to operational personnel in particular. The AHIMS team also streamed these sessions 
so external employees could participate online. According to one participant, these 
sessions were not overly popular; they recalled one session that they attended with 
only about half a dozen participants.  
 
Efforts to engage operational members of the organisation in the social media space 
did slowly begin to change towards the end of my time at the organisation. In early 
2015, the media team received additional resources to appoint a full-time supervisor 
responsible for media training across QFES. One participant told me that the media 
team previously oversaw this function, however cuts made by the previous Newman-
led government between 2012 and 2013 removed the team’s media training budget.  
 
While I was at QFES, the media supervisor developed a general media training 
package of introductory, intermediate and advanced workshops that each included a 
small social media component. The media supervisor also developed a separate 
social media-specific workshop, which the media supervisor delivered only once 
during my time at QFES. The media supervisor delivered this training in the 
Northern region23, which meant I was unable to attend. I did attend two (introductory 
and intermediate) Brisbane-based media trainings, which primarily focused on 
                                                
 
23 See Appendix F for an outline of these regions 
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developing mainstream media skills: advancing participants’ understanding of the 
mainstream media’s role, building relationships with the mainstream media and 
improving interviewing skills. The social media component of the full-day 
intermediate training I observed lasted for 10 minutes at the end, briefly outlining 
what social media are and reminding participants of their Code of Conduct 
responsibilities when using personal accounts.  
 
From the outset, the media training was prioritised and delivered more regularly than 
the social media training, with the aim to deliver it across all regions as soon as 
practicable. In contrast, the media supervisor only delivered the social media 
workshop upon request. Consequently, while the first social media management 
workshop took place in late May 2015, the media supervisor did not deliver it again 
over the next three months while I was still at QFES. Based on my discussions with 
the media supervisor and senior media officers who assisted in delivering these 
workshops, it seemed that social media was still quite new for many of the 
operational participants. As the media supervisor explained of participants’ responses 
to social media during workshops: 
I think people are quite excited about it. You can see the penny drop when 
people watch the [‘introduction to social media’] video and you can see 
people go, “Oh God. This is big. This is a huge opportunity.” I think people 
get that it’s really important, and get that it’s got huge potential. And they 
just need some guidance on how to use it. (Media supervisor, July 2015).  
This observation is interesting, and the media supervisor’s use of the words 
“opportunity” and “potential” are particularly illuminating. The statement about 
social media having “huge potential” indicates a view amongst operational staff that 
social media are still emerging and are as-yet underdeveloped. However, when the 
media supervisor made these comments to me the organisation had already been 
using social media for over three years. Rather than emergent, social media were 
well established, with over 160,000 Facebook ‘fans’ and almost 25,000 Twitter 
followers.  
 
For the workshop participants—operational members of the organisation—to 
respond to social media in this way demonstrates how slow the broader organisation 
has been to adapt to social media, again demonstrating that the organisational factors 
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that Hiltz et al. (2014), McNutt (2014) and Sanders (2014) outlined as shaping social 
media use, also extend to this organisation. The organisation thus requires 
widespread cultural change before all branches of the organisation understand and 
value social media, and consider it a core part of the business, which fundamentally 
equate to measures that would empower the media team and other stakeholders. 
 
The introduction of the media supervisor (training) role demonstrated a step towards 
such cultural change. The media supervisor told me that they intended on delivering 
the media package across all the regions, while they only delivered the social media 
package upon request. While this again demonstrates the organisation privileging 
traditional over social media, delivering social media training only to those who 
request it, suggests their interest has already been piqued. The optional delivery of 
the social media package, instead of a compulsory delivery as is the current 
arrangement with the media training package, is a missed opportunity to facilitate 
cultural change by engaging with members of the organisation who dismiss social 
media.  
 
The organisation may also achieve cultural change through greater visibility of the 
media team, and specifically the social media role. Media team members sometimes 
visit operational personnel’s workplace or attend training sessions to better 
understand the operational arm of the organisation. While conducting my fieldwork, 
I participated—along with three other media team members—in a daylong live fire 
training session at QFES’s internationally recognised 1.5-hectare training campus in 
Brisbane. This included simulations and controlled fires; simplified versions of the 
actual training trainee firefighters receive. Likewise, along with four media officers, I 
visited the Fire Communications Centre (“FireCom”) from which fire 
communications officers receive and log Triple Zero (000)24 calls and dispatch 
necessary resources. These in-house “field trips” provided opportunities to better 
understand and appreciate firefighters’ and fire communications officers’ jobs.  
 
                                                
 
24 Triple Zero (000) is Australia’s national emergency telephone number, like 911 is in the United 
States. 
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Having other staff visit the media team’s offices might similarly increase the 
visibility of the team and their work. Taking this one step further, an optional 
operational staff placement (one-week or one-month for example) in the media team 
might also empower operational employees to have a stake in social media, thus 
helping to introduce cultural change, particularly if it receives managerial 
endorsement. Drawing on Wilkinson’s (1998) classification of empowerment, we 
can see how this could apply to QFES: 
At its simplest, empowerment would commonsensically be associated with 
the redistribution of power, but in practice empowerment is usually seen as a 
form of employee involvement, designed by management and intended to 
generate commitment and enhance employee contributions to the 
organisation (p. 45). 
The empowerment that I suggest here is not about power redistribution within the 
organisation but instead, ideally, management-endorsed (or driven) strategies to 
involve more employees in the social media space. Experiencing the role first-hand, 
as I have as an external researcher embedded in their team, operational staff could 
better understand the media team’s work: how they assist operational responsibilities 
through their direct access to the media and public via mainstream and social media, 
and how the team benefits from strong internal communication networks. This set up 
also would foster current and future knowledge sharing between operational and non-
operational staff, thus enhancing (as Wilkinson (1998) suggests) the contributions 
that employees across various branches make to the organisation. 
 
5.8 INTRODUCING THE PUBLIC INFORMATION CELL (PIC) 
When discussing social media thus far, I have primarily referred to it as a platform to 
disseminate information. As I outline in the next chapter, QFES primarily use social 
media for one-way communication to push out information, as an extension of their 
existing traditional communications activities. This pattern of use mirrors other 
scholars’ findings (see Mergel, 2013a; 2016). The competing views that I have 
examined so far about social media as a platform to disseminate information, also 
extended to the use of social media for intelligence gathering.  
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During a significant incident, the government activates the State Disaster 
Coordination Centre (SDCC). The following excerpt from the Queensland State 
Disaster Management Plan, reviewed in May 2015, explains the SDCC and its 
staffing and management arrangements during and outside of activation as prescribed 
by the Queensland Disaster Management Act (2003): 
The SDCC is a permanent facility located at the Emergency Services 
Complex at Kedron. Outside of activation, it operates as a Watch Desk 
staffed and maintained in a state of operational readiness by QFES. The QPS 
Disaster Management Unit and a [Bureau of Meteorology] senior forecaster 
are permanently situated at the Centre. On activation, QPS takes operational 
control of the SDCC and the additional staffing. During a disaster event, 
permanent staffing is supplemented by QPS, QFES and PSBA staff and 
where required other agency liaison officers from State government agencies 
(Queensland Government, 2015, p. 12). 
 
Prior to the 2014-15 storm/cyclone season, the various disaster response tasks the 
SDCC conducted, when activated, were divided amongst six “cells” – clusters of 
staff tasked with differing responsibilities. These six cells, and their responsibilities, 
included: 
1. Command – coordinates and controls the other cells 
2. Operations – manages the operational response 
3. Intelligence – strategises, plans ahead, collects operational information of 
intelligence value 
4. Planning – plans deployment, distribution and acquisition of people, 
equipment and resources 
5. Aviation – coordinates air operations 
6. Logistics – manages the SDCC and staff 
During the 2014-15 storm/cyclone season the organisation added a new cell to these 
existing seven cells: 
7. Public information – whole of government public information cell 
 
The Public Information Cell’s (PIC) four responsibilities include: producing whole 
of government key messages for the Premier, Minister, and any other relevant media-
fronting stakeholders to use; monitoring mainstream media; detecting emerging 
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issues that the media may report; and monitoring social media (Twitter and 
Facebook). During activation, five people operate the PIC: one coordinator, one key 
messages officer (responsible for producing the whole of government key messages 
document and the Premier’s executive summary, and ensuring the documents 
correlate); two media monitoring officers; and one social media monitoring officer. 
The introduction of the PIC came about following ongoing and persistent agitation 
by media team managers, who advocated that the SDCC needed a public information 
function but were concerned that QFES executives expected the media team to use 
their existing resources to staff this function.  
 
Towards the end of my time embedded at QFES I observed and participated in a two-
day PIC training course, having already observed the PIC when it was activated 
during an event in February 2015. Facilitators invite Queensland government 
communications employees to participate in the training so that, when a significant 
event takes place and the SDCC is activated, PIC supervisors have a pool of trained 
personnel to call upon. Ideally, PIC supervisors would only roster QFES and QPS 
media personnel as a last resort, as they are already preoccupied with their 
organisation’s incident-related tasks. 
 
Before attending this training course and knowing that one of the roles included 
social media monitoring, I assumed the addition of the PIC to the SDCC meant the 
organisation was increasing its capability for using social media to gather 
intelligence. However, upon observing the PIC during TC Marcia (February 2015) 
and participating in the training (July 2015) I noted that the social media monitoring 
function within the PIC was largely an extension of the QFES media team’s social 
media monitoring activities, albeit covering all Queensland government agencies and 
not just QFES. That is, the social media monitoring officer manually monitored 
social media using Hootsuite, setting up search streams based on keywords and the 
event hashtag (e.g. #tcmarcia). 
 
The main purpose of the social media monitoring officer role, as explained during 
the training course, is to monitor the social media activity of prominent accounts. 
Such accounts include mainstream media organisations, relevant journalists, key 
public figures (including the Premier and Minister), government and local council 
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accounts and relevant event-related accounts (e.g. the training facilitator referenced 
the ‘Tassie Fires, We Can Help’ Facebook page established by a community member 
during the January 2013 Tasmanian bushfires, see Irons et al., 2015). Social media 
monitoring is limited to two platforms: Twitter and Facebook. The focus on these 
two platforms ignores others such as Instagram—photos and videos of damage 
could, when posted with a user’s geo-location function activated, direct operational 
resources towards those who need them most, in a timely manner. The focus of this 
social media monitoring role is instead to detect emerging issues, not to raise 
situational awareness, so much as image management. One participant described the 
purpose of the PIC’s social media monitoring function compared to QPS, who are 
the lead agency in the SDCC during an incident (as explained in the Queensland 
State Disaster Management Plan excerpt quoted above): 
They're looking for things different to what we do. They're looking at it from 
a purely operational policing, intelligence-gathering perspective. Whereas 
we're looking at it as that yes, but we're also looking at what's going to make 
the government look bad? So we might pick something up that they don't 
and vice versa. (Media team member, August 2015)  
It appears then that the purpose of the social media monitoring officer is not 
specifically about pulling intelligence from users located on the ground to inform the 
disaster response process. Rather, the priority is to detect image/reputation-damaging 
issues as they emerge, to reduce the impact of issues affecting the government, its 
agencies, the Premier, and/or the Minister.  
 
5.8.1 Competing expectations about the PIC’s capabilities 
However, like the competing expectations that exist around the broader purpose of 
social media, the introduction of the PIC also brought competing expectations about 
its capabilities in regards to social media intelligence gathering. My early 
assumptions about what a social media monitoring officer’s role entailed proved 
incorrect after observing the PIC in action, attending the PIC training and 
interviewing PIC staff. During an interview, held after the PIC training, the training 
facilitator explained to me their understanding of the executive’s expectation about 
the PIC’s capability for gathering intelligence during a disaster:  
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The expectation of the executive and the Minister [for Police, Fire and 
Emergency Services] would be that [if] someone tweets that they need 
rescuing off a reef somewhere, we'd [the PIC] pick that up, send it in to the 
[State Disaster Coordination] Centre, the Centre would task an aircraft and 
the aircraft would go. I don't think we're going to do that as often. We might 
do it on occasion but we shouldn't be relied on to do it. (Media team 
member, August 2015) 
This explanation reiterates a comment the facilitator made during the training 
regarding the executive’s expectation of the PIC’s social media monitoring 
capabilities. The facilitator noted that sometimes the senior executives’ expectations 
do not align with the PIC’s capabilities, as the PIC does not have the resources to 
monitor the sheer volume of information that social media users generate. A 
hypothetical example demonstrating these mismatched expectations is that someone 
may drive through a flooded road, get stuck and become stranded. That individual 
may then tweet about their situation. Some senior executives expect the PIC could 
promptly gather that intelligence, communicate it elsewhere within the SDCC and 
the SDCC would then deploy resources to rescue the stranded individual. The 
facilitator acknowledged the PIC does not have the data-gathering capabilities or 
knowledge to use social media for this purpose, which clearly does not align with the 
executive’s expectations. 
 
We can again relate this to Fiore-Gartland and Neff’s (2015) idea of valences to 
describe differences in expectations and tensions around those expectations. In the 
same way that Fiore-Gartland and Neff’s (2015) participants, who are patients and 
doctors, had competing expectations of the same thing (in this case the health and 
wellness data generated by new digital technologies), my participants valued and 
expected different things of social media (both the platforms and the social media 
monitoring function in the PIC).  
 
The facilitator’s assertion in both the workshop and a later interview that such 
expectations are unreasonable, is potentially problematic. It demonstrates competing 
views about what is manageable given the resources that the organisation assigns to 
such a function: evidently, the resources that are assigned are not sufficient to meet 
the executive’s expectations of the PIC. If the executive maintains these high 
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expectations, the PIC will be unable to do what the executive expects it to do, 
making the PIC ultimately untenable. These mismatched expectations again speak to 
the broader differing positions within the organisation about the purpose of social 
media. However, being in positions of authority, the executive can and does have a 
direct impact on how the organisation resources and manages social media. In the 
following chapter, I thus examine the organisation’s specific uses of social media 
platforms; how these uses differ or compare across platforms, and the role of 
strategies and policies in governing these uses. 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
The addition of social media to the media team’s role was met with mixed reactions, 
largely due to the workload implications this would have on the team. Team 
members prioritised traditional media tasks over social media, and largely viewed 
social media tasks as additional to, not included in, their responsibilities. I have 
drawn on Filby and Willmot’s (1988) ethnographic study to examine how my 
participants’ professional backgrounds and identities shaped their understandings of 
their roles (in particular the media team members) within a government agency. In 
addition, I have drawn on Stark’s (2009) concept of dissonance and Fiore-Gartland 
and Neff’s (2015) work to unpack the competing understandings of social media that 
were present in the organisation. How these theoretical perspectives relate to one 
another is most significant for this chapter: in examining the influence of 
participants’ professional histories on their current roles, we can see how 
participants’ varied professional ideologies actually fostered dissonant positions 
towards the use of social media, and the purpose of social media for the organisation. 
The material presented in this chapter contributes to our understanding of social 
media in organisational contexts, because the nature of social media—its uses, 
affordances and practices—is contested amongst members of an organisation. Those 
responsible for social media did not have the power to decide how it is positioned 
within day-to-day activities. 
 
This was particularly evident within the media team, as team members’ professional 
histories as print and radio journalists (for most of the media team members at least) 
contributed towards a view of social media as peripheral to their “actual” or 
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“normal” (traditional) media work. This extended beyond the media team. As I 
demonstrated through the “fight on the floor” incident later in the chapter, we can see 
how two dissenting views can generate conflict between members of different 
branches of the organisation. The culture that exists in these organisations, one in 
which uniformed operational personnel hold a higher hierarchical position than 
plain-clothed, non-operational staff, intensified this conflict. 
 
The views towards social media within the media team can be positioned along a 
spectrum. At the one end, some media officers were excited about social media being 
part of their role, viewing it as fun and enjoyable and an opportunity for creative 
freedom and flexibility. These media officers were typically avid users of social 
media in their personal time, particularly of creative platforms such as Instagram. At 
the other end of the spectrum were inherently negative views of social media, such as 
the media officer who lamented that it took away from their “actual” media work and 
described their opinion of social media, in two separate interviews over one year 
apart, as a “love hate relationship” (Media team member, June 2014).  
 
I illustrated how my participants’ professional histories shaped their current practice, 
through the example of the manager whose radio journalism background influences 
their approach towards information dissemination. This manager’s approach also 
highlights the tension between the speed and timeliness demanded of social media 
and the nature of the QFES media team’s work, which requires caution. These 
tensions are not specific to communications professionals working in emergency 
management, or even government communications professionals more broadly. 
Rather, journalism, media and communications professionals in general must manage 
these tensions.  
 
Many journalism scholars have examined the editorial challenges when journalists 
use social media. Usher (2014) for example observed how “immediacy puts pressure 
on journalists to produce content right away, rather than taking time to think 
carefully about news judgment” (p. 233). Similarly, Alfred Hermida (2012a) noted 
that: 
The rise of social media as a source for breaking news, and the speed at 
which information is disseminated on the network, poses a challenge to 
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journalism’s discipline of verification. Verification is at the core of the 
journalist’s contention to objectively parse reality and claim a special kind of 
authority and status. (p. 320) 
That is, the temptation to break unverified news on social media could threaten 
journalists’ reputations as purveyors of quality, accurate information if that 
information proves incorrect. However, journalists can safeguard themselves when 
reporting unverified information via social media. We often observe journalists 
prefix unverified information with “unconfirmed reports…” or “sources are 
claiming…”, a frequently deployed tactic by many journalists reporting during 
dynamic and fast-moving events like natural disasters and crises.  
 
In contrast, the consequences of the QFES media team disseminating incorrect or 
unverified information are far greater. The media team manager quoted above 
acknowledged this greater responsibility and accountability compared with 
journalists, explaining that “unlike journos, if we do the wrong thing people could 
die” (Media team manager, August 2015). Although extreme, this is certainly true. If 
the QFES media team disseminate incorrect or unverified information via either 
mainstream or social media—such risks are not specific to their use of social media 
after all, but inherent in their use of any communications medium—then vulnerable 
people could make ill-advised decisions based on that information, which might put 
them in greater harm. The nature of their work quite literally can mean life or death, 
as one media team member noted: 
We’re a government agency, we’re an authority on a lot of things that are 
very, very serious, the stuff we put up is really serious and we need it to be 
taken seriously (Media team member, June 2014). 
Unlike traditional communications media, social media, as I noted before, demands 
timely communication; when engaging with social media platforms, as St. Denis, 
Hughes and Palen (2012) note, emergency managers’ social media followers expect 
timely information from them. As the provider of the state’s fire and emergency 
services, QFES’s responsibility is first to the public. Therefore, while most of the 
media team members’ journalism backgrounds influence their professional ideology, 
they are keenly aware that their greater level of responsibility and accountability, as 
public servants working in a highly sensitive government organisation, distinguishes 
them from journalists. 
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Throughout this chapter, I have also maintained that these dissonant perspectives 
towards social media need not remain. I suggested that the organisation requires 
widespread cultural change before it can fully embrace social media. The 
appointment of a media supervisor to oversee media training is a useful step in 
initiating this cultural change. However, as I pointed out, there is a missed 
opportunity in only delivering this social media training upon request, rather than 
compulsorily doing so, as is the current arrangement for media training. By engaging 
operational personnel through compulsory social media training, MACC personnel 
(in their capacity as managers of the organisation’s social media function) can 
directly challenge their dissenting opinions about social media. In doing so, this 
might create an environment that Stark (2009) claimed makes dissonance productive. 
Operational personnel may have suggestions for how social media could be more 
operationally useful. These suggestions may be outside of MACC’s resourcing 
capabilities, but they may at least empower operational personnel by giving them a 
stake in social media if it assists operations.  
 
Second, the media team can directly challenge operational personnel’s dissenting 
views by increasing their visibility—and specifically the visibility of the social media 
function—within the organisation. It is likely that operational personnel have 
different views from the media team about the purpose of social media for the 
organisation because they do not fully understand the media team’s work, much as 
the media team cannot fully appreciate the work of a firefighter. I observed on a 
number of occasions, for example, operational personnel visiting the media team’s 
office—MACC’s open plan office was a popular thoroughfare to the cafeteria—and 
commenting with surprise about particular components of media officers’ work. In 
this chapter, I suggested that introducing optional placements for operational staff 
within the media team might help initiate cultural change within the organisation. 
Such placements could cultivate closer connections between operational personnel 
and the media team, fostering knowledge sharing between the two disparate branches 
of the organisation.  
 
Experiencing the role first-hand might also challenge operational personnel’s views 
of social media. By directly observing media team activities, they could see social 
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media as more than just a medium for the media team to post photos to and promote 
the organisation and its personnel. Instead, they might come to see social media as a 
space of potential operational importance; a space to provide time-critical warnings 
and information during a disaster, to educate the public to encourage behavioural 
change—crucial to their role as emergency responders—and a medium via which to 
engage in two-way conversation with their audience. I examine these uses of social 
media, and challenges to QFES current practices, in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Uses of social media 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
Since the advent of social media platforms, proponents have praised them for their 
ability to bypass mainstream media, connecting directly with followers and engaging 
in a two-way conversation (St Denis, Hughes and Palen, 2012). Despite the two-way 
communicative potential, government organisations primarily employ social media 
as an extension of existing communications strategies (Mergel, 2013a; 2016). For 
many of my QFES participants, the ability to transmit information exactly as they 
had constructed it was one of the appeals of social media. When releasing 
information to the mainstream media for public consumption, there is the risk that 
the media may misconstrue information or that they may cherry-pick facts to 
construct a particular narrative. With social media, information is presented to the 
public exactly as the organisation intends. Social media are seen as a space to post 
press releases and other news that the organisation will most likely also release to the 
mainstream media.  
 
Additionally, social media provide a marketing and promotional platform for the 
organisation, somewhere that they can post stories to about events and activities that 
the mainstream media may reject. Despite the promises of new forms of engagement 
and interaction between government and citizens via social media, in reality social 
media platforms instead present new challenges for these organisations. Mergel 
(2015) notes that government social media adoption raises new expectations among 
followers of increased accessibility and responsiveness. However, this conflicts with 
current practice in these organisations; consequently, they must develop strategies 
and adjust current processes to manage these expectations (Mergel, 2015, p. 467). 
 
Mergel (2015) also distinguishes different approaches to government social media 
use based on how centralised the organisation is, noting that 
In a highly centralized organization, social media are seen as a technology 
issue, and the chief information officer is responsible for the strategic and 
managerial issues that are arising. In decentralized organizations, social 
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media are the responsibility of public affairs or communication officers; 
these organizations also allow decentralized social media accounts across 
different content areas, teams, or temporary campaigns. (p. 464)  
In this study, I found that QFES actually straddled those two distinctions. In Chapter 
5, I examined how the organisation adopts an “out of sight, out of mind” approach to 
volunteer local groups (in particular) maintaining their own social media pages, even 
though (according to QFES’s social media guidelines) the organisation does not 
officially allow decentralised social media accounts. At the same time we can see 
how, like many other emergency management organisations, QFES is a highly 
centralised organisation with traditionally strict protocols and chains of command 
around information release (see Plotnick et al., 2015). This chapter analyses the 
organisation’s communicative uses of social media, drawing on the factors shaping 
these uses, described in the previous two chapters, to examine current practice.  
 
In the previous chapter, I described the internal dissonance in perceptions of social 
media as a function. I drew on Stark (2009) and Fiore-Gartland and Neff (2015) to 
examine how my participants differed about the purpose of social media in QFES. 
By ‘social media function’ I referred to a role or an activity that someone within the 
organisation maintained responsibility for. I refer to social media in this chapter 
primarily as a communicative function, examining how this previously unpacked 
dissonance informed the way QFES used social media as a platform to communicate.  
 
I previously noted that many of the media team’s professional histories (primarily as 
media professionals with traditional journalism backgrounds) shaped their views of 
social media in relation to their existing QFES media activities. Expanding this 
further, in this chapter I examine how these views then shaped their professional uses 
of social media, describing these uses as normalised. By “normalised”, I refer to 
embedding social media to fit existing practices; in this case using social media to 
extend existing traditional media activities. I draw on the sociological concept of 
Normalisation Process Theory from May and Finch (2009) to frame my 
understanding of these practices. ‘Normalising’ stands in contrast to adapting to 
social media, reconfiguring existing routines to take advantage of the communicative 
potentials of these new technologies. The chapter examines the organisation’s 
opinion-based versus evidence-based approaches to, and understandings of social 
 Chapter 6: Uses of social media 150 
media. This relates to the idea of normalising social media: by making opinion-based 
decisions, the organisation did not adapt to the (evidence-based) two-way 
communicative potential of social media. 
 
The team’s use of social media compares to what journalism scholars have shown 
regarding how journalists use social media. Singer’s (2005) seminal study examined 
how journalists normalised blogs, while Hermida (2012a, citing Lasorsa, Lewis and 
Holton, 2012) notes more broadly, “journalists are normalising social media rather 
than adapting their occupational culture” (p. 316). While acknowledging that there 
are some exceptions of news media professionals and their editors embracing social 
media for news creation and dissemination, Hermida argues that ultimately “studies 
show that they are much less likely to take advantage of the conversational modes on 
Twitter or Facebook” (p. 316).  
 
Similarly, in this chapter I examine how the media team at QFES largely normalised 
(rather than adapted to) social media. In doing so, efforts to engage in a two-way 
conversation with their audience were secondary to their one-way communication 
responsibilities. I argue that, without formal social media training upon the addition 
of social media to their role, updated social media policies and guidelines to follow, 
and managerial chains of command informing decisions, media team members made 
opinion-based rather than evidence-based decisions when using social media. This 
relates to the idea of normalising versus adapting, because without evidence to 
support their decisions, media team members normalised social media to fit existing 
communicative strategies that were evidence-based (evidence that came from formal 
tertiary education and their professional backgrounds).  
 
6.2 SOCIAL MEDIA USES AND PURPOSE 
QFES’s use of particular social media platforms remained consistent throughout 
most of my fieldwork, with the organisation focusing on Facebook and Twitter 
primarily. The social media team, and later the media team, simultaneously 
maintained an Instagram account, although, as I describe later in this chapter, 
maintenance of this account fluctuated. QFES also had YouTube and Pinterest 
accounts, although I did not observe the latter in use and the former was sporadic. 
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When they did use YouTube, it was primarily to post pre-recorded media 
conferences, or campaign videos and promotional pieces the multimedia team 
created (such as the ‘Back to the Brass Helmet’ series, described below). With the 
ability to upload videos directly to Facebook, rather than needing to first post to a 
video-sharing platform like YouTube to then embed in a post, I noted that the media 
team preferred this direct dissemination approach and the need for YouTube 
decreased.  
 
In observing QFES’s use of social media, and through my administrative access to 
their Facebook and Twitter accounts across my two-year ethnography, I established 
that Mergel’s (2013a; 2016) observation of government agencies’ default use of 
social media also extended to QFES. By observing their online activity through my 
administrative access to their social media accounts—I noted in Chapter 3 that 
observations included those I conducted in-person at my field site and also observing 
their online activity while on and off-site—I created a broad typology of social media 
posts by the organisation. These primarily serve specific one-way communicative 
purposes, but there is often crossover between the different types. As I started 
following QFES’s social media accounts before I began my fieldwork, an extended 
observation of their online activity, rather than a brief snapshot, informs the typology 
I created and ensures the accuracy of the assessment below. 
 
The typology builds on existing scholars’ research by briefly categorising the 
purposes of emergency management organisations’ use of social media for primarily 
one-way communication. I illustrate the uses described below with examples at the 
end of the descriptions, screen shots of posts from QFES’s social media pages. Not 
all of QFES’s social media posts served a one-way communicative function. The 
‘interacting’ category refers to a distinctly two-way communicative function, 
although such posts were infrequent. ‘Informative/warning’ posts—particularly 
during significant weather events—and ‘promotional’ posts were most common:  
 
Informative/warning: This content aligns with existing mainstream media activities. 
During events, the team disseminates warnings and updates, posting the location of 
resources (e.g. sandbags, cyclone shelters), and useful contact numbers and social 
media accounts for affected residents. This category also crosses over with 
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‘networking’ as QFES often shares posts from other agencies, particularly local 
councils (see Figure 4)—who may have more timely and relevant local 
information—and Queensland Police who are the lead agency during an event. In the 
lead up to bushfire season the team frequently notifies followers of impending burn-
offs to give them advance warning of smoke in their area.  
 
Networking: QFES often promotes its partnerships with other organisations via 
social media posts. In early-2015, QFES collaborated with Deaf Services Queensland 
(DSQ) to produce a fire safety social media campaign targeting hearing-impaired 
Queenslanders. QFES also promotes inter-agency collaboration, such as multi-
agency training exercises in preparation for storm/cyclone season. During events in 
particular, QFES shares important posts from other agencies (typically Queensland 
Ambulance, Queensland Police and local councils in the affected area) to amplify 
their message by disseminating it to a wider audience (see Figure 5). Sharing posts 
(or retweeting) serves an important role-establishing function and maintains collegial 
interagency relations, as one media officer told me: “it’s nicer to attribute it to the 
agency that owns that information” (Media officer, August 2014).  
 
Educational: Quiet periods, such as after the storm/cyclone season or the lead-up to 
the bushfire season25, provide an opportunity for QFES to share disaster 
preparedness and safety tips and other facts to educate followers to make better-
informed decisions for their own safety during an event. Educational posts are also 
useful during an event, for example if affected members of the community are 
contacting the organisation for assistance when they may not require it (see Figure 
6).  
 
Promotional: QFES publicises the organisation and its personnel, posting images of 
trainings and events to give followers a greater understanding of the organisation’s 
day-to-day operations (see Figure 7). This includes photos of personnel on 
deployment—both on their way to, during and after an event—to reassure followers 
                                                
 
25 Bushfires occur during hot, dry weather, and in Queensland the bushfire seasons usually extends 
from around August until December. The storm/cyclone season in Queensland typically extends from 
November until April. The months outside of these seasons, from April until November, are quieter 
periods and the media team develops its disaster preparedness messaging and campaigns during this 
time. 
 Chapter 6: Uses of social media 153 
of the organisation’s activity. The media team’s promotional posts are usually driven 
by content they have received from operational personnel. They may also include 
light-hearted, ‘soft’ news (for example animal rescue photos) or links to positive 
media stories about the organisation (for example a reunion between a firefighter and 
someone they rescued).  
 
Commemorative: On the anniversary of major events in Queensland’s history (such 
as severe cyclones), QFES often posts a commemorative update. These posts usually 
include an image (such as a photo of the destruction) and some information about the 
event. These posts sometimes also serve an educative purpose. For example, while 
commemorating the five-year anniversary of Tropical Cyclone Yasi, the QFES 
media team used the opportunity to remind followers about the importance of 
cyclone preparedness. Likewise, in mid-2015 the team began posting the ‘Back to 
the Brass Helmet’ episodes, a 10-week series created by the QFES multimedia team 
(see Figure 8). These “webisodes” (a web-based series) commemorated historic 
Brisbane fire events from the perspective of the firefighters who fought the fires, and 
simultaneously served a promotional purpose for the organisation.  
 
Interacting: Occasionally, QFES posts to explicitly engage in a two-way 
conversation with their audience. These posts typically include an article or video to 
generate comment and discussion amongst and with their followers (see Figure 9). In 
Section 6.3, I examine how my participants contested interactivity as a concept and 
differed in their interpretation of what constitutes appropriate government 
communication. My participants often spoke about “engaging”, but rather than 
referring to a form of interactivity (or engaging) with their audience, they were 
actually referring to creating appealing (“engaging”) content. 
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Figure 4 ‘Informative/warning’ example 
Figure 5 ‘Networking' example 
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Figure 6 ‘Educational’ example 
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Figure 7 'Promotional' example 
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Figure 8 'Commemorative' example 
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The use (or overuse) of ‘promotional’ social media posts was contentious within the 
team. Some team members considered them an important way to build awareness of 
the organisation’s activities outside of large-scale events. Given that a significant 
Figure 9 ‘Interacting' example 
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portion of their organisation is made up of volunteers, promotional posts also serve 
as a way to a) feature the work of and acknowledge those volunteers, and b) promote 
volunteerism to attract new recruits. Media team members often struggled to balance 
the competing social media expectations of QFES personnel, some of whom engage 
with the organisation’s social media (Facebook especially), and the expectations of 
‘regular’ members of the public: 
Some people have a gripe with the amount of promotion we do on there. 
They think it should be more warnings and safety messaging. But I do think 
the community engagement stuff is really good. It’s nice to promote what 
everyone’s doing. We just do a LOT of it at the moment. (Media team 
member, June 2014)  
 
Media officers imagined the makeup of their social media audience differently. 
Many agreed that their audience is fragmented and had different interests from one 
another. One media officer willingly assigned a percentage breakdown in describing 
their audience breakdown to me: 
When you look at our audience, I wouldn’t lie that I believe that 50% would 
be either a relative [of an employee], an actual person that works for the 
Department, that works in one of the volunteer organisations, or that has 
some other relation or friend or whoever who is connected (Media officer, 
January 2014). 
We can see here that this media officer groups their audience into distinct categories: 
internal personnel and their affiliates, and ‘others’ (regular members of the public). 
The media officer described their imagined audience when discussing the difficulty 
of managing angry Facebook comments following the then-Newman government 
cuts, which I outlined in Chapter 4. The deluge of angry comments the organisation 
received from those impacted upon by the government cuts illustrated to this media 
officer the makeup of their audience. Managing the competing interests of the 
factions within their audience was difficult, and team members did not agree on the 
appropriate amount of promotional content. One participant thought the team focused 
too much on promotional content, believing that this was not an integral part of their 
role as media officers. This caused concern that they were jeopardising their 
positions because of the perceived triviality of this work: 
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Sometimes I worry that we spend too much time fostering goodwill and 
professionalism with the staff and volunteers, and I don't think that's what 
we're paid to do. I think if that's what we're obsessed with doing we'll end up 
being closed or [media team members will] lose their jobs, because I don't 
think it's good value for money for the public to be paying a team of media 
officers to be patting volunteers on the back. Yeah it's an important part of 
the whole cycle of keeping the community safe, but is it the priority? No I 
don't think it is. (Media team member, June 2014) 
As with the previously quoted media officer, this media team member implies that, 
through their social media channels, they are simultaneously catering to an internal 
audience (QFES staff and volunteers) and an external audience (the general public).  
 
For media team members, this meant that they had a responsibility to serve the 
different factions of their audience with content that appealed to all. This 
participant’s job security concern was unsurprising as this interview occurred shortly 
after the organisational restructure. Journalism scholars have noted similar concerns, 
suggesting that communications professionals in general share job security concerns. 
Deuze (2007b), for example, noted that history has taught journalists to be sceptical 
of organisational change as these changes are usually staffing- and resource-related 
and result in redundancies (p. 147). However, we could also interpret their concern 
about “being closed” as providing an exclusive space that is only of interest to the 
QFES staff and volunteers.  
 
The above quotes from different media team members nonetheless again demonstrate 
competing views towards the purpose of social media for their organisation: some 
media team members considered promotional posts an important morale-boosting 
aspect of their social media use, while others considered them unnecessary and 
irrelevant to their core function as a government communications team.  
 
This created a paradoxical situation for media team members. Their social media 
content should have broad appeal (i.e. to followers who do not work for or are not 
directly connected to the organisation). Yet, being Brisbane-based, they relied on 
internal personnel located across the state for much of that content:  
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I think there’s a culture at the moment of us putting lots of stuff up because 
we’re appreciating operational people sending us the stuff. You don’t want 
to say no to them because there’s probably that concern that if you say no 
then they won’t continue to send you stuff. (Media team member, June 
2014) 
To ensure their content was of a consistently high quality, media officers sometimes 
rejected content. For example, they would sometimes reject photos from personnel 
that were poor quality, poorly framed, or did not actually depict anything of interest 
(media officers frequently joked about banning photos of personnel sitting at tables 
“doing nothing” as the team often received such photos from personnel). The media 
team recognised that although personnel considered such content to be interesting 
and would get pleasure from seeing themselves on QFES’s social media pages (a sort 
of internet stardom), this content did not always appeal to other members of QFES’s 
social media audience. The criticism in Figure 10 depicts this disinterest: 
  
 
This criticism is not simply an issue about photos, but is a broader issue around 
managing the competing expectations of QFES’s audience members. This critic 
clearly believes the purpose of the QFES Facebook page is to provide warnings and 
information about dangers. For this critic, QFES is failing in its responsibility to 
provide content that is of value, because it is instead preoccupied with sharing 
promotional content. We can see how media team members’ perception of their 
obligations towards specific audience factions directly shapes their uses of social 
media. Their dependency on internal QFES staff for social media content creates a 
fear of the repercussions should they not meet their expectations.  
 
Media officers tried to maintain quality content on their accounts, while 
simultaneously appeasing their contacts across the state, whom they relied on for 
Figure 10 Facebook page content criticism 
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content. This is significant for two reasons. First, it highlights the competing interests 
of their social media audience. With traditional media activities, their primary 
audience are journalists at local and state news outlets who, we can assume, have 
broadly similar content interests. In the case of QFES, however, and of most 
government agencies who use social media, their fragmented social media audience 
consists of organisational staff and volunteers, journalists, local residents, and the 
general public, with competing interests. Social media therefore serves both an 
external and internal communicative function for many of these organisations.  
 
Second, knowledge and expertise in this space is based on individual judgement 
calls. Social media platforms are new and evolving, and many of these organisations 
have had a presence for less than five years. Expertise in this space is therefore 
subjective; users often make opinion-based not evidence-based decisions. Decisions 
to accept or reject (and then post) content depend on the individual staff member’s 
opinion. These concerns are not particular to this organisation (QFES) in this 
location (Queensland/Australia); they extend to other government agencies. As 
restricted resources (budgets and staffing) plague many government agencies, their 
personnel must consider creative solutions to overcome these issues. This includes 
sourcing content from personnel across various locations when it is not practical to 
independently source content. Doing so relinquishes a degree of control over that 
content, and establishes a dependence on others in the organisation to conduct your 
work.  
 
The media team’s practices I have described—and their corresponding issues—only 
speak to a very tactical, reactive use of social media: selecting from the stream of 
incoming content to decide what they should post on their social media accounts. In 
this sense, media officers employ a traditional journalistic gatekeeper function. 
Gatekeeping is, according to Shoemaker and Vos (2009), “the process of culling and 
crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach 
people every day”, while “this process determines not only which information is 
selected, but also what the content and nature of the messages, such as news, will be” 
(p. 1).  
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In performing this gatekeeping function, we can see how (many of) the media 
officers rely on their professional training as traditional journalists; drawing on Filby 
and Willmot (1988) in the previous chapter, I outlined how media officers’ 
professional histories shaped their current roles as government communications 
professionals. Some journalism scholars have suggested that the introduction of the 
internet has reconfigured journalists’ gatekeeping roles to one of “gatewatchers” 
(Bruns, 2008b): 
Of observing the many gates through which a steady stream of information 
passes from these sources, and of highlighting from this stream that 
information which is of most relevance to one’s own personal interests or to 
the interests of one’s wider community (p. 177) 
Although, as I describe throughout this chapter, the QFES media team have largely 
normalised social media rather than adapted to current practice, we might consider 
that their responding to their audience’s questions and comments and filtering 
information based on that two-way communication, is a step towards this 
“gatewatching” function.  
 
The practices that I have thus far described give media officers very little agency 
beyond making yes/no gatekeeper selections. To be clear: media officers did also 
employ social media for proactive, planned uses such as pre-arranged campaigns or 
events. The screen shot in Figure 11 depicts one such pre-planned campaign: one 
post from a National Volunteer Week campaign that the media team created in 
conjunction with the QFES multimedia team, who produced professional 
promotional videos featuring Rural Fire Service (RFS) and State Emergency 
Services (SES) volunteers. Beyond these campaigns, which were typically attached 
to existing, mainstream media activities, I observed little long-term strategic use of 
social media. As I examine later in this chapter, the QFES media team’s use of social 
media largely depended on media officers making individual judgement calls, with 
fluid guidelines and directives from media team managers. 
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6.3 SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM PREFERENCES  
Since joining Instagram in 2012, the then-social media team used the platform to 
promote the organisation through photos of its personnel at local events and at 
incidents to which they responded. After the media team assumed responsibility for 
social media, I observed the team’s use of Instagram decline. Towards the end of my 
fieldwork, some media officers drove a resumed enthusiasm towards Instagram, 
which was largely dependent on their personal use of the platform. Again, it was an 
opinion-based rather than evidence-based decision to use Instagram. A new addition 
to the media team, who had previously worked as a social media officer before being 
made redundant in 2012, was partially responsible for rekindling this enthusiasm. 
Figure 11 QFES National Volunteer Week campaign 
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Other media officers—frequent Instagram users in their personal time—shared this 
enthusiasm, and media team managers supported the team’s resumed interest in the 
platform. During an interview for the PSBA internal social media review, a media 
team manager seemingly foretold this impending enthusiasm towards Instagram. The 
interviewer asked of any platforms not currently in use that the team may adopt in 
the next five years. The participant responded: 
I think Instagram’s going to be the next one. It’s not being very widely used 
though. Look I dunno, I’m not basing this on anything I’ve just got a view 
that Instagram is becoming more popular and the pictures tell a story a lot 
better than a lot of written words do. That’s my view but maybe I’m being 
naïve there. […] I just like the way that Instagram works, but that might only 
be a personal preference. I don’t have any basis or research to form that 
view it’s just my gut feeling that maybe that’s a platform that we need to 
develop a bit more. (Media team manager, emphasis added, June 2014) 
The participant’s foretelling of the increased popularity of Instagram—which, 
notably, current research supports (see Sensis, 2015, p. 18)—is interesting but 
perhaps coincidental, as media officers, not team managers, drove the resumed use of 
Instagram.  
 
However, it is the participant’s personal judgement call, emphasised in the above 
quote, which informs their prediction. The participant emphasises their lack of 
evidence multiple times, nonetheless asserting their claim. This is interesting as it 
demonstrates how the organisation’s social media investment (both financial and 
staffing) decisions can be opinion-based. This differs from other media and 
communications investment decisions, which are usually evidence-based.  
 
For example, towards the end of my fieldwork in mid-2015, the Queensland 
government began a floodwater safety advertising campaign. Despite tireless 
reminders not to drive through floodwaters (“if it’s flooded forget it” being the 
Queensland government’s floodwater safety catch phrase), Queensland drivers 
continually risk their safety, passengers’ safety, and swift water rescue technicians’ 
safety by driving across flooded roads. This occurs so frequently, QFES personnel 
repeatedly told me, that QFES now rescues more people from floodwaters than from 
fires. The floodwater safety campaign included surveys and focus groups across the 
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state to inform the development of television and radio advertisements and a new 
website (floodwatersafety.initiatives.qld.gov.au), which contained online resources 
such as a flooded roads map with real-time data and the ability to report flooded 
roads.  
 
If we compare investment in and evidence informing this campaign with QFES’s 
social media use, we can see how social media can be undervalued. Decisions about 
its use are often opinion-based, despite a growing body of evidence—both scholarly 
and industry-generated—about the uses of social media that offer practical, 
accessible strategies for organisations to implement. 
 
The influence of personal opinions on the organisation’s social media platform usage 
also extended to and was particularly evident, regarding Twitter. I observed the team 
privilege Facebook over Twitter; many media team members viewed Twitter as 
underused in Queensland and thus less relevant for whom they perceived as their 
target audience. In June 2014, one of the media team managers and I sat on a ‘social 
media in government’-themed industry conference panel together, titled ‘Best 
practice for emergency and crisis communication through digital and social media’. 
In advance of the panel, my co-panellist emailed me their prepared discussion notes. 
Regarding QFES’s use of Twitter, they wrote: 
Our anecdotal evidence is that Twitter has limited take-up in remote 
Queensland where half the population lives. So, with limited resources 
available to us, we need to use the channel that we know works. We don’t 
ignore the ways Twitter can quickly multiply the reach of a message, we 
simply make the pragmatic decision that Facebook works better for us, here 
and now. (Team manager, personal communication, June 2014) 
This anecdotal finding is unsurprising given Facebook’s continued dominance in the 
Australian social media market (see Sensis, 2016, p. 19). Aside from Facebook, 
Twitter is also less popular in Australia than Instagram, LinkedIn, and Snapchat 
(Sensis, 2016, p. 19). Another team member shared this anecdotally informed view 
of Twitter in an interview about halfway through my fieldwork: 
Do I think that Twitter will become bigger? Not in an emergency space, I’m 
just getting the view that people aren’t necessarily embracing Twitter as 
much in this space. We just don’t seem to be getting as much pick up there as 
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we do on the other platforms. Yeah, I’m not convinced with Twitter yet. 
(Media team member, emphasis added, June 2014) 
The emphasised parts of this quote suggest that the participant lacks conviction of 
what they are claiming, again demonstrating an opinion-based view of Twitter’s 
popularity amongst their audience.  
 
Further, my own tracking of QFES’s growth in social media followers actually 
counters this participant’s claim about their traction on Twitter compared to other 
platforms. The graph in Figure 12 depicts the growth in QFES Twitter and Facebook 
followers over a two-year period. After the organisation rebranded as QFES in early-
2014, the then-social media manager subsequently rebranded their existing @QldFire 
Twitter account to @QldFES and ceased using their @QldSES Twitter account 
(although retaining the handle), while merging their SES and QFRS Facebook pages 
to operate from one, QFES-encompassing account. The below graph therefore 
depicts the follower count for each platform after this rebrand.  
 
It is important to first stress that QFES has significantly more followers on Facebook 
than on Twitter: by the end of my record-keeping they had almost six times the 
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Figure 12 QFES Twitter and Facebook followers rate of growth 
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number of followers on Facebook than they did on Twitter. I do not intend for this 
analysis to over- or under-represent their number of followers on either platform. I 
demonstrate instead that my participants grounded their reasoning for using 
particular platforms over others in personal views and assumptions about those 
platforms, rather than in evidence. Although QFES has significantly more followers 
on Facebook than on Twitter, the above participant’s claim that they are not “getting 
as much pickup” on Twitter is inaccurate. We can see in the above graph that in fact 
their rate of growth of followers on Twitter is far greater than on Facebook. This is 
not particular to QFES. I compared QFES’s rate of growth with that of QPS, whom I 
also tracked over the same period as a point of comparison. The patterns in both 
organisations are very similar. I provide a graph comparing the two agencies’ rates of 
growth on Twitter and Facebook in Figure 13 below, while Appendix G contains a 
graph depicting each organisation’s Twitter and Facebook follower numbers over the 
two-year tracking period.  
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Figure 13 QFES and QPS Twitter and Facebook followers rate of growth comparison 
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It is possible that the differing rates of growth on each platform are due to QFES 
(and QPS) having almost saturated their Facebook follower market compared to that 
of Twitter, which is still growing. Despite the significant differences in their number 
of followers on each platform, it is important for the organisation to consider their 
potential reach on each platform, and how the structure of each platform affects that 
reach. Twitter’s large, flat network structure, compared to Facebook’s, which is 
instead structured around smaller-scale individual networks, potentially affords 
greater message reach and amplification (see Bruns and Moe, 2014, pp. 21-22).  
 
The audiences on each of these platforms are also important considerations. There is 
a growing body of research examining how many journalists now use Twitter to 
source and disseminate news (see Lasorsa et al., 2012; Parmelee, 2013; Hermida, 
2014). In addition, the media team member’s recollection of their social media use 
while working as a journalist (described in Chapter 5) is further evidence of how 
journalists adapt their practices to include these new communications technologies. 
Twitter’s structure means that many of those journalists, who may follow emergency 
management organisations like QFES on Twitter and have even more followers than 
them, can be useful amplifiers of emergency information, filtering (i.e. retweeting) 
important updates and warnings through their own networks, especially during times 
of crisis.  
 
Fostering an online relationship with journalists on platforms like Twitter may have 
positive ramifications for such organisations’ offline relationships with them, and for 
their workload. During an event, media officers frequently field calls from journalists 
requesting updates or interviews with operational personnel, while simultaneously 
releasing warnings and media releases, monitoring social media, monitoring emails, 
and liaising with operational personnel for internal updates. By fostering an online 
relationship with journalists, or providing information via social media proactively 
rather than reactively, media officers can potentially reduce some of those calls and 
demands from journalists, who are often requesting the same information. As one 
media officer, who at the time was new to the team and had come from a journalism 
role, told me: 
I found it very surprising if there is a big incident—say we get five or six 
media calls about—that we don’t put something straight on Twitter just 
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saying what area it is, what it is so grass fire, crews there. Just really basic 
info so that we are the point of reference that journos can get that info then if 
they need more they can ring back later. (Media officer, July 2015) 
This anecdote again demonstrates how some media team members imagine their 
social media audience: this media officer believes that QFES’s Twitter audience also 
includes journalists. It is likely, as I examined in Chapter 5 drawing on Filby and 
Willmot (1988), that this media officer’s most recent professional history as a 
journalist informs this belief.  
 
This anecdote also connects back to the proactive versus reactive communication 
strategies that I examined at the beginning of this section. The media officer draws 
on their own journalistic information-sourcing practices to propose proactively 
posting incident updates on Twitter rather than reactively responding to requests 
from journalists via media calls. The media officer suggests that this proposed 
proactive strategy may even allay some journalists’ enquiries in the first instance (“if 
they need more they can ring back later”), and prevent work duplication (answering 
multiple calls from journalists and providing the same information to each one). This 
suggestion of a new, proactive communication strategy differed from other media 
team members’ suggestions. Other media team members’ personal views of 
particular platforms, and in this instance of Twitter, prevented them from exploring 
new models of communication that could potentially have positive trickle-down 
effects that reduced—rather than added to—their workload.  
 
The media team’s day-to-day use of Twitter, and how they constructed content, also 
depended on individual judgement calls. After generating a Facebook post, the media 
team usually tweeted an abridged version of that post with a shortened link to the 
Facebook post (the ow.ly link in the first tweet of the thread depicted in Figure 14 
below links to a QFES Facebook post). This practice of duplicating Facebook 
content for Twitter actually runs counter to other Australian and New Zealand 
practitioners’ views of these platforms. In their report of a 2014 social media 
workshop with academics, informational technology specialists and emergency 
management professionals Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon (2015) reported that 
participants agreed that Twitter is useful for warnings and updates; in contrast, 
participants viewed Facebook as a platform on which to establish, engage and build 
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connections between online communities (pp. 23-24). At one point during my 
fieldwork, this approach (linking from Twitter to Facebook) became contentious 
within the team. As I noted in Chapter 5, Stark (2009) argues that dissonance can be 
productive when participants openly contest their informed competing perspectives 
to provoke positive change. However, as I demonstrate in the following example, it 
can also prove problematic when it creates tension and internal disunity. A reply 
from a Twitter user to QFES, seen below in Figure 14, generated strong 
disagreement about the ‘proper’ way to hyperlink to social media and debates about 
social media etiquette:  
 
 
The discussion began in a media team meeting that I did not attend, but I spoke to 
multiple attendees about the incident afterwards. In this meeting, a media officer 
proposed directing links in tweets to their website rather than to Facebook. They 
argued that QFES’s website contains all external communication (media releases, 
updates, alerts and warnings), while they do not always include every piece of 
information in Facebook posts. This team member noted that they usually link to 
their website on Facebook posts anyway, so the current process of linking from 
Twitter to Facebook to their website seemed convoluted. This argument is supported 
in part by the findings of Holton et al.’s (2014) study of Twitter users’ motivations 
Figure 14 Request to stop linking to Facebook 
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for posting hyperlinks on the platform, as their respondents “indicated that they post 
links, at least in part, to find information quickly and to reach hard-to-find content” 
(p. 39). Rather than bringing that “hard-to-find” content to the fore, the process of 
creating another step to that information by linking to Facebook only delays that 
search process.  
 
During fast-moving emergencies when endangered members of the public may be 
time poor and/or vulnerable, the need to quickly locate information is arguably even 
more pressing. Other team members agreed with this media officer, including one 
team manager, while another team manager strongly disagreed. The opponent argued 
that they should contain their online conversations within their collective social 
media space to foster continued conversation, which their website does not facilitate. 
They added that it also promotes social media within the organisation and the 
community, rather than directing them off-site. After failing to resolve the issue, the 
team managers approached the media director, who eventually agreed with the team 
manager opposing links to the QFES website. Recalling the incident to me 
afterwards, the opponent suggested that this was another example of the reluctant 
acceptance of social media within the team, many of whom had an old-school 
mentality of traditional media being the priority. The decision to continue linking 
from Twitter to Facebook came down to competing opinions about social media 
etiquette, and the media director’s support of one team manager over another. 
 
This disagreement around the team’s social media hyperlinking practices again 
demonstrates how the organisation made opinion-based rather than evidence-based 
social media decisions. We can see how this opinion-based decision served to 
perpetuate the normalisation of social media within the organisation, through their 
cross-platform content duplication and hyperlinking practices. Envisaging adaptation 
in this context, this incident could have provoked a reconsideration of the purpose of 
the different social media platforms, questioning the reasons behind current strategies 
and provoking change. Rather than duplicating content across platforms, the team 
might have, for example, recognised the structural affordances of the different 
platforms, recognising—like the participants in Anikeeva, Steenkamp and Arbon’s 
(2015) workshop—the value of Facebook for interactivity and that of Twitter for 
incident warnings and updates (pp. 23-24). 
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The incident also created temporary friction within the team; while Stark (2009) 
explains that such friction can be productive when sound arguments inform 
decisions, this incident did not necessarily generate a productive outcome. Those 
who supported linking from Twitter to the website maintained this view, even after 
the issue was ostensibly resolved. Some participants also indicated to me that the 
media director’s decision was more an “if it ain't broke, don't fix it” solution, rather 
than a decision that the existing approach was the best strategy. Finally, this issue 
demonstrates that, in using social media, the media team did not always satisfy their 
audience’s requests. While the complainant in Figure 14 may have seemed extreme 
for claiming, “[Facebook] is dangerous”, the underlying complaint is that linking to 
Facebook draws QFES Twitter followers off-site to a platform they may not 
necessarily use or like. If we compare this complaint to that of the QFES Facebook 
follower who complained, “all you post is crap” (Figure 10, p. 161), we can see that 
the organisation’s social media practices do not always consider or align with the 
expectations of their audience. Scholars, including Mergel (2015), have shown that 
government organisations (like QFES) have responded to citizens’ expectations by 
joining social media in the first instance (p. 457). Having now established social 
media presences, these organisations must mature into a second phase of 
responsiveness, which considers and responds to citizens’ expectations about how 
they should use these platforms.  
 
6.4 STRATEGY, POLICY AND PROCEDURES: INDIVIDUAL 
JUDGEMENT CALLS AND “YOU KNOW MORE THAN ME”  
As I noted in Chapter 4, as part of the organisation’s directive to establish a social 
media presence, members of the Information Management team (within the 
Information and Communication Systems branch) developed a ‘Department of 
Community Safety Social Media Strategy’ in 2011, after a short social media trial 
but before the organisation started actively to use social media. The extensive, 62-
page document provided background information about social media and the 
organisation’s reasons for joining, and information about where social media 
strategically aligns with the organisation, primarily focusing on one-way 
communicative uses. Employees are able to easily access this document via the 
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organisation’s intranet, and I accessed and downloaded it while conducting my 
fieldwork.  
 
Despite having undergone an organisational restructure and rebranding, this was the 
organisation’s only overarching social media policy or strategy document. For that 
reason, the document still includes the organisation’s former title (the Department of 
Community Safety) and I refer to it as such. According to the document history, its 
authors revised it multiple times throughout 2011 to incorporate feedback from the 
DCS Communication and Information Committee members and members of the All 
Hazards Information Management System (AHIMS) project team. The organisation 
did not update or formally review this document after they wrote and finalised it in 
November 2011, according to the revision history, despite significant evolution in the 
social media space since that time. The document (incorporating all attachments) 
does, however, state that it is valid until 30 June 2015.  
 
This document was useful for the social media team when they started in 2012. They 
clearly understood their purpose, as I noted in Chapter 4, and the organisation’s 
expectations about how they should represent the government. Referring to the 
Social Media Strategy document, a member of the original social media team 
recalled: 
There [were] a number of very strict guidelines at the time. There were like 
eight principles that they wanted for social media within the Department [of 
Community Safety]. I can’t remember them off the top off my head, but 
there was a document that was created so we had to be very mindful of what 
we were saying. (Former social media officer, January 2014) 
When I eventually began my fieldwork, I found that the media team (and before 
them, the social media team) did not refer to this document. Much of the content was 
by then irrelevant, as they had managed social media for long enough that they were 
familiar with the document’s instructions and their use of social media by then had 
evolved and was more sophisticated. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that 
“institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies, and programs function as 
powerful myths, and many organizations adopt them ceremonially” (p. 340). For 
QFES, their Strategy document served a perfunctory purpose, written concurrently 
with the organisation’s adoption of social media but rarely serving any long-term 
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overarching purpose. Members of the organisation did not always adhere to the rules 
in the document either. The relaxation around local brigades establishing and 
managing their own Facebook pages outside of MACC’s control—despite what the 
policy stipulates—was problematic, as I outlined in Chapter 5.  
 
While the Strategy document may have been valid until 2015, some of its policies 
were, in practice, cumbersome for the media team. The organisation, by default, 
blocks access to social media websites including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. 
This policy was inconvenient for new media team members, who had to apply to the 
Information Security Unit—a separate branch within the organisation—for access. 
When Facebook first started gaining popularity in Australia in 2008, employers were 
concerned about the productivity effects this would have on employees (Jenkins, 
2008; cited by Gregg, 2011, p. 88). Workplace restrictions like the aforementioned 
default block on social media are not particular to QFES either; a Sydney Morning 
Herald article in late 2012 reported that this was an increasingly common policy in 
many Australian workplaces (Breen Burns, 2012). Organisations most likely design 
such policies to prevent unnecessary distractions; however, once employees have 
smart phones, these policies of course become somewhat redundant. For QFES 
media team members this policy, and the need to apply to another branch in the 
organisation for access after they commence employment rather than having it pre-
arranged before they start, only provides an additional bureaucratic hurdle.  
 
One media officer recalled the difficulty they experienced applying for and receiving 
this social media access, and the impact it had on their ability to do their job: 
The issue was just that here, within the building [there was] a general block 
on YouTube, Facebook and all those kinds of things. I just had to send a 
thing to IT asking that I have that access. Annoyingly it took a month, so I 
had to follow it up. [Another media officer] said that is what happened with 
[them] as well so not to expect it very soon. It was just a pain because I 
needed it for my work but they just [had to] tick a box. (Media officer, July 
2015) 
Although this media officer acknowledged that this policy exists “so people actually 
[do their] work”, QFES employees can, with the support of their manager, apply for 
an exemption to this policy. Some participants told me it is relatively easy to ‘make a 
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case’ for access and to receive an exemption. However, as this media officer 
explained, the logistics of receiving that access—even when their day-to-day work 
depends on it—are not necessarily straightforward. In comparing the accessibility of 
social media to that of other communications media or devices that the media team 
require for their work—an email address, telephone or computer, for example—we 
find that traditional media tasks are again prioritised over social media, as media 
officers’ access to traditional media tools are prearranged before they start. This 
demonstrates a default organisational position of containment towards social media. 
 
While the organisational heads maintained a hands-off approach to social media, 
allowing individual champions to drive its use and the MACC branch especially to 
drive the organisation’s social media direction, media team managers maintained a 
relaxed approach to day-to-day social media operations. Managers’ flexibility around 
social media and reluctance to establish clear rules for the media officers caused 
confusion and uncertainty within the team. Media team managers all maintained the 
same position: “the users are the ones who need to drive it” (Media team manager, 
August 2015). By “users”, team managers refer to the media officers, as they are 
responsible for the day-to-day social media monitoring and posting, while managers 
rarely monitor the QFES social media accounts. Allowing “users” to drive its 
direction also extended to rules: 
I don’t have any stringent rules about what we should do, “I want you to 
think outside of the box so if you can come up with something that you think 
is going to work come to us and we’ll play around to it.” Sometimes we’ve 
said yes—most of the time we’ve said yes actually—sometimes we’ve said, 
“no we’re not going to go down that path” (Media team manager, June 2014) 
The managers’ reluctance to establish clear rules is interesting, as it is most un-
governmental. These organisations are typically risk-averse; Plotnick et al. (2015) 
describe them as having “lots of ‘red tape’” and note that “written policy documents 
[must be] followed” (p. 2). As I outlined in the previous chapter, the organisational 
restructure and addition of social media to the media team’s responsibilities created a 
managerial predicament amongst media team managers. Media team managers—
who openly acknowledged their inexperience in the social media space—evaded 
responsibility for social media, instead emphasising that “the users” (media officers) 
should drive social media. Team managers’ reluctance to create rules further serves 
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to abrogate them of any responsibility for a function they view themselves as ill 
equipped to manage.  
 
Managers’ flexibility towards social media created an informal and fluid approval 
process. Unlike traditional press releases that have a strict approval process, which 
media officers complied with, social media did not have a formal approval process: 
We have a lot of faith [put] in us, that we will do a good job and that we 
don’t need everything to be approved to put it up there, and that we have 
good judgement and all that sort of thing. (Media team member, July 2015) 
Granted, if the media team released an official warning, they would modify it to post 
on social media; a manager would have already seen and approved that content. But 
media officers posted other content not subject to a template or bound by 
organisational protocols at their own discretion, using their own judgement when 
crafting content. I frequently heard media officers tell one another—and not a 
manager or supervisor—that they were going to “pop” or “chuck” something on 
social media. The informal language around social media, and the practices that I 
observed, demonstrated the team’s casual approach towards social media information 
dissemination, compared with their approach to existing media tasks. This non-
interventionist approach makes sense in that receiving a manager’s approval for 
every tweet or Facebook post could create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles and 
delays. More important is the reason why the team adopted this approach. From my 
observations and discussions, this approach emerged organically in response to 
managers’ insistence that media officers know more about social media than them, as 
I noted in Chapter 5. This level of responsibility did sometimes make media officers 
uncomfortable, though, as it effectively exposes them to risks should they make a 
mistake. 
 
While media officers did not always have to seek approval to post on social media, 
they could approach a senior media officer, supervisor or manager for advice if they 
were uncertain. This happened on one occasion during an unusual weekend incident, 
which a team manager recalled during an interview towards the conclusion of my 
fieldwork. In July 2015, Queensland experienced two large, non-destructive 
earthquakes off the Fraser Island coast in the south-eastern corner of the state, two 
days apart. Seismic events are uncommon in Queensland, with earthquakes more 
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common in neighbouring New Zealand. The first earthquake occurred early in the 
morning outside of office hours. The on-call manager decided to post an update to 
Facebook notifying followers of the magnitude and location of the earthquake, and 
reports of power outages. They told me later that they decided to post about the 
earthquake because it met their self-determined newsworthiness criterion, thus 
making an individual judgement call based on their own prescribed criteria. The 
post—depicted below in Figure 15—was popular; it generated over 2,000 ‘likes’ and 
nearly 700 comments, significantly more traction than their posts usually receive, 
with many followers from across the state reporting in the comments that they had 
felt the earthquake.  
 
Figure 15 Queensland earthquake post 
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Following the second earthquake, this time on a Saturday with only an on-call media 
officer and manager working from home, the media officer decided to again post an 
update to Facebook. With no damage or injuries reported and wanting to liven up the 
Facebook post, the media officer incorporated a witty hashtag into an otherwise 
serious update, adding “#ShakeItOff” (shake it off) at the end. The media officer 
emailed the text to their on-call manager before posting it, acknowledging in the 
email that they had been “cheeky” with the hashtag and requesting advice about its 
appropriateness. In our interview, the manager recalled their uncertainty about the 
flippancy of the hashtag; they warned that this earthquake might precede a bigger 
one that might cause injuries, fatalities or major damage in which case the 
organisation would not “shake it off”. The manager advised removing the hashtag 
although acknowledged its appeal—“I liked it from a point of view that maybe I’d 
want to read that. But would you say it as an organisation? Maybe not” (Media team 
manager, August 2015)—noting that the hashtag “wasn’t wrong” but in this instance 
their approach was to “err on the side of caution because you never know what’s 
going to happen in an hour’s time.” (Media team manager, August 2015). I followed 
up by checking the Facebook page after our conversation, and it was evident that the 
manager and media officer compromised as the post included the hashtag 
“#AllShookUp” (all shook up). 
 
This incident demonstrates media team members’ competing understandings of what 
constitutes appropriate government communication. As I demonstrate next in this 
chapter, regarding the team’s choice of style and tone for their social media posts, 
this informal social media approval process created uncertainty about what was 
ultimately appropriate and “allowed”, and generated a fear of making mistakes. One 
media team member told me that “we pretty much have control over what we do”, 
summarising the team’s approach as “if in doubt then consult the managers” (Media 
team member, July 2015). In the earthquake example, the media officer was 
evidently doubtful; however a different media officer may have considered the 
hashtag appropriate and posted it without consultation. Managers trusted that media 
officers knew when it was necessary to approach a manager for advice and to resolve 
issues. Referring to media officers, one manager remarked:  
There’s a common sense approach there, which says that if they’re going to 
post something that they think the flag might need to go up on, they’ll run it 
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past a manager who will ultimately make a call. (Media team manager, 
August 2015) 
This common sense approach was, in practice, not common sense at all. ‘Common 
sense’, by its very definition, implies reason and a degree of shared understanding 
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). As I have examined throughout this thesis, however, I 
found that the organisation did not conceptually understand the purpose of social 
media as it related to them, and its users (the media team) differed on what 
constitutes appropriate government communication. For that reason, common sense 
was unattainable.  
 
The idea of a common-sense approach to social media, rather than one directed by 
policy, is not particular to QFES. Evidence from journalism studies suggests that this 
extends to other comparable industries. Through their interviews with Flemish 
journalists, Opgenhaffen and Scheerlinck (2014) found that guidelines for social 
media use are not always formally communicated in documents or policies, as the 
rules in many of the organisations they studied were often implicit, communicated 
either verbally or via email. Moreover, they found that sometimes guidelines did not 
exist because management remained unconvinced about the value of social media 
platforms like Twitter, while at other times journalists perceived formal guidelines as 
unnecessary as social media are “common sense”, with journalists preferring tips 
offered as direction (pp. 733-734). The findings of their study obviously relate to 
QFES, demonstrating how the organisational and managerial responses to social 
media examined in this thesis, and attempts to maintain an informal and relaxed 
approach, are neither organisationally specific nor industry-specific. 
 
6.5 ‘CONVERSATIONAL’ VERSUS ‘BUREAUCRATIC’: STYLE, 
LANGUAGE AND TONE 
I think we probably went through a period of transition for a while where we 
were all trying to learn what to do cause we’ve all come from such media 
backgrounds it was very different for someone like me—who is used to 
writing in a certain way, and communicating in a certain way—to adapt. 
And you still have to switch your brain I think from media speak to social 
media speak. (Media team member, June 2014) 
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As an extension of an organisation’s existing communications activities, government 
social media communication often maintains a bureaucratic, approval-driven style. 
As Hughes and Palen (2012) note, though, the limitations of some platforms—like 
Twitter’s 140-character limit—mean that existing communications formats do not 
always easily transfer to “the abbreviated, informal style of social media” (p. 3). This 
may explain why the QFES media team considered it easiest to tweet an abridged 
version of a longer Facebook post, with a link to that post. Fewer stylistic limitations 
on a platform like Facebook meant that media officers could easily duplicate media 
releases and warnings without fear of miscommunicating their intended message.  
 
As one media team member told me, regarding the team’s warning release process, 
“We are so stifled by a template and we don’t touch it, we are not allowed to”. While 
this may imply criticism, the media officer was actually commending this template 
process, continuing: “It’s good that we don’t touch it because we are not the content 
experts.” (Media team member, July 2015). “Content expert” refers to operational 
personnel or those with specialist knowledge such as Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) 
weather forecasters, who provide the forecasting content of QFES’s warnings. In this 
sense, the above participant therefore perceives themselves as messengers. This 
approval-driven process of information dissemination somewhat abrogates the media 
team of responsibility for that content; they receive it from operational personnel in 
the organisation and follow an established approval process to release it externally, 
without moderating the content. This process is not particular to QFES; Mergel 
(2015) notes that this occurs in all government organisations to “avoid 
misinformation, reduce the risk of over-communication, and support the protection 
of sensitive information” (p. 458). 
 
Platform restrictions aside, the conversational style of social media is unfamiliar for 
government organisations. As I noted in the introduction of this thesis with reference 
to the Bay Area Rapid Transport’s (BART) unexpectedly frank communication on 
Twitter, the informal style of social media conflicts with government agencies’ 
traditionally formal communicative style. Coupled with these agencies’ inherent risk-
aversity, their social media communication is template and approval-driven and 
sometimes impersonal. One QFES media team member told me that while the team 
has a media style guide—“strict guidelines on how you write things, the core 
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messages we have; there’s a rule basically for everything” (Media team member, 
June 2014)—they did not have one for social media. This demonstrates how 
organisational social media strategies lag behind current practice and, again, the 
different organisational approaches to traditional media and social media. This 
creates a dependency on media officers’ individual judgement when generating 
social media content; two media team members told me during separate interviews 
that “we make it up as we go along” (Media team members, June 2014), 
demonstrating these individual judgement calls and a lack of continuity or strategy in 
the organisation’s social media efforts.  
 
Many team members’ professional histories as media professionals meant that their 
training taught them to communicate in a very formal, traditional manner that 
differed from social media: 
Coming from media, which is very formal and then we have to make it 
informal for social media but at the same time strike that balance where it’s 
not too informal. (Media team member, June 2014) 
This demonstrates that when public sector agencies assign social media to the 
existing communications division, rather than creating a new team with social media-
specific skills and expertise, they assume that those team members’ existing 
communications skills are sufficient. In reality, the addition of social media often 
requires up-skilling or retraining altogether.  
 
Throughout my fieldwork, the media team—lacking social media-specific skills and 
expertise—struggled to determine their social media ‘voice’ or style. One media 
officer, whom I interviewed multiple times, changed their view over time on the 
team’s style. They told me initially, “I think that it’s great now because it’s not so 
formal and it is a bit more relaxed” (Media team member, January 2014). However, 
in an interview five months later, this team member acknowledged that “the language 
has changed, it has evolved, it has become very government speak from when we 
first started” (Media team member, June 2014), indicating an evolution over time in 
the team’s stylistic approach. I observed tensions between the team’s attempts to 
achieve a relaxed tone—in keeping with the overall tone of social media—compared 
with mainstream media, while also maintaining a sense of authority: 
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The stuff we put up is serious, it’s hard to juggle making fun of a road crash, 
and then talking about road safety and you should always take it seriously. 
(Media team member, June 2014)  
The nature of QFES’s work presented a challenge. While they wanted to enliven 
their social media content to make it more appealing, oftentimes their subject matter 
demanded a serious tone lest the organisation appear to make light of the seriousness 
of an incident. Often the solution to lighten their social media tone was posting 
promotional content: photos of operational personnel at events or trainings, children 
visiting local fire stations, or animal rescue operations, for example. However, as I 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, this solution presented its own challenge. The 
(over-) use of these types of promotional posts—what some viewed as self-
indulgent—that served little informational or educational purpose, generated 
disagreements within the team and criticism from some followers about the purpose 
of social media for their organisation.  
 
 
The uncertainty around what constitutes ‘appropriate’ government social media 
communication, a lack of strict publishing rules or guidelines from managers, and a 
dependence on individual judgement calls, created an aversity for experimentation 
amongst media officers. Media officers were often unsure about what they were 
“allowed” to do, and consequently fearful of potential repercussions for doing the 
“wrong” thing. One media officer recalled how this fear meant the team missed an 
opportunity to engage in light-hearted banter on Twitter at one point. In July 2015, 
the Queensland Police posted a witty tweet about the cold Queensland weather, 
referencing a judge from The Voice Australia reality television show, depicted in 
Figure 16 QPS cold weather tweet 
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Figure 16. The Voice replied via its official Twitter account, depicted in Figure 17, 
making a comment about “heat[ing] things up”. Likely because of the mention of 
“heat” and the inclusion of a fire emoji, the QPS respondent replied by introducing 
QFES into the light-hearted conversation.  
 
The media officer explained that, upon receipt of this @mention and with no 
managers present at the time, the media officers in the office were unsure of how to 
respond: 
We were debating over whether to engage with QPS media. […] We were 
just sitting there going ‘should we?’ We really want to and we were 
[thinking of] these great puns and witty things we could say but we were too 
scared to. (Media officer, July 2015) 
Figure 17 The Voice Australia tweet 
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The media officers present eventually ignored the tweet, hesitant to participate in the 
conversation and fearful of possible retribution. While the incident described above 
was frivolous, that same uncertainty extended to other, more serious incidents also. 
The media officer described how this uncertainty underpins a lot of their social 
media activity: 
I think there’s just that element of fear, which makes people reserved and not 
really confident with social media. You know when you fear something you 
kind of start to dread it a little bit because you’re worried that if you put 
something out you’re going to get in trouble for it or there’s going to be 
some kind of backlash. (Media officer, July 2015) 
This fear and uncertainty explains the resistance that many media team members felt 
about social media, as I have shown earlier in this thesis. It also explains why media 
team members continually prioritised existing, traditional communications activities 
over social media. With traditional media activities, managers had clearly 
communicated their expectations to media officers, and media officers had clear 
guidelines to follow. Moreover, they had confidence in their training and knowledge 
of their role. It is logical then that, without guidance, emergency management 
organisations’ social media activity replicates existing communications activities 
(Mergel, 2016, p. 143)—activities that, in contrast to social media activities, are 
bound by strict rules.  
 
In debating what constitutes an appropriate style of social media communication for 
their organisation, media team members frequently drew comparisons with the 
Queensland Police Service. QPS have developed a reputation and large fan base due 
to their boundary-pushing humorous style, with many of my participants making 
unsolicited comparisons between their organisation and QPS during our informal and 
formal conversations. 
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6.5.1 “Some of the posts that go on QPS’s page I probably wouldn’t like to see 
on the QFES page”: Comparisons to QPS 
As one of the most popular law enforcement agency pages on Facebook in the 
world26, QPS is frequently heralded as the model government social media page, 
regularly connecting key safety messages with pop culture references and making 
jokes out of non-serious warnings (see Figure 18). For this reason, and because of the 
frequent inter-organisational collaboration between QPS and QFES, my participants 
frequently compared themselves to QPS; one participant’s description of themselves 
as the “poor cousins” (Media team member, June 2014) not only illustrated this 
comparison, but also demonstrated a feeling of inferiority.  
 
Media team members differed significantly as to what style or tone was appropriate 
for their organisation. For QPS, much of their content—particularly traffic delays—
lends itself to light-hearted, witty posts that differ from those of QFES. QFES’s 
social media content is mostly serious and difficult to lighten, although one media 
team member noted that—when time allowed—they “try [to] jazz it up to make it hip 
and social media speak” (Media team member, June 2014). In contrast, other team 
members deemed their current social media style appropriate, given their 
organisation:  
                                                
 
26 I was unable to verify which law enforcement agency is the most popular on Facebook beyond 
checking the follower count of specific pages. Having searched some of the more widely known 
popular law enforcement pages, I found Queensland Police Service (QPS) has more followers than 
New York Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), London’s 
Metropolitan Police Service and the West Midlands Police in the United Kingdom. The Polícia 
Federal (The Federal Police of Brazil) does, however, have more Facebook followers than QPS. 
Figure 18 QPS Facebook post 
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I like that we keep it professional, that we’re not taking that humorous angle 
like other agencies are. When we are an agency [that]’s putting out 
warnings, we need that credibility. We need people to be able to trust us, so 
we are a lot more serious. (Media officer, August 2015)  
For this media officer, a serious tone displays professionalism. Some team members 
felt that a light-hearted social media style was unbecoming of a government 
organisation altogether: 
I think the jokey side of things should stay out of government but that’s 
literally only my personal view, it’s got nothing to do with whether it works 
or not cause sometimes it does. (Media team member, June 2014) 
QPS and QFES’s social media styles also differ because of the broader purpose each 
organisation’s social media presence serves. In a 2015 interview, QPS’s senior 
digital media officer, James Kliemt, spoke about QPS’s social media strategy. When 
asked whether they specifically construct their content so that followers share it, 
Kliemt responded: “We come at it from a media perspective and not a marketing 
perspective, so rather than trying to quantify these things, we just tell a story” 
(quoted in Herbison, 2015). However, “just tell[ing] a story” is a distinctly marketing 
perspective: QPS’s promotion of the organisation and frequently employed Dad joke 
strategy makes QPS’s posts more personable and relatable. This is a unique approach 
as it is noticeably distinct from QPS’s traditional communication strategies, and 
constructing this content requires careful consideration. 
 
In contrast, QFES approaches its social media from a distinctly media perspective, 
using social media as an extension of traditional communication strategies. This 
approach is common in such organisations, as I have noted throughout the thesis. 
However, QFES do not need to employ social media in the same way as QPS to 
promote and personalise their organisation. As one of my participants noted, the 
differing community perceptions of the two organisations (QFES and QPS) create 
different promotional motivations: 
Police have a different brief to us. We have a good public image. The 
community don't trust police as much as they do firefighters, so they 
leverage on that humour side of things to assist them with that public image. 
(Media team member, August 2015)  
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Firefighters and emergency management professionals (including paramedics) 
generally have favourable reputations in the broader community. This view of QFES 
within the Queensland community is evident when scanning comments on QFES’s 
Facebook posts for example; Facebook commenters regularly praise firefighters for 
their efforts, often labelling them heroes, while commenters often call SES 
volunteers “orange angels” in reference to the orange overalls they wear and the 
assistance they provide the community when required.  
 
In contrast, the public do not always view law enforcement agencies and police 
officers as favourably. In Queensland especially, QPS has had a turbulent history 
with periods of corruption during the 1980s, in particular, which has meant that the 
organisation has had to repair its image in the state. For QPS then, social media are a 
useful tool to promote the organisation and its members, and provide a humanised 
view of an organisation that historically has been viewed unfavourably. In that sense, 
social media serve very clear public relations goals for the QPS, while QFES’s well-
established favourable reputation in the community means social media are not 
necessarily required for this purpose.  
 
These different anecdotes describing media team members’ positions on QFES’s 
social media style, and comparisons to QPS, ultimately demonstrate differences 
about what constitutes appropriate government communication. One team manager 
told me that their directive to media officers was to maintain a “conversational” 
style: 
It’s been articulated to them that the social media strategy should be 
conversational, in other words rather than just posting things telling people 
what to do or this that and the other, that we should try and encourage a 
conversation. (Media team manager, June 2014) 
The participant clearly refers to “conversational” in terms of interactivity (i.e. two or 
more people having a conversation), however it may also refer to a style of 
communication that is informal, forthcoming and friendly. “Articulated” is however 
the key component of the above statement; it suggests clear communication and 
mutual understanding between the instructor (the above quoted participant) and the 
recipient (the media team). However, without any formal policy, strategy or social 
media style guidelines for media officers to follow, this conversational tone becomes 
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aspirational—something to aim for, and more significantly something that 
individuals users must define for themselves in the first place and then drive—rather 
than a formal directive from team managers or executives beyond the MACC branch; 
an expectation rather than regulation, and certainly not a priority.  
 
In the context of journalism, Domingo (2008) describes this as the “myth of 
interactivity”, maintaining that: 
The professional culture of traditional journalism has a strong inertia in the 
online newsrooms that prevents [journalists] from developing most of the 
ideals of interactivity, as they do not fit in the standardized news production 
routines. (p. 680) 
We can draw comparisons here to emergency management organisations, as the 
ideals of interactivity do not fit with their command and control routines. In 
maintaining responsibility for emergency response operations, these organisations 
are accustomed to instructing and directing; interactivity thus conflicts with the 
existing dynamics between the organisation and members of the public. This applies 
to the QFES media team as information providers; their existing routines of 
instructing and informing also limit them from developing the ideals of interactivity.  
 
Making comparisons to Usher’s (2014) findings from her ethnography at The New 
York Times we can see how, despite the two-way communicative potential of social 
media platforms, this potential is not necessarily realised and the concerns raised 
above are not QFES-specific. Examining how, if at all, social media ‘participation’ 
reshaped Times journalists’ work, Usher (2014) reflected:  
“Participation” was a buzzword for simply being on social media. Times 
journalists had constructed what participation meant to them: it certainly 
meant engaging on these platforms, but what they were unsure of was 
whether doing so was significant and whether it ought to reorder how they 
did their work. (p. 226) 
As I noted in Chapter 2, Usher (2014) found that ‘participation’ for journalists in the 
digital age simply meant maintaining a presence on social media platforms, in 
contrast to Jenkins’ notion of participatory (p. 214). As I noted earlier in this chapter, 
my participants similarly often spoke about “engaging”, but rather than referring to a 
form of interactivity (or engaging) with their audience, they were actually referring 
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to creating appealing (“engaging”) content. Without formalised strategies around 
maintaining a conversational approach, media officers made individual judgement 
calls when constructing social media posts; judgement calls that meant the style of 
the post depended on its content creator. I have already outlined how media team 
members prioritised existing media tasks over social media and, like many other 
government agencies using social media, duplicated that existing media content for 
social media. Efforts to make their social media more conversational therefore 
depended on individual media officers taking the extra time, championing this 
approach, and adopting it into their own practices—when and if time permitted.  
 
6.6 INTERNAL CHAMPIONS: INTRODUCING A SOCIAL MEDIA 
“LEADER” POSITION  
The media team’s addition of an informal social media “leader” role to one media 
officer’s existing role in late May 2015 perhaps best demonstrates the organisation’s 
reliance on individual social media champions to drive social media from the ground 
up. While QFES’s use of social media to promote the organisation and disseminate 
information was formalised in that the media team maintained responsibility for this 
function, the introduction of this leadership role did symbolise a dependence on one 
individual to champion social media in the team and drive the team’s strategy.  
 
Although Latonero and Shklovski (2011) demonstrated the value of internal 
“evangelists” in championing social media off the ground in emergency management 
organisations, the responsibility placed here on one individual to continually 
champion social media illustrates how this championing role is an ongoing one, even 
after social media were relatively established in the organisation. However, while 
individual champions are important for initiating ground-up organisational change, in 
the context of journalism Paulussen (2011) notes that top-level managers play an 
influential role in championing changing practice for two reasons, which also apply 
to this context. First, top-level managers are influential as their support may 
encourage a shifting mindset amongst managers below them. Second, their support 
may attract the additional resources required to manage new responsibilities. 
Therefore, a combination of social media champions—or “role pioneers” as 
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Paulussen (2011, p. 63) refers to them—and supportive managers is ideal in initiating 
organisational change.  
 
The creation of this social media leader position also suggested a redirected focus 
towards social media within the media team. As I noted in Chapter 5, this was one of 
four informal leadership roles introduced to strengthen QFES relationships with 
internal and external stakeholders. I depict these roles and a short description of each 
in Figure 19 below. Note, the different shading and dotted borders denote the 
informality of these roles: they did not cause a formal role change and were not new 
job titles, and their inclusion in the organisational chart below is simply for 
illustrative purposes. 
 
 
The newly appointed social media leader explained to me that the four leadership 
positions were initially four-month roles, with the possibility of extension to six 
months before the four media officers rotated roles with others in the team. My 
understanding of this proposed rotation strategy was that, rather than it serving to 
gradually build some first-hand social media understanding and skills in every media 
Media Director 
Media 
Manager 
Media 
Supervisor 
(Training) 
Media 
Supervisor 
Senior Media 
Officers (x3) 
(Junior) Media 
Officers (x4) 
Social media  
(observing other agencies, 
looking for new ways to do 
things) 
Traditional media  
(building stronger 
connections with media 
personnel / journalists) 
Operations  
(liaising with operational 
arm of the organisation 
including SDCC, SOC and 
QGAir) 
Technical  
(liaising with technical side 
of the organisation including 
scientific branch, technical 
rescue, HAZMAT and 
FireCom) 
Figure 19 Media officer leadership roles 
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officer, it was devised as a way for everyone to have a “turn” and—as I elaborate 
below—to provide new opportunities for junior team members. While the first social 
media leader had only worked as a media officer for about three months, they had 
formerly worked for the organisation as a social media officer and were passionate 
about social media. Illustrating the informality with which managers introduced this 
role, the social media leader said they anticipated the impending bushfire season27 
might push aside the social media role during that often-busy time. Again, as I have 
outlined throughout this thesis, the team often prioritised existing media 
responsibilities over social media responsibilities. When the team did consider social 
media strategically—in this case, through the addition of a social media leadership 
role—it required flexibility in light of unanticipated, higher priority concerns.  
 
One purpose of this role, a team manager told me, included observing what other 
(public and private sector) agencies were doing on social media, because in their 
view, the team was too internally focused and not following best practice. By 
creating the social media leadership role, the team manager hoped the social media 
leader might introduce new, creative processes to the team; according to this 
manager, constant organisational restructures and bureaucratic processes over recent 
years had stifled innovation within the team. However, the manager also 
acknowledged that one reason for these new leadership roles was to provide new 
opportunities for junior team members, who were unhappy about the professional 
development opportunities being afforded only to senior media officers. Therefore 
these new roles (and the social media leadership role specifically) were not just about 
improving their social media strategies; they were also a tactic to diffuse tension.  
 
Another component of the new social media leader’s role was to lead monthly social 
media team meetings, similar to the team’s already-occurring fortnightly media team 
meetings but solely dedicated solely to social media and to be less frequently held. 
The team held its first social media strategy meeting in late July 2015, and I only 
participated in this one meeting before concluding my fieldwork. The purpose of the 
                                                
 
27 Bushfires occur during hot, dry weather, and in Queensland the bushfire seasons usually extends 
from around August until December. The storm/cyclone season in Queensland typically extends from 
November until April. The months outside of these seasons, from April until November, are quieter 
periods and the media team develops its disaster preparedness messaging and campaigns during this 
time. 
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meeting, according to the invitation the organiser forwarded to me, was to “discuss 
ideas, suggestions, strategies, recent activity and plans”, while the organiser 
encouraged attendees to “come along with lots of feedback, examples and 
suggestions” (Media team member, personal communication, July 2015), indicating 
an informality about the meeting. Of these meetings and opportunities for media 
team members, one team manager later told me: 
I think it gives an opportunity for them to come together and dedicate an 
hour where they’re not doing [anything], like we do with the media team 
meeting. But they’re a lot less structured. (Media team member, August 
2015) 
That social media meetings require “a lot less structure”—compared to media team 
meetings that usually have an agenda—demonstrates an informal approach to social 
media. The location of this first social media meeting illustrates this informality. 
Media officers decided (and team managers agreed) to hold this meeting at a nearby 
park—a ten-minute walk from the office—as an excuse to escape the stuffy office 
environment for the preferred fresh air. The impracticality of the location was 
quickly apparent, as the eleven participating media officers, team managers and I 
struggled to fit on the park bench, leaving some participants to stand.  
 
The meeting began with the social media leader providing a brief overview of current 
social media statistics—Facebook page likes, Twitter follower counts, most popular 
posts over the past month—and the social media leader explaining that they wanted 
to discuss scheduling posts and posting during an incident as it unfolds. However, the 
meeting ultimately served as an opportunity for team members to voice their 
opinions about their current practice. While one team manager suggested at the 
beginning of the one-hour meeting that they should end with some takeaways for the 
next few weeks, the meeting was unstructured and participants offered their opinions 
and suggestions on different topics as the conversation evolved. While there were no 
actionable takeaways, it being only the first meeting, the team may have had a more 
planned and structured approach to future meetings that I did not attend. Beyond this 
meeting and a brief conversation with the newly appointed social media leader, I did 
not observe any strategic change to the team’s social media use.  
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I initially interpreted the media team managers’ introduction of this social media 
leadership position (alongside other leadership positions) as the organisation’s 
intention to strategically evolve their use of social media. However, as noted above, 
team managers introduced these four roles in response to increasing unhappiness 
amongst junior media officers about the opportunities senior media officers received 
that they did not. Team managers therefore hoped to provide junior media officers 
with individual responsibility they could have ownership over. While the social 
media leadership role partly involved looking for new ways to do things and learning 
from current practice in other similar agencies, the primary reason for this new role 
was to provide new opportunities for junior team members. The creation of the role 
also exemplified the organisation’s dependence on media officers, rather than on 
team managers, for guidance and development of social media strategic direction. In 
assigning this responsibility to media officers, team managers again abrogated 
responsibility for social media, instead relying on (junior) team members to maintain 
formal responsibility.  
 
6.7 UNCONTROLLABLE EXTERNAL FACTORS  
Social media plans, strategies and policies are necessary for government agencies to 
measure social media success, to allow adaptation of them as required, and to protect 
the organisation (Mergel 2015, pp. 465-466; Anikeeva et al., 2015, p. 26). Social 
media policies also ensure an organisation’s social media efforts align with existing 
communication strategies and overarching goals (Mergel 2015, p. 459), and establish 
expectations around user (citizen and employee) behaviour on the platforms (p. 466). 
As Facebook is their prioritised social media platform, QFES’s expectation of their 
Facebook users’ behaviour on the page is clear. In the ‘About’ section of their 
page—depicted in full in Appendix H—they prohibit followers from swearing, 
posting offensive, inflammatory or inappropriate content, harassing other users, 
disseminating spam, revealing sensitive material about others, linking to other 
Facebook pages or off-topic websites, or reporting on offensive Facebook content 
(followers are instructed to report this directly to Facebook). QFES warns that they 
may delete comments that break these rules, and ban users who repeatedly refuse to 
abide by the terms of use.  
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Despite establishing clear expectations of their Facebook users, QFES Facebook 
users do sometimes contravene these rules. Rule-breaking activity necessitates 
careful page moderation by the media team. I use the term ‘moderation’ to describe 
particular responsive activities that are only permissible by those with administrative 
access to the page; however it does not include all activities that page administrators 
conduct. Specifically, I refer to hiding or deleting posts and blocking persistently 
rule-breaking users. For example, swift water rescue operations28 are a contentious 
topic amongst followers, who can be protective and defensive of firefighters. Some 
commenters view behaviour requiring swift water rescue as reckless and 
unnecessarily endangering the swift water rescue technicians. Media team members 
told me how, when posting about swift water rescue operations, they anticipate 
passionate responses such as, at its most extreme, “you should have left them there to 
die”. The example in Figure 20 depicts an interaction between a commenter and a 
QFES Facebook page administrator. Through my own administrative access to 
QFES’s Facebook page 29, I was able to also view comments that page administrators 
had hidden. The blurred second comment in Figure 20 indicates that a QFES media 
team member had hidden it.  
 
Despite clearly established rules for their Facebook page, media team members often 
interpreted rule-breaking activity differently, and differed in their moderation of the 
page and enforcement of the rules. Some team members freely hid potentially rule-
breaking comments, while others, like the respondent to the commenter in Figure 20, 
preferred instead to respond directly to criticism, and warn people about their tone 
and/or the content of their comments rather than to hide them. Despite the frequent 
use of the word “bloody”, which in this context is used as a swear word and therefore 
violates QFES’s user guidelines, the QFES page administrator responded directly to 
the comments in an attempt to allay further allegations or criticisms from other 
                                                
 
28 Swift water rescue is a form of technical rescue that specially trained QFES firefighters conduct. It 
involves entering fast-moving water to rescue trapped individuals from, for example, trees, drains, or 
flooded roads. 
29 While media team managers granted me administrative access to the page through my own personal 
Facebook account, I only used this access to view the Facebook page analytics, interactions between 
QFES and their followers through private messages, and hidden comments. I did not use my 
administrative access to post to the page on QFES’s behalf. On a couple of occasions, while in the 
office I noticed simple spelling or grammatical errors in a post. I notified a media officer or manager 
and they asked me to correct this. 
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followers. In this case, their response did little to pacify the commenter, and the page 
administrator subsequently hid their second comment. Despite clearly defined rules, 
we can see how media team members were still able to interpret them differently and 
how QFES Facebook followers’ behaviour was still sometimes difficult to manage. 
Team members consequently had to be alert and responsive to potentially 
inflammatory comments when posting contentious content.  
 
 
For the most part throughout this thesis, I have examined the role of human actors in 
shaping emergency management organisations’ uses of social media. However, non-
human actors do also have a role in shaping these uses. Examining how both human 
and non-human actors and actants30 shape news work, Lewis and Westlund (2015), 
for example, note that recent studies have typically adopted human-centric 
approaches. While these approaches are valuable in that they examine “individual 
role conceptions, organizational constraints, professional norms, national culture or 
ideology, and other socio-cultural factors”, they tend to overlook “the distinct role of 
technology and the inherent tension between human and machine approaches” (p. 
20). However, the authors do acknowledge that some exceptions to this do include 
the work of Anderson (2013) and Boczkowski (2004a). Neff et al. (2012) noted that 
                                                
 
30 I borrow from Lewis and Westlund’s (2015) definitions of actors and actants, see pages 21-25 in 
particular. 
Figure 20 Rule-breaking activity on QFES Facebook post 
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science and technology academics have avoided technologically deterministic 
approaches so as to (rightfully) “better account for user agency and the social 
construction of tools” (p. 300). In doing so though, Neff et al. (2012) contend that 
user agency has been privileged to such a degree that we are “ignoring the serious 
questions that remain about how tools are designed, how they function socially, and 
how users are aware of their positions and power” (p. 301). For that reason, I will 
briefly examine the role of non-human actants in shaping QFES’s uses of social 
media, and the challenges they provide.  
 
Facebook’s algorithm is one such non-human actant requiring examination. As 
Gillespie (2014) defines them: “in the broadest sense, [algorithms] are encoded 
procedures for transforming input data into a desired output, based on specified 
calculations” (p. 169). Scholars in journalism studies have noted the need for further 
interrogation of algorithmic effects on news and information flows (see Hermida, 
2016, p. 90; Anderson, 2011; Tufekci, 2014), and it is clear that these concerns are 
not journalism-specific but also apply to emergency management organisations as 
disseminators of news and information.  
 
Facebook’s algorithm filters content that users see on their News Feed, meaning that 
users do not see every post from their Facebook ‘friends’ or pages they like and 
follow, but rather algorithmically-selected highlights. Outside of Facebook, little is 
known about how the algorithm actually operates, meaning that Facebook page 
operators like QFES have little control over what content their followers actually see. 
Page operators can target their posts using a range of options, based on followers’ 
gender, location, language or age, for example. QFES frequently targets smoke alerts 
or official warnings to users in a specific geographic location; this is a useful way to 
increase their reach to followers in an area affected by the warning. Page operators 
can also pay to boost their post and increase its reach. This is beneficial for well-
resourced organisations, but for government agencies like QFES who have limited 
resources—and for whom on-the-ground, quantifiable resources are prioritised over 
social media—paying to increase their reach is not always a viable option. With 
Twitter (Newton, 2016) and Instagram (Wagner, 2016) potentially introducing 
newsfeed algorithms, these challenges will in future extend to social media platforms 
more broadly and not apply only to Facebook.  
 Chapter 6: Uses of social media 198 
 
In Figure 21, we can see the impact of Facebook’s algorithm on page owners like 
QFES. The complainant laments the fact that they received QFES’s warning about 
downed power lines on a main Brisbane road blocking traffic in both directions, long 
after QFES posted the warning. While the critic demonstrates their awareness that 
Facebook’s algorithmic controls have prevented them from receiving the warning in 
a timely manner, they nonetheless direct their frustration towards QFES. This is 
because emergency management organisations maintain responsibility for 
information dissemination, irrespective of their dependence on platforms outside of 
their control, for punctual delivery of that information.  
 
 
Criticisms about the timeliness of warnings also extend to other digital technologies, 
and are not particular to social media. In January 2016, a severe bushfire impacted on 
the West Australian town of Yarloop, destroying 128 homes and causing two 
fatalities (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016). Yarloop residents 
immediately accused West Australia’s Department of Fire and Emergency Services 
(DFES) of poor communication. Residents deemed DFES’s use of the national SMS 
Emergency Alert system31—the Australian telephony warning system —as too slow, 
while DFES Commissioner Wayne Gregson responded, telling residents, “You 
cannot be sitting at home waiting to get a text before you take responsibility for your 
personal safety” (Burrell, 2016).  
                                                
 
31 The Emergency Alert is a telephony warning system used in Australia, delivering address-based 
warnings since October 2009 and location-based warnings since October 2013. The Council of 
Australian Governments resolved to develop a warning system in April 2009, following 
recommendations in the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission’s interim report in 2009. It “provides 
recorded text-to-voice messages to fixed line telephones and SMS texts to mobiles. […] EA sends the 
recorded text-to-voice messages over the standard Public Switched Telephone Network at a rate of up 
to 1,000 per minute. It sends the SMS texts to mobiles over Telstra’s, Optus’ and Vodafone’s (the 
Carriers’) networks at a rate of up to 500 per second. The system limits text-to-voice to a maximum of 
4,000 characters, which allows for a message of approximately 30 seconds in duration. EA does not 
allow the recipient to repeat the message. Currently, EA limits the total number of characters for a 
single SMS message to 160 (including spaces)” (IPSOS, 2014, p. 125). 
Figure 21 QFES Facebook commenter complaint about delay receiving warning 
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Issues around timely communication regularly emerge following significant events. 
A National Review of Emergency Alert found that operational users and community 
members highly value the Emergency Alert system; it is an effective way of 
communicating the seriousness of an event, and recipients act on those warnings 
(IPSOS, 2014, p. 9). Issues emerge when message senders and recipients have 
differing expectations about warning message frequency, and here we can draw 
comparisons between social media and other digital media technologies. The Review 
highlighted the fact that community members found “the idea of receiving multiple 
telephone alerts throughout an event was acceptable and generally desirable” (p. 10). 
In contrast, the DFES Commissioner’s aforementioned comment that community 
members are responsible for their personal safety, highlights conflicting opinions 
about emergency management organisations’ role in preparing community members 
to cope with disasters.  
 
New (mobile and social) communications technologies, such as telephony-based 
warning systems and social media platforms, are demonstrably disrupting emergency 
management organisations. These disruptions are sometimes advantageous, when 
they potentially facilitate wider message reach. They are also problematic when they 
facilitate a dependence on authorities or when aforementioned technical issues, 
largely outside of these organisations’ control, prevent timely warning dissemination. 
These issues may have long-term reputational consequences for authorities, as they 
could potentially jeopardise the community’s trust in such organisations. These 
considerations present communicative challenges for all emergency management 
organisations; they are not particular to Australian organisations but are common 
among all emergency management organisations using new communications 
technologies, particularly during emergencies when these technical issues are quite 
literally life threatening.  
 
6.8 SOCIAL MEDIA AS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE: 
EXPERIMENTAL AND UNSUPERVISED 
Throughout most of this thesis, I have focused primarily on QFES’s use of social 
media to disseminate information. This is not because I overlooked how QFES use 
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social media in an intelligence-gathering capacity. Rather, through my observations 
and interviews I found that QFES’s use of social media for this purpose currently 
remains significantly underdeveloped. Where the organisation did use social media 
for this purpose, it was largely experimental and unsupervised. This underuse is 
despite an ever-growing body of research about the potential use of social media to 
gather intelligence during a disaster (Yin et al., 2012), indicating that while scholars 
propose intelligence-gathering social media capabilities, there exists a disjuncture 
between scholars’ speculation about what occurs in these organisations and their 
current practice.  
 
In drawing on DiMaggio and Powell (1983) when considering crisis communication 
an organisational field, we can see how this underuse of social media to gather 
intelligence actually refutes some claims about how social media are disrupting the 
field. Grafström and Windell (2012) attempt to refute earlier studies (see Sauder, 
2008) by arguing that “novel actors are not met with reluctance by already 
established field actors; rather, they are invited to take part in field activities” (p. 74). 
I find that this claim contrasts with my own findings: I found the organisational 
hierarchy met novel actors with reluctance. If we accept that the use of social media 
for intelligence gathering purposes remained significantly underdeveloped at QFES 
at the time when I was there, we might consider this to be evidence of established 
field actors (in this case, QFES) demonstrating reluctance towards novel field actors 
contributing to the disaster response process.  
 
Moreover, the QFES media team’s informal approach to interactivity, which I 
examined earlier in this chapter, is further evidence to refute Grafström and 
Windell’s (2012) claim. Emergency management organisations' haphazard 
approaches to intelligence gathering are comparable to the practice of networked 
journalism, what Jarvis (2006) describes as "the collaborative nature of journalism 
now: professionals and amateurs working together to get the real story, linking to 
each other across brands and old boundaries to share facts, questions, answers, ideas, 
perspectives" (para. 2). However, in the same way that this challenges journalists’ 
authority and traditional roles (Usher, 2014, p. 187; citing Deuze, 2007a), this 
challenges emergency management organisations' authoritative positions as 
information holders, instructors and disaster responders in their organisational field. 
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Although I have illustrated the ways in which Grafström and Windell’s findings 
contrast with my own study, it is important to recognise the individuality of case 
studies. As I explain in Chapter 7, while points of comparison exist between 
organisations, it is not possible to generalise the findings of a single organisational 
case study to all organisations more broadly. Therefore, I make these arguments 
against their findings to illustrate this point rather than to disprove their findings. 
 
In this section, I examine the experimental and unsupervised use of social media to 
gather intelligence. In Chapter 3, I acknowledged that I only spoke with Emergency 
Services Complex employees—who have differing degrees of knowledge and 
experience in using social media in an intelligence-gathering capacity—once during 
this study. I attempted to interview these individuals again, but was unsuccessful in 
arranging further interviews; these participants either declined as they no longer 
worked in social media intelligence, or they did not respond to my emails. The 
former individual redirected me to two QPS staff members who work in the 
intelligence cell32 in the State Disaster Coordination Centre (SDCC), from where the 
Queensland government manages its disaster response during activation. I spoke with 
one of them informally; they declined a formal interview, as they did “not wish to 
circumnavigate the Qld Police Service policy with respect to sharing of information” 
(QPS member, personal communication, August 2015). I inform my analysis in this 
section by those early interviews, this informal conversation with the QPS employee 
and my observations of the SDCC during activation.  
 
While I was primarily positioned in the Media and Corporate Communications 
(MACC) branch, I did have the opportunity to observe the SDCC on multiple 
occasions when it was activated during severe events, including Tropical Cyclones 
Ita (April 2014) and Marcia (February 2015). Outside of these events, I also spoke 
(both informally and formally) with some personnel positioned in the SDCC about 
their use of social media.  
 
                                                
 
32 As I outlined in Chapter 4, during activation the various disaster response tasks are divided amongst 
six “cells” in the SDCC. These cells are clusters of staff tasked with different operational 
responsibilities. The ‘intelligence’ cell is one of these cells. 
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Any sort of intelligence-gathering taking place in the organisation generally took 
place experimentally and informally. For example, one participant told me that, even 
after the organisation cancelled its contract for the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation33 (CSIRO)-created Emergency Situation Awareness 
(ESA) software (outlined in the Chapter 2), they still had access to the software and 
occasionally used it during an incident. They would use it not only to get a sense of 
the conversation taking place on Twitter, but also to corroborate what users were 
saying on social media with Triple Zero data from ESCAD (which participants 
referred to simply as “SCAD”, rhyming with “mad”).  
 
When a member of the public calls Triple Zero (000)—Australia’s national 
emergency number—and connects through to the Fire Communications Centre 
(“FireCom”), the call operator records that emergency information in the Emergency 
Services Computer Aided Dispatch (ESCAD) system. From there, fire 
communications officers deploy the necessary resources to the scene of the 
emergency. Operational personnel on the ground, responding to the incident, also 
record their actions and the deployment of any other resources (or resource 
requirements) on the “job log”. This job log then presents a detailed “story” about the 
incident, from the initial request for assistance, through to the operational response, 
up until the incident has ended. The media team also had access to the ESCAD data. 
This meant that if a journalist called or a member of the public enquired via social 
media about a particular incident (the visibility of smoke, for instance), a media team 
member could consult the ESCAD system and, if appropriate, provide information 
about the incident.  
 
Regarding their use of the ESA software in conjunction with ESCAD data, the 
participant told me: 
Even though the Centre’s not using that ESA tool anymore, I’ve still got on 
my iPad and I use it all the time. I am always collecting information off that, 
but I’ve also now got complete access to SCAD. So, someone could be 
talking about a house fire [on social media], I’ll go in to SCAD in the SOC 
                                                
 
33 The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) is a federal 
government agency for scientific research in Australia. 
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[State Operations Centre]34, and I’ll validate it through other means. Triple 
zero [calls]. (Emergency services personnel, June 2014) 
I could not validate this participant’s recollection of using social media data to 
inform the disaster response process, nor did I observe such behaviour in action, so 
their recollection might in fact have been hypothetical. Nonetheless, this recollection 
demonstrates that even when members of the organisation did use social media to 
gather intelligence, it happened experimentally rather than due to any formal 
procedure. In this case, this participant used the software in spite of the cancelled 
contract, simply because they still had access to it on their device. 
 
While I did not observe the above participant’s aforementioned experimental use of 
social media to gather intelligence, I did observe social media intelligence gathering 
first-hand during TC Marcia in February 2015. While observing the State Disaster 
Coordination Centre (SDCC), I met two web developers from the Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority who were working in the intelligence cell elsewhere in the 
SDCC. The Queensland government established the Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority (QRA) following a period of extreme weather activity in Queensland from 
November 2010 until April 2011, which included Cyclones Tasha and Anthony and 
Severe Tropical Cyclone Yasi, and the Queensland Floods (Queensland Government, 
n.d.). Established under the Queensland Reconstruction Authority Act (2011) to 
“reconnect, rebuild and improve Queensland, its communities and economy” after 
this destructive period, the QRA is now a permanent agency covering future events 
that impact the state (Queensland Government, n.d.).  
 
I sat and spoke with the QRA web developers for about an hour, and visited them 
again the following day. They showed me an in-house developed application that 
pulls geo-tagged images and videos from Twitter and Instagram, based on trending 
topics, and maps them. They started developing the application the previous year, 
rolling it out shortly before the severe storm that hit Brisbane in late November 2014, 
some three months before TC Marcia. The QRA developed the application to map 
damage after an event for QRA’s damage assessment reports, but the team of 
                                                
 
34 While the SDCC operates as the whole of government headquarters when activated during an event, 
the State Operations Centre (SOC), located in the Emergency Services Complex next to the SDCC, is 
the headquarters for fire operations. 
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developers recognised that it could be a useful mapping tool during unfolding events. 
While they did not develop it as a real-time intelligence-gathering tool, they began to 
experiment with the tool for this purpose during TC Marcia.  
 
The two developers operated off a laptop connected to a projector, with their screen 
content projected on the wall and visible to others in the room. The data came 
through sporadically; when I visited them again the following evening they explained 
that there were patches when no images or videos came through. When I asked them 
how this intelligence filtered beyond them, they explained that, despite being told 
that groups of people would approach them for intelligence, this occurred randomly 
and they were unsure of the identity of the individuals approaching them. Based on 
my observations, they did not interact much with others in the room (fellow members 
of the intelligence cell); when they did, it was impromptu, and it seemed more in 
reaction to what was depicted on screen rather than because they were using their 
social media intelligence alongside other intelligence. They did not provide 
intelligence to the Public Information cell (PIC), but did suggest that the PIC could 
benefit from having access to the application and their data.  
 
These sporadic and experimental uses of social media to gather intelligence—from 
rogue use of some tools to informal trials of newly-developed software—
demonstrate a reliance on individual social media champions in these organisations. 
They also suggest that while emergency management organisations’ use of social 
media to disseminate information is well established, the use of social media for 
intelligence-gathering purposes is still in its infancy. Social media are not (yet) a core 
function in these organisations; emergency management professionals do not rely 
upon them as a source of information, but as a potential line of enquiry to investigate 
further or even to corroborate against other intelligence.  
 
This is not an issue for QFES alone to overcome. Australian and New Zealand 
academics, informational technology specialists and emergency management 
professionals who participated in a 2014 social media workshop remarked: 
The majority of organisations lack dedicated social media staff and the 
responsibility of maintaining the organisation’s social media presence 
(whether through an organisation’s own social media account or by active 
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participation in existing social media networks) is given to those with a 
special interest in this technology, who then must find time for social media 
responsibilities around their primary job. (Anikeeva et al., 2015, p. 25) 
These remarks refer specifically to an organisation’s proactive social media use, and 
again demonstrate evidence of what Gregg (2011) terms “function creep”, where 
“online obligations add to existing job descriptions without any previous job 
expectations being taken away” (p. 105). Certainly, they apply to QFES; as I noted 
earlier in this chapter, media team managers gave the social media leadership role in 
the first instance to a media officer with a keen interest in social media, who had 
previously worked for the organisation as a social media officer.  
 
These remarks also apply to an organisation’s reactive social media use to gather 
intelligence. In the case of both of the aforementioned examples, employees with a 
special interest in the technology maintained these responsibilities, alongside their 
core role. This is particularly true of the QRA web developers. Not only did they use 
the technology beyond its originally intended purpose, but they also worked 
demanding 12-hour shifts on rotation during this event, in a role outside of their day-
to-day jobs.  
 
But, by adding social media to an existing role, rather than establishing it as a stand-
alone function, these organisations are setting it up as secondary to existing 
responsibilities. Moreover, as long as rogue individual champions in these 
organisations continue to use social media informally and experimentally, rather than 
for any pre-defined purpose, it is likely that these organisations will continue to view 
social media as peripheral to the organisation’s core disaster management function.  
 
6.9 BALANCING CONFLICTING ORGANISATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES  
Throughout my fieldwork, I frequently noted disagreements about whether the media 
team should release updates about an incident via social media as the incident 
unfolded. Mergel (2015; citing Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo, 2009) notes that “the 
traditional way of government communication follows a need-to-know paradigm” (p. 
457); for QFES, the decision to release information about an incident as it unfolds 
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becomes an individual judgement call about what the public does or does not need to 
know. During incidents, I observed media officers experiencing difficulty in initially 
contacting operational personnel located on the ground at an incident, and then in 
receiving information from them during that incident. There are two reasons for why 
this likely occurred. First, on-the-ground personnel attending an incident were busy 
with operational responsibilities. Second, as outlined below, on-the-ground personnel 
were sometimes reluctant to provide updates from the scene. Consequently, updates 
from on-the-ground personnel were usually infrequent during incidents, and 
dependent on the media officer’s or manager’s ability to reach their one contact 
person on scene. 
 
During unfolding incidents, operational personnel are understandably engaged in 
their work and in the immediate tasks at hand. While they may be the appointed on-
the-ground media team contact person, their operational responsibilities sometimes 
prevent them from immediately responding to requests for information or media 
interviews. As one media officer explained: 
Sometimes, you don’t know because they are so operationally busy, you 
can’t track them down. It’s the nature of the beast…“oh yeah I’ve got to do 
an interview right now” or “I have got to go into this water and save 
somebody who is trapped and clinging to a tree.” We’re gonna get second, 
it’s always operational first. (Media officer, August 2014) 
This demonstrates how operational personnel prioritised their at-hand operational 
duties over MACC’s public information responsibilities. When members of the 
public are at risk, operational personnel will necessarily prioritise public safety over 
other responsibilities that, in that instant, to them are not ostensibly about life or 
death. However, this approach makes the job of the media and communications 
personnel responsible for keeping the public informed—whose actions may well 
prevent other members of the public from putting themselves in danger—much more 
difficult. These different roles—whose responsibilities are essentially at odds with 
one another—functioning simultaneously within QFES, create internal tensions. The 
communications personnel need to disseminate information to the public in a timely 
manner, while the operational personnel need to conduct the on-the-ground incident 
response. However, as the communications team is dependent on those operational 
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personnel for information to disseminate, their work is impeded for reasons outside 
of their control. 
 
Although community members in danger may confront on-scene personnel, certain 
contexts may call for a more pragmatic approach where personnel must do the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people. For emergency management 
organisations, communicating to the public is not always obviously a second-order 
activity. If the on-scene officer had a choice between assisting one at-risk individual 
before them and providing an update to MACC that leads to an entire town 
evacuating, the later action clearly saves more lives. The problem is that the second 
scenario is not as clear to the on-scene officer as the endangered individual before 
them is. Further, as another participant conceded, the organisation does not have an 
existing culture of information sharing for the purposes of public dissemination.  
 
The following perspective reinforces how operational responsibilities take 
precedence over other responsibilities. It also suggests that the timeliness demanded 
of social media communication is problematic, given the existing communicative 
structures within the organisation:  
Traditionally there’s never been a line of communication from a fire in that 
blow-by-blow sort of way. The people who have [the information] are busy 
fighting a fire and they don't have a culture of reporting it and that’s for good 
reason. It’s because things change quickly and no matter how quickly you 
ring somebody you can get some information and you can post it and by the 
time it hits people’s timelines it’s half an hour later at the very earliest and 
you’ve just given them information that might actually be wrong. (Media 
team member, August 2015)  
Earlier in this chapter, I noted the challenge of being subject to platforms’ algorithms 
when disseminating time-sensitive information. The volatility of disasters (in this 
example, bushfires) means that the spread of misinformation is a genuine risk for 
these organisations when using social media. Naturally, this is problematic for 
emergency management organisations when this misinformation could potentially 
cost lives. The fear of being responsible for spreading out-dated information perhaps 
indicates why there are internal tensions around information sharing between on-the-
ground personnel and MACC personnel. Even when the organisation does post 
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information in a timely manner, and algorithmic restrictions aside, they ultimately 
have no control over when followers will receive that information, as another 
participant acknowledged: 
We can’t validate when they received the information. Do they look at it 
immediately? Or do they look at it in two hours? (Media team member, 
August 2015) 
Consequently, the spread of misinformation during an incident may be outside the 
organisation’s control, because their followers may only check their social media 
timelines and receive that notification some time after the organisation posted it. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that emergency management organisations 
can abrogate their responsibility to provide information in a timely manner in the 
first place. This links back to the key points throughout this chapter about 
normalising versus adapting to social media. Rather than falling back on their 
normalised, taken-for-granted understandings of communication practice (often 
established in their professional training, experience and commitments as 
journalists), the organisation—and specifically, the media team who are responsible 
for social media—need to adapt by reshaping and transforming their communicative 
practices, including the organisational structures that both enable and constrain these 
practices.  
 
6.9.1 Requesting and receiving information from officials on the ground  
While operational duties typically took precedence over public information 
responsibilities, MACC personnel also experienced difficulty receiving information 
and updates once they had made contact with personnel on the ground. The media 
team’s access to ‘INCSnap’ (Incident Snap)—an internal photo and video-sharing 
application that operational personnel use to capture photos on-scene—did make 
information sharing easier. However, the content in these images often required 
interpretive skills that only operational experts had. As firefighters primarily 
captured these photos for operational and damage assessment purposes, and they 
occasionally included sensitive content, they were often of little social and 
mainstream media value, and often inappropriate for public dissemination. 
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I found that often on-the-ground personnel were reluctant to provide any update until 
they had confirmation that the information was correct. For example, in the case of a 
fire incident, this confirmation may only come from operational personnel when they 
are certain they have completely extinguished the fire. One media officer recalled an 
incident where this inhibited their work, as they could not provide information to the 
media or the public via social media: 
We rang them every five minutes for half an hour, so that’s six phone calls. 
“Is the fire out?” “We believe the fire is out we can’t confirm yet.” “We 
believe the fire is out but we can’t confirm yet. Do not release that the fire is 
out because we cannot confirm yet”. That’s a thing that’s always gone 
through their operational capabilities that you must confirm that the fire is 
out 100% and it’s been verified before you release that information. (Media 
officer, July 2015) 
In this incident, the fact that the fire was occurring in the centre of a city worsened 
the situation for QFES, as media were on the ground observing the incident and 
reporting live. The media team did eventually post a tweet, but only to confirm that 
the fire was out once they had received confirmation from operational personnel on 
the ground. According to one participant, this came twenty-five minutes after on-the-
ground media had reported the fire was almost out as they witnessed it first-hand. 
 
This incident not only demonstrates the difficulty in depending on operational 
personnel for information, but also the difficulty in disseminating public information 
during unfolding incidents. Unfortunately, this is at odds with the public’s 
expectation of these organisations’ social media presences. As one media team 
member explained: 
The community expects us to provide information to them, during incidents 
in particular, because we are the emergency services. [They] should be able 
to see an incident of almost any hazard and naturally think, “The emergency 
services will be involved” and therefore they should be able to come to our 
page, no matter what the hazard or what the response is, or who the lead 
agency is. (Media team member, July 2015)  
As this participant explained, when the organisation maintains a presence on social 
media, their followers rightly expect that they will receive timely information about 
incidents as they are unfolding. The critic quoted earlier in this chapter supports this 
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explanation, as they complained, “I thought this page was to inform us of dangers 
and fires etc. but all you post is crap” (see Figure 10, p.161). However, providing 
timely information to the public is also about fulfilling what many within the media 
team perceive as their role during an incident: 
We want people to come to us as a point of authority, it looks silly at a fire if 
[other agencies] are tweeting but the people who are the lead agency on the 
fire are not. (Media officer, July 2015)  
As this participant explains, the organisation must not only provide information to 
the public to meet their expectations, but it is also important that they ensure the 
public perceives them as the primary source of authoritative information. As the 
organisation responsible for public safety during times of crisis, it is paramount that 
the public trusts them, views them as the authority, and turns to them in the first 
instance for information and warnings. Consequently, breakdowns in internal 
communication flows can prevent the public and the media from viewing the 
organisation this way.  
 
While responders’ concerns around the timeliness and validity of information in 
changeable situations are understandable, there are risks associated with their 
reluctance to provide information. In some cases, this may create more harm. First, 
the proliferation of social media platforms has meant that members of the public now 
disseminate and search for updates and information through their online networks, no 
longer utilising official organisations as their sole sources of information (Hughes 
and Palen, 2012, p. 1). The risk of misinformation around an incident potentially 
increases as the mainstream media and social media users look to those located on 
the scene of an incident as a source of information. Second, in uncertain and 
dangerous conditions, at-risk members of the community—who may not even turn to 
other sources for information but instead rely only on authorities—may instead make 
ill-informed decisions when they do not have regular updates and timely information. 
In the current crisis communication climate, emergency management organisations 
must strike a balance between meeting the public’s expectations to deliver 
information in a timely manner, and satisfying their internal information 
dissemination approval processes.  
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From these observations, we learn that the introduction of social media into these 
organisations often conflicts with existing protocols. We can also better understand 
the operational resistance to social media that I described throughout earlier chapters. 
For operational personnel, supporting social media in the organisation and 
considering it a part of the organisation’s core business was not a simple case of like 
versus dislike. Supporting social media would have involved fundamentally 
reshaping the communicative function of members of the organisation who were 
responsible for social media (in this organisation, the media team). Operational 
personnel considered social media disruptive and problematic, viewing it as 
peripheral to their core job: fighting fires or conducting rescues. However, as I 
explained, disseminating information to the public via social media could also serve 
a valuable operational function if it meant communicating risk in a timely manner, 
which might save more lives or reduce the workload for operational personnel. The 
challenge for these organisations is to change the culture to convince operational 
personnel of the operational value of social media platforms, by employing strategies 
like those I suggested in Chapter 5 that may set this cultural change in motion.  
 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
Throughout this chapter I have examined the ways the Queensland Fire and 
Emergency Services use social media, answering RQ2: How do emergency 
management organisations use social media? Building on Chapters 4 and 5, we can 
better understand how the factors I outlined in those chapters shape QFES’s current 
uses of social media. Media team managers have resisted implementing strict 
guidelines to govern media officers’ use of social media, insisting that media officers 
should also drive its direction. With little explicit direction from managers, media 
team members’ individual views shaped much of their use of social media. We can 
see how this leads to a normalisation of social media within these organisations, as 
users (primarily media officers) draw on their existing communications expertise and 
apply it to this new communicative platform. Moreover, this chapter has 
demonstrated how social media technologies do not in themselves dramatically 
transform organisational routines, but rather there is a mutual reshaping occurring. 
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In this chapter, I also examined media officers’ paradoxical situation whereby, due to 
their positioning in Brisbane in the southeast corner of the state, they depended on 
QFES employees around the state for content; content that, while interesting to the 
personnel who sent it, did not always appeal to members of the public. Through this 
paradoxical situation, media officers’ differing views about the makeup of their 
social media audience emerged. This demonstrated how social media serves both an 
internal and external communications function for their organisation, and documents 
the difficulties the organisation experienced in trying to meet the expectations of the 
different factions within its social media audience.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have repeatedly compared the media team’s approach to 
social media with its approach to traditional media activities. Despite an overarching 
‘Department of Community Safety Social Media Strategy’ document, I found that 
this document had quickly become outdated, and that the organisation’s general 
approach to social media was strategy-less. Unlike traditional communications 
activities, which were bound by strict approval processes, I found that the ‘rules’ 
governing social media were, in contrast, quite fluid. “If in doubt then consult the 
managers” (Media team member, July 2015) was the media team’s approach. One 
team manager described this as a “common sense approach” (Media team manager, 
August 2015), but I found that, in practice, it was not common sense at all and that 
common sense was unattainable.  
 
My participants’ discomfort around this fluidity demonstrates the need for social 
media policy documents in these organisations, to ensure expectations are explicit 
rather than implicit. Moreover, they also protect those responsible for social media, 
whose creativity and spontaneity are otherwise stifled by fear of mistakes or failure. 
The changeability of social media and frequent introduction of new platforms means 
that government social media policies would benefit from being ‘live’ (or at least 
easily adapted) lest they become quickly out dated and irrelevant, as was the case for 
QFES.  
 
The fluid approach to rules and strategy also extended to the team’s style and tone on 
social media, where different perceptions were held within the team about what 
constituted appropriate government communication. Government communication is 
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traditionally bureaucratic and template-driven, which conflicts with the lighter, 
informal style that many users expect of social media. We can see how social media 
are not radically altering government organisations’ communicative relationships 
with their audience; the example that I provided in the introduction to this thesis of 
the Bay Area Rapid Transport’s unexpected frankness in informing Twitter followers 
of the reasons for public transport delays, proved the exception, not the norm. A 
clearly defined social media strategy would again help reduce some of this 
uncertainty and eliminate inconsistencies in tone among team members. Otherwise, 
as I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, social media are normalised to fit 
existing strategies that government communications professionals are familiar and 
comfortable with.  
 
This chapter also examined some of the uncontrollable external factors that shaped 
the media team’s use of social media. One factor included the behaviour of their 
social media audience members who, despite clearly established rules on QFES’s 
Facebook page, engaged in rule-breaking activity. Another factor included the 
platforms themselves; features such as Facebook’s algorithm meant that the 
organisation had little control over when their followers received warnings. I noted, 
though, that this issue is not particular to social media platforms; that issues around 
the timely dissemination of warnings extend to other communications tools too. This 
demonstrates the disruptive effect of communications technologies in the emergency 
communication space.  
 
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated the role of social media champions within the 
organisation. In the later stages of my fieldwork, media team managers appointed a 
social media leader, a junior media officer who already championed social media 
within their team and now became informally responsible for directing the team’s 
social media efforts. In the intelligence-gathering space, I examined how the use of 
social media for this purpose was still in its infancy and was largely dependent on 
rogue social media champions conducting this role in addition to their existing 
official responsibilities. The ways in which social media are reshaping the 
communicative relationships of internal personnel also demonstrate the disruptive 
effects of social media. Just as there was early resistance within the media team to 
the addition of social media to their role, there is still significant operational 
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resistance to social media in the organisation. To overcome this, the organisation 
requires widespread cultural change so its members consider social media a core part 
of the business and recognise its potential operational value; but this is a cultural 
change that the organisation can attain.  
 
In Chapter 7, I outline the implications of my findings for practice in emergency 
management organisations. One of my proposals is that closer partnerships between 
these organisations and the owners and operators of the proprietary technologies with 
which they engage, be developed. Such partnerships can partially overcome 
uncontrollable external factors, like Facebook’s algorithm, ensuring that affected 
residents receive emergency warnings and updates in a timely manner.  
 Conclusion 215 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis has told the detailed story of organisational accommodation of, 
negotiation about and resistance to social media in one Australian emergency 
management organisation, through my first-hand access to it, that facilitated an 
extended period of participant observation and twenty-five in-depth interviews with 
key stakeholders. This thesis has established how the culture, ideology, and 
management of emergency management organisations influence the way they use 
social media, and in doing so answered the following research questions:  
 
1. What are the factors shaping emergency management organisations’ use 
of social media? 
2. How do emergency management organisations use social media? 
 
The introduction of social media has had a disruptive effect on emergency 
management organisations, but transformation can sometimes be a long, ongoing 
process. These organisations are governed by a ‘command and control’ structure and 
typically adhere to strict rules; as social media are, in contrast, quite fluid and 
conversational, the introduction of social media technologies to such organisations 
can challenge existing communicative norms.  
 
Chapter 1 introduced the transformative effect of new social media technologies on 
the way users communicate during emergency events, which I illustrated by 
providing examples of events over the past ten years that have demonstrated the 
significance of these technologies. While proponents claimed social media would 
have a disruptive and transformative effect on government (Mergel, 2015), in 
practice government agencies have normalised social media to fit existing 
communication patterns (Mergel, 2013a; 2016); in QFES, positioning social media 
within its existing Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) branch meant 
that social media served a distinctly one-way communicative function. I argued that 
the gap in the literature, which I found, provided the impetus for the empirical study. 
These gaps specifically included: the tendency for research in this area to be largely 
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speculative; the lack of research from an embedded perspective; and the lack of 
research investigating the post-implementation stage (i.e. 2-3 years after 
organisations have adopted social media).  
 
In Chapter 2 I reviewed the relevant existing literature, in doing so highlighting the 
current gaps in the field, which provided a justification for this study. This chapter 
began by situating this study within broader discussions of the disruptive effect of 
new technologies, which has been exemplified by the introduction of social media 
platforms. I discussed how the digital transformation of communication has affected 
government communication and the provision of services to the public. Reviewing 
the different ‘stages’ of e-government, I described that a truly participatory, open and 
collaborative form of e-government is difficult to achieve and, regarding social 
media specifically, I highlighted the variations in the adoption and use of these new 
technologies, and a number of pervading issues that exist regarding government 
social media usage. I identified the similarities between the effects of social media on 
the journalism industry and on government—specifically on emergency management 
organisations—which a review of relevant journalism studies literature revealed. In 
addition, I pointed out the similarities between the values of journalists and 
government communications professionals, which provided further justification for 
the use of journalism studies literature throughout this thesis.  
 
I then established two functions of social media use by emergency management 
organisations: using social media to gather intelligence, and to disseminate 
information. I highlighted two clear gaps through this literature review. First, that 
research primarily focuses on the use of social media by affected members of the 
public, mostly overlooking emergency management organisations’ uses of social 
media. Second, where scholars have addressed the perspective of emergency 
management organisations, there is a tendency to examine the potential uses rather 
than the actual uses. In focusing on emergency management organisations and 
examining their current practice first-hand, I have contributed an understanding of 
how social media operates as a communicative function in these organisations, 
showing how the introduction of social media with little guidance or strategy leads to 
individuals making judgement calls about its use, which contributes to the 
organisation-wide uncertainty about its purpose.  
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In Chapter 3, I then outlined the methods I employed for this study, describing how 
my combination of participant observation and in-depth interviews, as well as other 
forms of ancillary data, within an ethnographic approach allowed me to examine 
first-hand the tensions around social media use in emergency management 
organisations. By including an overview of the organisational context within which 
this study was situated, I provided a foundation for the deeper examination of this 
context and for the implications of the organisational changes. In Chapter 4, I 
showed how my participants operated within a constantly changing organisational 
environment that created uncertainty and instability. 
 
The chronological background narrative I provided in Chapter 4 further illustrated 
the disruptive environment that my participants operated within. I identified how the 
organisation’s decision to trial social media came about through a combination of 
top-down government directives, external successes during major events, and 
internal social media champions agitating for experimentation. The organisational 
changes that occurred around the time that I began my fieldwork significantly 
impacted the resourcing, positioning and repositioning of social media within the 
organisation, while a lack of internal communication around the changes that 
affected employees heightened the feelings of uncertainty. I showed how the social 
media team’s shared understanding of their purpose and role differed from the media 
team’s later understanding of both once they assumed responsibility for social media; 
managers assumed media officers—whose roles were significantly disrupted with the 
addition of new responsibilities—were adequately prepared to manage social media, 
which provided a foundation for the informal approaches to social media that I 
examined in Chapter 5. 
 
Building on the findings of Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 I examined the organisation’s 
competing perspectives towards social media. I examined how this occurred on 
micro and macro levels within the organisation. On a macro level, there was broader 
organisational disagreement about who should manage social media and drive its 
strategy and direction. On a micro level, the addition of social media to the media 
team reshaped media officers’ roles and their existing communicative 
responsibilities, while there were competing understandings within the team about its 
 Conclusion 218 
purpose, and about who in the team was responsible for driving the strategy and 
direction of social media. I noted how the shared social media role, compared to the 
delegation of media tasks, created a lack of ownership and responsibility and meant 
that media team members privileged their existing communicative tasks over social 
media. Simultaneously, the lack of clarity within the team around managerial roles 
and responsibilities exacerbated this lack of ownership and responsibility for social 
media. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 examined the current uses of social media in the organisation by 
building on the factors outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. I showed that the organisation 
did not have any overarching strategy that guided its use of social media; while an 
overarching Department of Community Safety Social Media Strategy document 
existed from when the organisation first joined social media, this document quickly 
fell out of date and was unused. Instead, individual judgement calls informed 
decisions. Participants made individual judgement calls when curating content and 
deciding what constitutes appropriate government communication on social media. 
These individual judgement calls also extended to their choice of particular 
platforms; media officers’ fondness for Instagram drove the media team’s renewed 
interest in the platform, while team members viewed Twitter as being of little 
relevance and interest to their audience. The media officer-driven social media 
approach is not necessarily a bad thing though; as I proposed in Chapter 5, the next 
step is to move from one-off practices towards formulating strategy and policy, 
which the media officers could lead. 
  
The influence of media team members’ professional histories on their view of social 
media, which I examined in Chapter 5, extended to their uses of social media: in 
sourcing social media content from their contacts across the state, media team 
members performed a traditional journalistic gatekeeping role in accepting and 
rejecting content. Towards the end of this chapter, I drew on the operational uses of 
social media. I noted that current uses of social media to gather intelligence are 
experimental and ad hoc. I also examined how the use of social media to disseminate 
information during an incident as it unfolds, conflicts with the organisation’s existing 
operational lines of communication. This demonstrates the disruptive effect of social 
media in these organisations, as the timeliness demanded of these new public 
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information responsibilities conflicts with the on-the-ground operational 
responsibilities. At the end of Chapter 5, I suggested that introducing optional 
placements for operational personnel within the media team and compulsory, 
organisation-wide social media training may help initiate cultural change in order for 
social media to be more widely accepted across the organisation, and to be 
considered of operational importance. These suggestions for cultural change might 
also help the organisation find a way to balance these conflicting on-the-ground 
operational responsibilities and public information duties. 
 
7.1 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
Throughout this thesis and in the literature review in particular, I observed that 
research investigating the use of social media by emergency management 
organisations is in its infancy. Existing literature that does examine emergency 
management organisations’ use of social media either tends to be speculative by 
outlining the potential uses, or it examines the initial implementation process. There 
is thus a lack of research investigating the post-implementation stage (i.e. 2-3 years 
after organisations have adopted social media). My study assessed that post-
implementation stage to examine current practice, rather than potential use pre-
implementation, providing a valuable examination of social media use alongside 
existing responsibilities and demonstrating how, after that initial implementation 
stage ends, social media use becomes normalised. This thesis has built on the 
findings of some scholars in the field (see Hiltz et al., 2014; McNutt, 2014; Sanders, 
2014) who have already observed how organisational factors, rather than 
technological factors, present the biggest barriers preventing these organisations 
from engaging with these platforms. Despite these barriers, many organisations have 
adopted social media and positioned it within existing communications departments. 
In presenting an example of one such organisation, this study advances these early 
findings to additionally interrogate the factors shaping these organisations’ uses of 
social media.  
 
Existing research has also discussed the potential uses of social media for 
intelligence gathering to inform the disaster response process. While this thesis has 
primarily focused on the use of social media to disseminate information, my detailed 
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observations have suggested that these potential uses are not realised in practice. 
Where these organisations do employ social media for intelligence-gathering 
purposes, such practices occur ad hoc or experimentally, while existing intelligence-
gathering tools may be too difficult or expensive for users. This finding provides 
motivation for further collaboration between practitioners and researchers. With a 
better understanding of these uses, future collaborations between industry partners 
and researchers should focus on building practitioners’ capabilities for gathering 
intelligence to inform the disaster response process.  
 
I have drawn heavily on journalism studies literature throughout this thesis for a 
number of reasons, principally because they have provided the basis for a useful 
comparison between the disruptive effect of social media in journalism and 
emergency management organisations, two similar industries. First, I noted that 
many of my participants came from traditional journalism backgrounds and tertiary 
education, and described how the values of journalism mirror the professional values 
of my participants as government communications professionals. For that reason, my 
participants often applied a journalistic framework to their uses of social media. This 
included their assuming the role of a ‘gatewatcher’ when vetting social media 
content and, like many journalists (see Usher, 2014), largely overlooking the two-
way interactive potential of social media.    
 
Second, I recognised how the transformative effect of social media on emergency 
management mirrors many of the changes already experienced by the journalism 
industry, and described how the ‘normalised’ use of social media that I observed in 
the organisation under investigation has been similarly documented in studies of 
journalism practice (see Singer, 2005; Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton, 2012). 
Mitchelstein and Boczkowski (2009) recognised a lack of empirical findings that 
compare the impact of technological change in news production with other 
industries, maintaining that such comparisons would help ascertain what is unique to 
journalism and what commonalities journalism and other industries share (p. 576). 
With this study providing that cross-industry comparison, this thesis thus provides a 
valuable theoretical contribution to journalism studies, too. 
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In addition to journalism studies, I also borrowed from other disciplines including 
organisational sociology and emergency management, noting how they explain 
organisational phenomena particular to this study better than the media and 
communication discipline. This study contributes to the wider understanding of 
technological change within organisations, as the changes associated with social 
media that I have investigated in this study are not particular to emergency 
management organisations within government, but rather are issues with which both 
public and private organisations in a diverse range of fields are contending. This 
research has provided theoretical contributions, illustrating the current practice and 
values applied in the use of social media by emergency organisations. 
 
7.2 INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTION  
Many emergency management organisations are still at the stage that QFES was at 
when I concluded my fieldwork there in August 2015. Then, its social media use had 
been an established function within the organisation for the previous 2-3 years, and 
had been somewhat normalised to adapt to existing communicative strategies. Some 
emergency management organisations are now more advanced in their use of social 
media; they may have a separate social media team with day-to-day and long-term 
strategies, or they may officially use social media to gather intelligence and inform 
the disaster response process. Some organisations are yet to adopt social media. 
Almost all organisations are at some point on that continuum. This thesis is therefore 
not just a history of social media in the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services. 
Rather, it is a case study of organisational change: the institutional and interpersonal 
conditions that I have addressed throughout this thesis also exist in other 
organisations, and there are lessons that apply to all organisations in this study. 
Having outlined the academic contribution that this thesis makes, in this section I 
will describe how this thesis provides a contribution to industry, building on this to 
then suggest possible implications for practice in emergency management 
organisations more broadly.  
 
Through my attendance at industry and academic conferences, and participation in 
workshops through the larger Social Media in Times of Crisis project, I recognised 
the similarities between my participants and other practitioners responsible for social 
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media in their organisations. Many of these organisations, by default, position their 
social media function within their existing media, communications or public affairs 
divisions, and the personnel within those divisions predominantly have traditional 
media or communications backgrounds. Having examined the impact of the QFES 
media officers’ professional histories on their use of social media, I believe it is 
likely that practitioners in other comparable organisations will similarly apply a 
traditional communications framework in their own approach to social media. These 
practitioners can take this knowledge and apply the lessons from this thesis to their 
own organisations to improve their uses of social media. Such improvements may 
include social media training for those responsible for social media, designing and 
delivering training packages that meet the specific needs of these emergency 
management organisations’ communications professionals.  
 
Our larger Social Media in Times of Crisis project produced a policy report titled 
‘Support Frameworks for the Use of Social Media by Emergency Management 
Organisations’ (Flew et al., 2015). Workshops with stakeholders from a number of 
Australian emergency management and law enforcement agencies informed the 
recommendations of this report. One of our key recommendations was to establish a 
national network of social media practitioners within Australian emergency 
management organisations. We recognised that many of these organisations conduct 
their social media activity in isolation, with little understanding of what occurs in 
other similar organisations. The QFES media team managers’ decision to introduce 
an informal social media leadership role, which I addressed in Chapter 6, partly 
acknowledged this predicament. Team managers expressed the belief that QFES 
media officers are too internally focused when conducting social media, and not 
following best practice.  
 
It is not always feasible for these organisations to share lessons from their own 
experiences at industry conferences, which is, at present, the primary means of 
knowledge-sharing amongst emergency management communications professionals. 
Conference attendance is often expensive and is low priority for emergency 
management organisations’ media teams already operating within a restricted budget. 
When these teams do receive additional funding, the priority is instead on more 
quantifiable resources: additional staff, or visits to regions to build local connections 
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with operational staff, for example. Instead of relying on industry conferences for 
this knowledge-sharing to occur, we suggested a national network, ideally including 
an online, geographic boundary-evading component, that would instead facilitate this 
knowledge sharing (Flew et al., 2015).  
 
This also allows more equal opportunity for various organisations to not only 
participate but also share their experiences, irrespective of organisational resource 
restrictions and the national profile of their team. Having participated in industry 
conferences, I found that it is typically the larger, better-resourced and higher-profile 
organisations that are afforded the opportunity to share their experiences. Namely, 
conference organisers frequently invite the Queensland Police Service (QPS) to share 
their experiences and expertise, despite the fact that their oft-cited examples (from 
the 2010-2011 floods) occurred over five years ago now, and that other 
organisations’ social media use is now also well established. Moreover, the industry 
conferences I attended are often east coast-centric: representatives from Queensland, 
New South Wales and Victoria are frequently in attendance, while I never personally 
met an emergency management communications professional from Western 
Australia or Tasmania during my studies.  
 
A national network would instead facilitate knowledge sharing amongst all 
organisations, irrespective of their location, online popularity, the length of time they 
have used social media, and the size of the organisation and its media/social media 
team. Organisations could contact one another for help or share advice—both 
positive and negative—about new platforms, programmes, software, or tools that 
other organisations may benefit from. Such national networks could be replicated in 
other countries, and ideally in the long-term, transnational networks could also be 
created, facilitating knowledge-sharing across organisations of similar size which 
may respond to similar types of incidents. For example, parts of Canada experience 
significant bushfires similar to parts of Australia, severe enough that Australian 
firefighters flew to Canada to assist in firefighting efforts in 2015. Communications 
professionals in each of these organisations could offer similar support and 
experience in the social media space.  
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Finally, a national network could be useful in overcoming shared problems. In 
Chapter 6, I recognised that Facebook’s algorithm presents an uncontrollable 
external factor that shapes emergency management organisations’ communicative 
relationship with their audience. This issue is not particular to QFES; rather, it most 
likely also affects other emergency management organisations. Next in this section, I 
suggest potential collaborative opportunities between emergency management 
organisations and social media platforms, some of which have already demonstrated 
interest in the crisis communication space. Such collaboration may also provide 
emergency management organisations with an avenue to agitate for changes to the 
way that the algorithm filters the content their audience sees. This is particularly 
pertinent during emergencies, to ensure that affected members of the public receive 
emergency warnings and updates in a timely manner. A national network of social 
media practitioners from Australian emergency management organisations could be 
of use in this situation, particularly if that network eventually expanded and became 
international, as a group of practitioners working together to achieve such change 
would be a more effective force than one single organisation attempting to single-
handedly persuade a large corporation like Facebook to change its approach.  
 
As noted above, social media platform owners and operators have responded to the 
increased use of their platforms during disasters by introducing new features for both 
affected users and official agencies responsible for their rescue, thus demonstrating 
an interest in the crisis communication space. This has affected the context within 
which page operators like QFES are operating, but the degree to which platform 
owners and operators collaborate with law enforcement agencies and emergency 
management organisations to foster that interest varies. An examination of the role of 
social media platform owners and operators in the crisis communication space was 
outside of the scope of this study. However, I will spend some time here addressing 
this and in doing so propose future developments for organisations and platform 
operators.   
 
Google, which “seeks to make critical information more accessible around natural 
disasters and humanitarian crises” (Google, n.d.), has already developed strong 
partnerships with emergency responders. Google’s Public Alerts is one of a number 
of tools (that also includes Google Person Finder and Google Crisis Map) in its crisis 
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communication repertoire; these Public Alerts ensure that if a user searches a 
location where an alert is currently active, that alert will appear at the top of the 
search results. Google collaborates with government agencies and not-for-profits to 
display their warnings and alerts in search results. Amongst international agencies 
that Google collaborates with, it lists Australian agencies such as the New South 
Wales Rural Fire Service (NSW RFS) and South Australian Country Fire Service 
(SA CFS). Such partnerships are thus possible for organisations that are serious 
about building their social media capabilities.  
 
In September 2013, Twitter introduced a new alert service, Twitter Alerts. This 
service allows pre-approved law enforcement, emergency management and 
government agencies as well as selected NGOs to send critical information (such as 
warnings, evacuation instructions and safety messages) to their subscribers via a 
push notification or an SMS message. The message is also highlighted on a 
subscriber’s home timeline with an orange bell to indicate its importance (Pena, 
2013). While Twitter developed this platform with official agencies in mind, there 
are some limitations that may affect its use.  
 
First, the ability for agencies to individually dictate how they use the service is 
potentially problematic. If multiple agencies within the same jurisdiction use the 
service differently or inconsistently, it can cause confusion amongst users who 
receive those alerts, rendering the service ineffective. Within Queensland, for 
instance, the Brisbane City Council may use the service as an awareness tool for all 
weather warnings, while the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services may in 
contrast only use it to warn members of the public of imminent danger. These 
inconsistencies can also lessen the impact of the alert. Without governance over the 
use of the tool, inconsistencies in its use could be potentially problematic and 
confusing for followers, cause message fatigue, and lessen the impact of the service. 
Working with agencies to establish some clear guidelines and restrictions around the 
use of the tool could reduce some of these problems and make it more effective. 
 
Second, the current inability to target Twitter Alerts to followers based on their 
geographic location means that all followers of a particular account who have 
registered to receive Alerts will do so irrespective of relevance, which could again 
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lessen the impact of this service. Based on anecdotal evidence, organisations are 
currently using Twitter Alerts experimentally, and we are yet to witness their 
effectiveness in a major disaster. However, a growing number of agencies have 
joined the service—Twitter (2014) regularly updates its list of participating 
organisations—demonstrating that many organisations are at least interested in 
adding this feature to their communications toolbox. Future collaboration between 
Twitter and those agencies pre-approved to use Twitter Alerts will ensure that future 
iterations of the tool will be even more useful to the agencies disseminating the 
Alerts, and to the intended recipients.  
 
Finally, in October 2014 Facebook launched Safety Check, a tool for users in 
disaster-affected areas to notify their online network of their ‘safety status’ (Gleit, 
Zeng, and Cottle, 2014). Based on a user’s location as listed in their profile and 
identified in geo-location data, Facebook sends users a notification asking if they are 
safe. When a user confirms that they are safe, Facebook posts this on the user’s 
timeline. Facebook has activated this for major events including the April 2015 
Nepal earthquake, the November 2015 Paris attacks, and the March 2016 Brussels 
attacks.  
 
Following the July 2016 Nice attack, Facebook indicated a move to a user-directed 
system, announcing: 
Following a community-generated Safety Check activation, we have 
activated Facebook-initiated Safety Check in response to an attack in Nice, 
France. […] Last month, we began testing features that allow people to both 
initiate and share Safety Check on Facebook. Over the last few months, we 
have improved the launch process to make it easier for our team to activate 
more frequently and faster, while testing ways to empower people to identify 
and elevate local crises as well (Disaster Response on Facebook, 2016) 
In contrast to Twitter Alerts, this feature has received significant attention since its 
launch, due to the widespread uptake and technological errors after the March 2016 
Lahore suicide bombing that saw Facebook sending automated messages enquiring 
about their safety status to users outside of the affected area (Bhuiyan, 2016). The 
move to a user-directed system most likely came following the intense criticism 
Facebook has received about their inconsistent activation of the tool for some events 
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and not others (D'Orazio, 2015), as the move helps absolve them of bias and 
criticism, to a degree.  
 
While Safety Check was not developed for emergency management organisations, 
and is not—in its current form—directly useful to them, the data—in emergency 
management-speak, “intelligence”—that the tool generates might be of operational 
value. Recent developments indicate that Facebook is looking to improve the tool, 
and future collaborations with emergency management organisations may motivate 
these organisations to improve their current uses of social media beyond the default 
one-way dissemination approaches. While Facebook stated upon its launch that 
Safety Check “wasn’t designed as a first responder tool” (quoted in Wagner, 2014), 
its widespread uptake may provide motivation for Facebook to partner with first 
responders so that it is of value to them. Moreover, as Andrew Quodling and I 
pointed out in a news article soon after the launch of Safety Check, such 
collaboration also gives Facebook greater responsibility for their users (Quodling and 
Potter, 2014).    
 
7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
ORGANISATIONS 
Drawing on Francis and Bessant’s (2005) “four Ps of innovation”, I argued in 
Chapter 2 that we have only observed the first ‘step’ of innovation thus far: ‘product 
innovation’. This “relates to changes in the products/services offered by an 
organization” (Krumsvik, 2015, p. 778); by adopting social media platforms, 
emergency management organisations now offer a direct communication service to 
constituents. I suggested that organisations might achieve the other steps of 
innovation. Conducting first-hand observations over an extended period of time has 
afforded me the unique position to suggest changes or opportunities to evolve 
emergency management organisations’ current use of social media, which I hope 
many practitioners will consider. In embracing and implementing some of the 
lessons and recommendations from this thesis, the other steps of Francis and 
Bessant’s (2005) “four Ps of innovation” may begin to be realised. 
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I examined the operational resistance to social media throughout this thesis, and in 
Chapter 5 I suggested two key ways for the organisation to instigate cultural change. 
First, I suggested making the QFES media team’s social media training package 
compulsory, just as the media training package currently is, noting how the optional 
delivery is a missed opportunity to facilitate cultural change by engaging with 
members of the organisation who dismiss social media. This is because it might 
gradually build some first-hand social media understanding and skills in every 
member of the organisation, especially amongst operational personnel. In the early 
stages of my fieldwork I observed a presentation of a media training package, and 
observed participants—senior managers from the former Emergency Management 
Queensland (EMQ)—laugh throughout the social media component of the workshop. 
This indicated to me, an outside researcher conducting overt observations, that 
participants dismissed social media and refused to take it seriously. Introducing a 
compulsory social media training package—not just a component within media 
training packages—might help workshop facilitators to better understand the 
perspectives of operational personnel, which facilitators could use to shape future 
workshops.  
 
Second, through my own participation at a daylong live fire training session, 
alongside three other media team members, I developed a greater appreciation and 
understanding of the work of firefighters. I also accompanied members of the media 
team to the organisation’s Fire Communications Centre. Again, this gave me a 
greater understanding of the different operational roles in the organisation. I 
suggested introducing an optional placement for operational personnel in the media 
team. By experiencing the media team’s role first hand, and operating the 
organisation’s social media function (with some oversight and guidance), I suggested 
that operational personnel might come to understand and appreciate the value of 
social media in emergency management.  
 
While these suggestions pertain to the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, 
based on my observations of current practice, other organisations could introduce 
similar strategies. They may experience similar resistance amongst operational 
personnel to social media that a more transparent relationship between the media and 
communications branch—if that is where the social media function operates from—
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and the operational personnel might help overcome. It is likely that other 
organisations offer some form of media and/or social media training to operational 
personnel, depending on the organisation’s policy towards spokespeople. (QFES, for 
example, maintains an open media policy, in which anyone can speak to the media 
provided it is to the benefit of the organisation.) Compulsory training in other 
organisations could help build the profile of social media, empowering dissenting 
employees by giving them a stake in organisational decision-making.  
 
In this thesis, I have noted how journalism as an organisational field into which new 
actors and technologies intrude (see Grafström and Windell, 2012) has close parallels 
with crisis communication as an organisational field similarly being disrupted by 
social media technologies and actors. Examining the impact of blogs on journalists, 
Singer (2005) proposed that “the question of ‘who is a journalist’ online will only 
become more, not less, provocative as roles, norms and practices become 
increasingly fluid” (p. 193). We can make comparisons here to emergency 
management organisations. Smartphone-equipped members of the public (and on-
scene media) who are observing the incident unfold are now a valuable source of 
information, meaning the role of official agencies, including emergency management 
organisations and law enforcement agencies, becomes similarly fluid, when they 
were once primary sources of information. 
 
There is potential, however, for official agencies to openly invite these new actors to 
participate in field activities. I have identified throughout this thesis how emergency 
management organisations, by default, use social media as an extension of existing 
communications activities to push out information. In future, these organisations 
could work towards being more active in soliciting input from their audiences during 
an unfolding event, recognising them as valuable ‘eyes on the ground’. There are 
understandably risks involved with soliciting feedback. Those individuals might 
mistake requests for updates about what is occurring around them as encouragement 
to put themselves in danger to provide such information. However, emergency 
management organisations could anticipate this by gathering members of their 
communications, community engagement, community safety and operational 
branches (see Appendix E), and pooling their expertise to devise clear 
communications strategies in advance to involve members of the public—via social 
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media—in the disaster response process, but in a way that discourages risk-taking 
behaviour.   
 
The different needs of the various factions within the organisation’s social media 
audience emerged as a consideration throughout this thesis. I discussed this in 
Chapter 6, where I examined my participants’ contrasting imaginings of their 
audience, which they perceived as being composed of both members of the 
organisation (volunteers and paid personnel), journalists, and regular members of the 
public. Some of my participants described the difficulty they experienced in 
simultaneously catering to different audience members’ interests. In addition, media 
team members experienced a paradoxical situation whereby they depended on QFES 
employees around the state for content that, while interesting to the personnel who 
sent it, did not always appeal to regular members of the public. These concerns are 
most likely not particular to QFES, but extend to many other organisations.  
 
This presents a case for creating multiple social media channels for different 
purposes, for example a Facebook page specifically for promotional content and to 
appeal to personnel, and another page for warnings and incident updates only. 
Alternatively, an organisation may choose to use different platforms for distinct 
purposes, such as using a photo-sharing platform like Instagram for promotional 
content primarily. Such practices are already evident in some organisations. The 
Country Fire Authority (CFA), the state of Victoria’s rural firefighting and 
emergency services organisation, provides a useful model for how different social 
media platforms or pages could serve different purposes. On Twitter, they have both 
a CFA Members (@CFA_Members) and a CFA Updates (@CFA_Updates) Twitter 
account, clearly stating that the former provides news for its paid and volunteer 
firefighters—but, being public, is available for anyone to view—while directing 
followers to the latter account for warnings and updates, which may instead be most 
interesting to regular members of the public and/or journalists. Such approaches may 
also help overcome criticisms from audience members who may, for example, find 
promotional content irrelevant or boring.  
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7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
While points of comparison exist between this organisation and similar organisations 
elsewhere in Australia, it is not possible to generalise the findings of the study to 
international or even all Australian emergency management organisations. 
Differences such as organisational protocols, geographic variations, and disaster 
propensity may result in conflicting views about social media and its uses. Thus, 
there is a need for more ethnographic research in other emergency management 
organisations: for example, comparing Queensland with New South Wales or 
Victoria, the two most populated states in Australia. We know that these states 
routinely manage significant bushfires that often pose more of a threat to lives and 
property than the bushfires experienced in Queensland, while Queensland endures 
more significant storms and cyclones that these states do not experience. These 
different types of disasters and geographic differences between the states mean that 
members of the public and emergency responders may use social media differently. 
Nonetheless, we can learn from the experiences of QFES and apply these lessons to 
other organisations where appropriate.  
 
The timeliness of research outputs is a valid concern regarding ethnographic 
research. My fieldwork ended in August 2015; therefore the content of this thesis 
does not claim to reflect any changes that might have occurred after this time. After 
completing the draft of my thesis shortly before examination, I contacted each 
interview participant individually with excerpts from my thesis containing quotes 
from our interviews. I did this to ensure that my participants did not feel I 
misrepresented anything they had said at the time.  
 
In follow-up emails during this process, a number of participants remarked that, 
while their quotes did accurately represent their opinions at the time the research was 
undertaken, the situation had evolved since then. One participant observed, “Since 
your time here, things have changed a bit and some of my opinions from then to now 
are a little different” (Media officer, personal communication, September 2016). 
After receiving this feedback, I invited the media manager to email a summary of 
these changes for me to report on in my thesis, which the manager accepted. QFES 
representatives were eager to make the point that they have “evolved [their] social 
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media practices significantly over the past 12 months”, emphasising the “vital and 
integrated” role it plays in their business and is a “key tool for QFES to engage and 
interact with local Queensland communities” (Media manager, personal 
communication, September 2016). The manager also informed me of the following 
changes: 
QFES Media now has well developed style guides and monitoring guides 
that inform and shape our social media presence. We discuss and develop 
our social media strategies continuously as part of usual business and have 
dedicated time during team meetings to troubleshoot issues, analyse our 
performance and discuss social media innovations that we could potentially 
adopt in our business. Every media campaign, bushfire warning, safety 
message and incident that warrants media promotion is now accompanied by 
a social media element. Our tone, language and personality has developed in 
this space and our audience has responded well to these developments, as 
evident through an ever increasing following on all of our social media 
platforms as well as a higher level of engagement across Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram. QFES Media is managing the development of the QFES 
Social Media Policy that will shape and inform QFES’ interaction with 
Queenslanders into the future. (Media manager, personal communication, 
September 2016) 
 
Many of the changes described here build on practices that I observed. While 
conducting my fieldwork, the media team did discuss social media, albeit in an 
informal and largely reactive manner. The team’s evolving social media style (or 
“personality” as the manager describes it) is most likely a result of increased 
confidence in the space that comes with time and experience, and perhaps also 
managerial support to experiment. Moreover, throughout my fieldwork, a social 
media post typically accompanied media campaigns, bushfire warnings, and safety 
messages; although, as I revealed in Chapter 6, the media team did often experience 
difficulty in receiving information from on-scene operational personnel during 
incidents, which hindered their ability to disseminate timely updates to their 
audience. The media manager’s update indicates that they post more frequently 
during incidents, and further observations would allow me to investigate what has 
changed internally to facilitate this development.  
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The media manager extended an offer for me to revisit the organisation and note the 
changes first-hand, which I hope to follow up on in the near future. The manager’s 
update provides interesting points for me to follow up on or investigate further if I do 
go back. First, it will be interesting to examine who is involved in the development 
of the Social Media Policy, and their role in this process. The inclusion of 
operational personnel and executives might help to address the organisational-wide 
uncertainty about the purpose of social media that I have described throughout this 
thesis. Including stakeholders from across the organisation will also encourage buy-
in and ownership of social media from those outside of the MACC branch.  
 
Second, the mention of “a higher level of engagement” is worthy of further 
investigation, to examine how QFES measure engagement and more importantly 
how they respond to it. ‘Engagement’ may refer to increased likes, views or shares. 
But if it refers an increased number of comments on Facebook or @mentions on 
Twitter, for example, it is worth investigating how they respond to that; whether this 
compels them to interact more with their audience—and the implications of this for 
staffing and rostering social media—or whether this “higher level of engagement” is 
simply a response to their developed social media style. 
 
While I have already acknowledged that my thesis presents a snapshot of QFES’s 
social media use at the time, it nonetheless provides useful lessons for the 
organisation and others who may be at a similar stage now to that QFES was at, then. 
Moreover, as I note at the end of this chapter, I look forward to accepting QFES’s 
offer to revisit the organisation in the near future to observe and reflect on these 
changes first-hand.   
 
Although the change of government in Queensland that occurred before and during 
this study, and the politicised nature of these organisations in general, mean that 
organisations like QFES are subject to frequent organisational change and 
restructure, these patterns are not limited to Queensland. Even in places where there 
are less hyperactive attitudes to change, there is an adoption process that creates a 
struggle for these organisations. This thesis has presented a narrative of the changes 
associated with technological adoption, particularly when that change occurs amidst 
organisational disruption. Although it tells the story of one organisation in one 
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geographic location, the story presented in this thesis is much more representative of 
a universal process of coming to terms with social media, and of the challenges 
associated with it. Having drawn on literature from journalism studies in particular, 
we can see how many of the challenges that I have identified throughout this thesis 
apply beyond emergency management organisations themselves, and beyond public 
sector agencies. As I have demonstrated throughout, the technological disruptions 
affecting emergency management organisations mirror many changes already 
experienced by the journalism industry.  
 
7.5 FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
This study speaks broadly to the issues associated with organisations’ adoption of 
communication technology. As with all research projects, this study was limited in 
scope due to time and funding restrictions. While this study focused primarily on the 
QFES media officers who oversee the organisation’s social media function, questions 
still remain around how new social and mobile communications technologies alter 
individual employees’ work/life balance. Scholars, including Gregg (2011), have 
begun to answer these questions. Future research could build on Gregg’s findings 
and examine what this means for communications professionals working in 
emergency management organisations specifically. Questions about the impact of 
these technologies on their work and lifestyles are particularly pertinent during 
emergency events. Issues around fatigue management during round-the-clock 
emergency events persist for all personnel working in these environments. However, 
future research could examine the ways in which mobile and social media 
technologies create pressure for employees to remain ‘on’, even when officially ‘off 
the clock’.  
 
In this thesis, I also acknowledged that I did not interview any operational personnel 
separately from the PSBA social media review interviews. While I engaged with 
them through media training observations, there is scope to better understand the 
resistance towards social media from an operational perspective. I also noted that I 
did not speak to senior executives, acknowledging that, had I spoken to them, their 
perspectives towards social media may have differed from the media team members’ 
perceptions of their opinions. Future research could build on the findings of this 
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study, but examine the perspectives of senior managers in such organisations to 
better understand the administrative factors shaping the uses of social media in these 
organisations.  
 
For emergency management organisations to better harness the potential of social 
media, they require external assistance to develop the tools and capabilities to 
improve their use of these platforms. This is particularly true of the intelligence-
gathering potentials of social media platforms. As I have demonstrated throughout 
this thesis and in Chapter 6 especially, by default QFES employed social media as an 
extension of their existing one-way communication strategies, which mirrors patterns 
of use in other similar organisations (see for example Mergel, 2013a; 2016). In doing 
so, the organisation overlooked the intelligence-gathering potential of social media, 
and of platforms like Twitter especially. However, a sophisticated use of social 
media platforms requires investment in staffing, resources and the development of 
appropriate infrastructure to mine these platforms for relevant data.  
 
Of Twitter specifically, Rogers (2014) notes that “As with other Internet or new 
media data sets, one is often required to be employed by or within the walls of the 
corporate research lab in order to have access to larger data sets, including 
longitudinal ones” (p. xxii). There is clear potential for future collaboration between 
these organisations and research institutes to develop their capacity to make sense of 
the intelligence that they can gather via social media. This might involve a better 
understanding of the platforms and the networks that emerge on those platforms, or 
collaboration to develop tools to mine these platforms for data that is of use and 
easily interpreted to inform the disaster response process. 
 
Finally, when addressing the limitations of this research, I explained how some of 
my participants raised concerns about how things had evolved in their organisation 
since I concluded my fieldwork. This demonstrates both the issues around timeliness 
of (particularly ethnographic) research, and how quickly organisational practices 
evolve when using new technologies like social media. As I noted earlier, during 
these discussions with my participants, a team manager suggested that I revisit the 
organisation to better understand how their use of social media had evolved since my 
time there. While this was outside of the scope of this PhD project, I hope to arrange 
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a short-term period of observation in the near future, as an interesting postscript to 
the story of an organisation perpetually under reorganisation and technological 
evolution.  
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Appendix A  
Queensland public servant redundancies, data from Helbig and Ironside (2012) 
 
Ordered by number of jobs cut:  
Department Job losses Staff remaining Losses as percentage 
of department size 
Health  4,140 66,110 6.26% 
Transport and Main Roads  1,450 7,360 19.70% 
Housing and Public Works  1,425 3,989 35.72% 
Justice and Attorney-
General  
510 4,715 10.82% 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry  
450 1,948 23.1% 
Education, Training and 
Employment  
405 66,204 0.61% 
Communities, Child 
Safety and Disability 
Services  
385 6,045 6.37% 
Natural Resources and 
Mines  
360 2,444 14.72% 
Community Safety  345 10,579 3.26% 
Environment and Heritage 
Protection  
220 1,117 19.7% 
Police  215 14,978 1.44% 
State Development, 
Infrastructure and 
Planning  
145 800 18.13% 
Energy and Water Supply  135 273 49.45% 
National Parks, 
Recreation, Sport and 
Racing  
130 1,329 9.78% 
Science, Information 
Technology, Innovation 
and the Arts  
110 1,895 5.80% 
Treasury and Trade  85 1,094 7.77% 
Premier and Cabinet  45 621 7.25% 
Local Government  15 105 14.29% 
Tourism, Major Events, 
Small Business and the 
15 107 14.02% 
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Commonwealth Games  
Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Island and 
Multicultural Affairs  
15  363 4.13% 
TOTAL  10,600 192,076 
 
5.52% 
 
Ordered by percentage of staff made redundant:  
Department Job losses Staff remaining Losses as percentage 
of department size 
Energy and Water Supply  135 273 49.45% 
Housing and Public Works  1,425 3,989 35.72% 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry  
450 1,948 23.1% 
Environment and Heritage 
Protection  
220 1,117 19.7% 
Transport and Main Roads  1,450 7,360 19.70% 
State Development, 
Infrastructure and 
Planning  
145 800 18.13% 
Natural Resources and 
Mines  
360 2,444 14.72% 
Local Government  15 105 14.29% 
Tourism, Major Events, 
Small Business and the 
Commonwealth Games  
15 107 14.02% 
Justice and Attorney-
General  
510 4,715 10.82% 
National Parks, 
Recreation, Sport and 
Racing  
130 1,329 9.78% 
Treasury and Trade  85 1,094 7.77% 
Premier and Cabinet  45 621 7.25% 
Communities, Child 
Safety and Disability 
Services  
385 6,045 6.37% 
Health  4,140 66,110 6.26% 
Science, Information 
Technology, Innovation 
and the Arts  
110 1,895 5.80% 
Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Island and 
15  363 4.13% 
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Multicultural Affairs  
Community Safety  345 10,579 3.26% 
Police  215 14,978 1.44% 
Education, Training and 
Employment  
405 66,204 0.61% 
TOTAL  10,600 192,076 
 
5.52% 
 
  
 Appendix B 258 
Appendix B  
Department of Community Safety (DCS) organisational chart 
  
Queensland 
Community 
Parliament 
Parole Boards 
Minister for Police, 
Corrective Services 
and Emergency 
Services 
Internal Audit 
Director-General 
Department of 
Community Safety 
Queensland 
Ambulance Service 
Queensland 
Corrective Services 
Emergency 
Management 
Queensland 
Queensland Fire and 
Rescue Service 
Corporate Support 
Division 
Strategic Policy 
Division 
Executive 
Committees 
Emergency Services 
Advisory Council 
Corporate Support Division: 
• Finance and Acquisition 
Services 
• Human Resources 
• Information and 
Communication Systems 
• Facilities Management 
Strategic Policy Division: 
• Policy and Legislative 
Reform 
• Organisational 
Performance and 
Evaluation 
• Ministerial, Information 
and Legal Services 
• Media and Corporate 
Communications 
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Appendix C  
Public Safety Business Agency (PSBA) organisational chart  
 
 
  
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Deputy CEO 
Operations 
QG AIR Service 
Information 
Technology 
Business Services 
Human Resources 
Office of the CEO 
Strategy 
Ministerial and 
Executive 
Services 
Media 
(Lead by Executive 
Director Media) 
QFES Media 
(Lead by Media 
Director) 
Media 
(Lead by Media 
Director) 
Multimedia 
Communications 
QPS Media and 
Public Affairs 
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Appendix D 
Media and Corporate Communications branch desk configuration pre-Keelty Review 
 
  
Desk 
 
Wall 
 
Shoulder-height 
temporary partition 
Waist-height 
temporary partition 
 
1. Media manager 
2. Media supervisor 
3. Social media officer 
4. Social media manager 
5. Communications team 
6. Sponsorship manager 
7. Media officer 
8. Media director 
 
9. Researcher 
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Media and Corporate Communications branch desk configuration post-Keelty 
Review 
 
  
Desk 
 
Wall 
 
Shoulder-height 
temporary partition 
Waist-height 
temporary partition 
 
1. Media manager 
2. Media supervisor 
3. Media supervisor (training) 
4. Communications manager 
5. Communications manager 
6. Communications officer 
7. Sponsorship manager 
8. Media officer 
9. Media director 
 
10. Researcher 
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Appendix E 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) organisational chart 
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SES Directorate 
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Deputy Commissioner 
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Chief Superintendent 
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Appendix F 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services operational regions  
Data from Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (2016)  
 
 
Far Northern Region: ranges from Cardwell in the southeast to the Torres Strait 
Island in the north and the Gulf of Carpentaria in the west. The city of Cairns is the 
major centre in this region. Most of the population is located in the southeast corner; 
however there are also remote communities spread throughout the rest of the region. 
This region is subject to frequent cyclones and flooding. This region includes an 
operational staff of 110 full-time and 290 part-time firefighters. 
 
Northern Region: a geographically large region, it ranges along the coast from the 
Hinchinbrook Shire South to Bowen across to the Northern Territory border, while 
also extending south to the South Australian border. Most of the population is 
located along the east coast; however there are mining and agricultural communities 
located inland. This region experiences cyclones and occasional major flooding. This 
Brisbane  
Region 
South Eastern 
Region 
North Coast 
Region 
South Western 
Region 
Central  
Region 
Northern 
Region 
Far Northern 
Region 
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region includes an operational staff of 165 full-time and 215 auxiliary (part-time) 
firefighters. 
 
Central Region: ranges from the Whitsunday Islands to Agnes Water, and also 
includes tropical islands and the southern end of the Great Barrier Reef. Major 
centres include Mackay, Rockhampton, Gladstone, Emerald and Longreach. 
Firefighters in the region respond to a number of emergencies each year, particularly 
road crash rescues along the busy highways in the area, as well as frequent grass and 
bush fires. This region includes an operational staff of over 620 full-time and 
auxiliary firefighters and over 8,000 volunteer Rural Fire Service firefighters. 
 
North Coast Region: includes coastal cities and towns Bundaberg, Hervey Bay and 
the Sunshine Coast and extends inland to the Burnett hinterland. Approximately 210 
full-time employees (firefighters and non-operational personnel) staff this Region, 
approximately 479 auxiliary firefighters and 6,000 volunteer Rural Fire Service 
firefighters. 
 
Brisbane Region: a relatively small region geographically, approximately 36% of 
the Queensland population live in this region which covers approximately 5,160 
square kilometres. It includes the local government areas of Brisbane, Caboolture, 
Kilcoy, Pine Rivers, Redcliffe and Redlands. This region includes 792 full-time and 
123 auxiliary fire officers.  
 
South Eastern Region: the area to the south and southeast to the New South Wales 
border, west and northwest of Brisbane and extends out to the Great Dividing Range. 
Major cities in this region include the Gold Coast, Logan, and Ipswich, as well as the 
Scenic Rim, Lockyer Valley and Somerset Regional Councils. This region includes 
487 permanent fire officers, technical and administrative staff, 240 auxiliary 
firefighters, and approximately 3,500 volunteer firefighters. 
 
South Western Region: extends from Toowoomba in the east, west to the South 
Australian border and south to the New South Wales border. Toowoomba is the 
region’s major city; most of the population is located in the eastern part of the region. 
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This region includes 463 auxiliary and 100 full-time firefighters (the highest 
percentage of auxiliary firefighters working alongside full-time staff). 
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Appendix G 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) and Queensland Police Service 
(QPS) Twitter and Facebook followers over a two-year period 
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Appendix H 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES) Terms of Use 
From Facebook page ‘About’ section  
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Appendix I 
Major milestones and events before, during and after fieldwork 
Linkage/ PhD 
Project milestones 
Social media use in the 
organisation 
Government / political 
changes, including 
policy release 
Social media platform 
changes 
Natural disasters / 
incidents 
 
 
 
 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
 
Dec-Jan: South-east 
Queensland floods 
Feb: Cyclone 
Yasi 
Apr: DCS 
social media 
trial ends 
Aug: Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 
Interim Report released, 
Queensland govt 
responds 
Jan: DCS first 
considers trialling 
social media 
Nov: DCS Social 
Media Strategy 
document 
finalised, last 
updated 
Jan: DCS 
establishes 12-
month social 
media team 
Mar: Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry Final 
Report released;  
Queensland state election, 
Campbell Newman elected 
Premier 
Apr: Facebook 
acquires Instagram 
Oct: Queensland 
government makes 
significant public sector 
job cuts 
 
Jan: Cyclone 
Oswald; ARC 
Linkage 
project 
commences 
 
June: DCS 
establishes 
Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram pages 
Sept: Early contact with, visits to 
organisation commence; Keelty Review 
released; Disbandment of social media 
team announced; Twitter Alerts 
launched 
Nov: Department 
of Community 
Safety disbanded; 
QFES, PSBA 
established 
Dec: Observations formally 
commence; Stradbroke Island 
bushfires; Twitter Alerts available to 
Australian organisations 
 
Jan: Media team 
assumes responsibility 
for social media; Cyclone 
Dylan; first interview 
 
June: PSBA social 
media review 
interviews 
Aug: TC Ita 
interviews 
Oct: Facebook 
launches Safety 
Check 
 
Nov: Brisbane 
“super storm” 
Dec: QFES 
Commissioner 
replaced; PSBA 
social media 
review internally 
released 
Jan: Queensland state 
election, Annastacia 
Palaszczuk becomes 
Premier 
 
Mar: Cyclone 
Nathan; 
Queensland 
Reconstruction 
Authority 
permanent 
Feb: Cyclone 
Marcia 
Apr: National 
Review of 
Warnings and 
Information 
released 
May: Brisbane 
storm, 5 
fatalities 
June: Facebook introduces 
Saved Replies function; 
Ravenshoe café explosion, 2 off-
duty firefighters severely injured; 
Resumed enthusiasm towards 
Instagram in media team 
 
July-Aug: Wrap-up 
interviews; fieldwork 
concludes 
Dec: ARC 
Linkage Project 
concludes 
2014-2015 
storm and 
cyclone 
season: PIC 
added 
Apr: Cyclone Ita 
